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Director: Dr. Adrian Gheorghe
Since the emergence of commercial aviation in the early part of last century, economic 
forces have driven a steadily increasing demand for air transportation. Increasing density 
of aircraft operating in a finite volume of airspace is accompanied by a corresponding 
increase in the risk of collision, and in response to a growing number of incidents and 
accidents involving collisions between aircraft, governments worldwide have developed 
air traffic control systems and procedures to mitigate this risk. The objective of any 
collision risk management system is to project conflicts and provide operators with 
sufficient opportunity to recognize potential collisions and take necessary actions to avoid 
them. It is therefore the assertion of this research that the currency of collision risk 
management is time.
Future Air Traffic Management Systems are being designed around the foundational 
principle of four dimensional trajectory based operations, a method that replaces legacy 
first-come, first-served sequencing priorities with time-based reservations throughout the 
airspace system. This research will demonstrate that if aircraft are to be sequenced in four 
dimensions, they must also be separated in four dimensions.
In order to separate aircraft in four dimensions, time must emerge as the primary tool 
by which air traffic is managed. A functional relationship exists between the time-based 
performance of aircraft, the interval between aircraft scheduled to cross some three
dimensional point in space, and the risk of collision. This research models that relationship 
and presents two key findings. First, a method is developed by which the ability of an 
aircraft to meet a required time of arrival may be expressed as a robust standard for both 
industry and operations. Second, a method by which airspace system capacity may be 
increased while maintaining an acceptable level of collision risk is presented and 
demonstrated for the purpose of formulating recommendations for procedures regulating 
air traffic management methods and industry standards governing performance 
requirements for avionics designed to support trajectory based operations.
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NOMENCLATURE
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast. System that uses GPS-
based transponders to report position and receive position of other 
proximate aircraft.
ATC Air Traffic Control.
CASSIS CTA/ATC System Integration Studies. A series o f flight tests conducted in
Europe to evaluate time of arrival control concepts.
CFR Code of Federal Regulations.
Clearance An instruction offered by an air traffic controller to a pilot to perform a
specific maneuver or function. Once accepted, compliance with the 
instruction becomes compulsary.
Cost Index A metric used by commercial air carriers to quantify total operating cost. It
is the ratio of cost linked to flight time versus fuel cost. Flight time costs 
include costs incurred per flight hour, such as periodic maintenance 
inspections and flight crew expenses.
CTA Controlled Time of Arrival, acronymn commonly used in Europe.
CTOA Controlled Time of Arrival, acronymn commonly used in US.
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency.
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival.
EUROCAE European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment. Develops standards 
for avionics, European counterpart of RTCA.
FAA Federal Aviation Administration.
FMS Flight Management System. Avionics used to calculate aircraft trajectories,
optimize performance, and cross three dimensional points at required times.
GPS Global Positioning System.
HITL Human-in-the-Loop simulation.
IFR Instrument Flight Rules.
KIAS Knots indicated airspeed. Speed historically displayed in aircraft cockpit
based on measurements of static and dynamic pressure.
KCAS Knots calibrated airspeed. KIAS adjusted for gauge errors.
KEAS Knots equivelant airspeed. KCAS adjusted for compressibility of air.
KTAS Knots true airspeed. KEAS adjusted for density of air. Also reflects the
true speed of the aircraft through the air mass.
KGS Knots ground speed. KTAS corrected for the effect of wind. Reflects the
speed of the aircraft over the ground.
Mach An aircraft speed relative to the local speed of sound.
Meter fix A three dimensional point in space used as a flow control point for arrival
traffic to assist in formation of a uniformly spaced sequence of traffic.
NATCA National Air Traffic Controllers Association.
NextGen Title of FAA’s vision for the next generation air traffic management system.
NM Nautical Mile.
RADAR Radio Detection and Ranging.
RNP Required Navigation Performance.
RPM Revenue Passenger Miles.
X
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics. Develops standards for
avionics in US, counterpart of EUROCAE.
RTA Required Time of Arrival.
RTP Required Time Performance. A term proposed in FAA strategic planning
documents referring to a time-based performance metric and developed 
through this research.
SMS Safety Management System.
TET Time Error Tolerance. A user-configurable setting specific to General
Electric Flight Management Systems, with values ranging from 6 to 30 
seconds. The exact influence on the system is proprietary information, but 
in general, lower settings reduce the threshold at which the system will 
correct for expected crossing time errors.
TMA Traffic Management Advisor. This system creates a time-based schedule
of runway threshold crossings at major US airports and calculates an 
associated time-based schedule for meter fix crossings that serve as flow 
control points around the airport for arrival traffic.
TBO Trajectory Based Operations.
TOAC Time of Arrival Control.
3 DP AM Three Dimensional Path Arrival Management, a system used to provide
offset waypoint assignments as a means of increasing distance flown by an










2.1. Evolution of Separation Standards..................................................................... 10
2.2. Trajectory Based Operations...............................................................................14
2.3. Airspeed Expressions...........................................................................................17
2.4. Literature Review................................................................................................ 18




4.1. Collision R isk......................................................................................................49
4.2. Research Motivation............................................................................................54
4.3. Data Sources........................................................................................................ 57
5. SEPARATION FUNCTION DERIVATION...............................................................72
5.1. Collision Risk Modeling......................................................................................72
5.2. Data Analysis....................................................................................................... 77
5.3. Performance Metrics............................................................................................93
5.4. Collision Probabilities....................................................................................... 102
5.5. Interval Analysis................................................................................................ 111
6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH........................................... 119
6.1. Time-Based Performance Metric...................................................................... 119
6.2. Dual Time of Arrival Control Standards.......................................................... 121
6.3. Accuracy in Descending Flight.........................................................................122
6.4. Refining the Time-Based Collision Risk Model............................................ 124
6.5. Revising the logic driving FMS algorithms.....................................................125
REFERENCES....................................................................................................................127
APPENDICES.....................................................................................................................133
APPENDIX A: Olympia Eight Arrival..................................................................... 133
APPENDIX B: 2010 FAA Flight Trial Results........................................................134
APPENDIX C: 2011 FAA Simulation Results.........................................................135
xii
Page
APPENDIX D: 2011 FAA Flight Trial Results........................................................137
APPENDIX E: 2012 FAA Simulation Results.........................................................147




1. Automated and Manual RTA Performance Comparison for CASSIS Flight Trials... 79
2. FY-11 Simulation Crossing Time Error Data Summary...........................................84
3. Time Error Tolerance Performance Data for Simulation..........................................87
4. Comparison of Level vs. Descending Flight Performance........................................89




1. Demand for Air Travel and the Economy........................................................................ 1
2. Projected Demand for Air Transportation.......................................................................2
3. Effect of Adcock Antennas on Traffic Density.............................................................12
4. Research Methods Cube with Creswell’s Traditional Methods.................................. 40
5. Research Method for Development of Separation Functions.......................................44
6. Research Process............................................................................................................. 48
7. Effect of Wind on Separation Distance......................................................................... 52
8. Separation Distance Variations with Equal Time Intervals..........................................56
9. CASSIS I Crossing Time Errors.................................................................................... 59
10. CASSIS II Crossing Time Errors................................................................................... 61
11. Typical Pilot Interface for B737 Aircraft with GE FMS..............................................64
12. Comparison of Ground versus Airborne Automation System Performance...............69
13. Seattle Flight Test Crossing Time Error Distribution................................................... 82
14. FY-11 Simulation Results...............................................................................................85
15. Crossing Time Error for Descending Flight..................................................................91
16. Crossing Time Error for Cruise Flight........................................................................... 93
17. Required Navigation Performance Metrics...................................................................96
18. Example RTP-20 Crossing Time Error Distribution...................................................100
19. Two Alternative RTP-20 Distributions........................................................................ 101
20. Two Aircraft Crossing-Time Error Distributions........................................................107
21. Range of Possibilities for High-Aspect Collision Geometries...................................109
XV
Figure Page
22. Graphic depiction of Possible High-Aspect Collision Times................................... 110
23. Sample Crossing Time Error, Initial Scenario.............................................................115
24. Sample Crossing Time Error, Updated Scenario....................................................... 116
25. Standard Terminal Arrival to Seattle-Tacoma International Airport...........................133
1
1. Introduction
1.1. Air Traffic Demand and Capacity
For decades, demand for air travel in the United States has been closely tied to 
economic factors, and a strong correlation exists between economic metrics such as gross 
domestic product and demand for air travel. The relationship between real gross domestic 
product in billions of dollars and demand for air travel in terms of billions of revenue 
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Figure 1: Demand for Air Travel and the Economy
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While Figure 1 illustrates the historical demand for air travel, future demand is of 
greater interest to air system planners. The Federal Aviation Administration publishes an 
annual forecast of expected demand for air travel, and a recent projection for the coming 
two decades is illustrated by the bar chart shown in Figure 2 (Adapted from FAA, 2014, p. 
43).
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Figure 2: Projected Demand for Air Transportation
The demand for air transportation has more than doubled since the late seventies, and 
it is clear that substantial increases in demand are still expected in the coming decades. 
This is cause for concern as opportunities for investment in infrastructure to support 
growing demand have been nearly exhausted, resulting in frequent delays as demand 
routinely exceeds capacity during peak periods of operation. These delays ultimately result 
in substantial cost to numerous stakeholders. Airlines suffer increased expenses in terms 
of fuel and maintenance related costs, and frequently incur additional flight crew expenses 
as well. The flying public also incurs cost resulting from the increased time required for
3
travel as flights are cancelled, connections are missed, and to some additional degree as air 
travel is avoided due to passenger expectation of such delays. According to a recent study 
estimating the cost of delays in financial terms, the total cost of US air transportation delays 
in 2007 was $32.1 billion (Ball, Barnhart, Dresner, Hansen, Neels, Odoni, Petereson, 
Sherry, Trani, & Zou, 2010). These fiscal costs do not include environmental impacts that 
result from untold amounts of additional carbon-based emissions associated with increased 
combustion of jet fuel during these delays.
A number of initiatives have been implemented in recent years or are being 
implemented to increase system capacity in each of the aviation domains. These domains 
are generally accepted to be en route airspace, terminal airspace, oceanic airspace, and 
airports. In the early part of this century, capacity of the most congested portions of en 
route airspace was effectively doubled by cutting in half the required vertical separation 
between aircraft from 2,000 feet to 1,000 feet between flight level 290 and flight level 410, 
airspace that serves as optimum cruise altitude for most jet aircraft (FAA, 2005). In the 
runway environment, a number of initiatives have been explored to increase the number of 
aircraft that can land on a runway in a given period of time by finding ways in which the 
effects of wake turbulence can be avoided (Bell, 2009). Additionally, new runways have 
been constructed at airports where geographic constraints allow physical expansion, 
resulting in increased system capacity at 16 airports in the US (FAA, 2011, p. 1). However, 
most of the feasible options for increasing capacity through infrastructure expansion and 
airspace restructuring are either in progress today or have already been completed, 
necessitating the introduction of new systems and procedures that allow the density of air 
traffic to be increased within limited volumes of airspace.
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As air carriers increase the number of flights scheduled each year to accommodate 
increasing demand, the number and magnitude of expected delays associated with future 
air traffic operations is also expected to increase. In response, the US has proposed its 
Next Generation Air Traffic Management System, referred to as NextGen, as a new system 
for managing air traffic based on emerging technology and procedural changes. Similar 
efforts are underway in Europe under a parallel program entitled Single European Sky. 
Both of these programs are justified by claims that capacity can be increased to 
accommodate demand by improving efficiency while simultaneously improving safety and 
delivering environmental sustainability. One of the most promising concepts enabling 
development of both systems is the replacement of current “first come, first served” 
methodologies with time-based management of air traffic. An intuitive analogy can be 
drawn between this concept of air traffic management and other time-based scheduling 
problems such as those associated with restaurant management. A restaurant may 
accommodate customers as they arrive, and when demand exceeds capacity, queues 
develop and delays are incurred. In contrast, a restaurant that accepts reservations allows 
customers arriving at a negotiated time to be seated with little or no delay, and it is this 
notion that aviation leaders hope to capitalize on by offering time-based reservations to air 
traffic customers. However, while a time-based reservation system allows delays to be 
reduced for individual patrons, it does nothing to increase the total capacity of the system. 
Thus, at peak periods of operation, some customers will be denied service or offered 
service at other times until the system is saturated, a point at which no further demand will 
be accommodated.
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Over the past several years, numerous studies have been commissioned by the FAA 
to explore the benefits of using time to sequence aircraft. Support systems have been 
developed to assist controllers with scheduling the arrival of aircraft at busy airports, and 
have shown some benefit in reducing the cost of delays by issuing clearances to aircraft 
that allow them to absorb necessary delays during en route portions of their flights. Prior 
to these efforts, delays were routinely incurred at low altitude and in close proximity to 
terminal areas where operating costs, particularly for jet aircraft, are highest. By assigning 
delays further from the arrival airport, the delays can be absorbed at higher altitudes where 
fuel bum rates are lowest, and cost is reduced.
However, changing the location at which delays are incurred does nothing to reduce 
the magnitude of the delays, and only marginal gains have been achieved as a result of 
employing time-based scheduling systems. Instead, they have only served to provide a 
measure of mitigation to the cost of the delays. In order to make significant advancements 
toward achieving the goals of NextGen and Single European Sky, capacity itself must be 
increased. Numerous constraints exist with regard to adding additional capacity to the 
existing airspace system, especially in the vicinity of the world’s most frequent 
destinations, and few alternatives remain for the addition of new airports, additional 
runways at existing airports, or other similar measures that would increase the capacity 
through capital investment. Similarly, airspace in both terminal areas and en route sections 
of the system have been or are in the process of being optimized, leaving little room for 
additional capacity through design efforts. Thus, other methods by which capacity can be 
increased must be considered.
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To achieve an increase in system capacity, the rate of arrivals and departures at 
saturated airports during peak periods of time must be increased. To accomplish this 
objective, the density of the air traffic must be increased such that a greater number of 
aircraft can operate in the same airspace simultaneously. However, arbitrarily reducing the 
distance between aircraft comes at the expense of safety. There are at least two concerns 
that arise with regard to determining safe operating separation between aircraft. The first 
involves encountering wake turbulence effects from preceding aircraft while the second 
involves the potential for collisions.
The specific effect of wake turbulence is beyond the scope of this project, but the 
methods develops herein can easily be adapted to compensate for wake turbulence risk 
mitigation. The focus of this document is to identify a method by which aircraft may be 
separated to achieve desired increases in capacity by increasing traffic density without 
exceeding an acceptable level of collision risk. In short, this paper offers a quantitative 
method for achieving important objectives of NextGen and the Single European Sky.
1.2. Problem Statement
Since the advent of modem air traffic control shortly after World War II, collision 
avoidance has been accomplished by maintaining an adequate distance between aircraft to 
ensure enough time is available to allow for both controller and pilot recognition of 
conflicts and subsequent corrective action to avoid potential collisions. However, today’s 
technology allows development of systems and procedures whereby the underlying 
objective of providing adequate time for collision avoidance can be provided directly 
instead of using a distance-based standard as an approximation for the amount of time that 
is required. The challenge faced by aviation regulatory authorities is that if aircraft are
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sequenced by time, they cannot be separated by distance due to inescapable properties of 
aerospace physics. This study identifies the effect of those properties and proposes new 
methods and metrics by which aircraft sequenced in four dimensions may also be separated 
in four dimensions.
In order to arrive at a time-based separation standard, there are several sub problems 
that must be solved. First, an understanding of the capability with which modem aircraft 
can achieve an assigned crossing time at a specified location must be developed. Any 
aircraft that is assigned a required time of arrival at a point in space will arrive with some 
measurable error that can be expressed in units of time. The magnitude of that potential 
time error will be one of the independent variables in this study. A second independent 
variable is the time interval between aircraft scheduled to cross a three-dimensional point 
in space. As the interval between aircraft is increased, the magnitude of the deviations that 
would be necessary by each aircraft in order to arrive at the same point at the same time 
must necessarily be larger, and the corresponding probability of the aircraft arriving with 
enough error to collide decreases.
The dependent variable will be the probability of collision between aircraft. For any 
point in space, the total probability of collision is equal to the probability of the first aircraft 
being at that point at some time and the probability of the second aircraft being at that same 
point at the same time for every possible arrival time. If the probability of each aircraft 
arriving at the specified place and time is known, it is then possible to calculate the 
probability of collision. The relationship between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable will be expressed via mathematical functions that serve as the heart of
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the collision risk models developed through this research, and are referred to as a separation 
functions throughout this document.
Once a separation function is developed to express the relationship between arrival 
time error, interval, and collision risk, it can then be used as the basis for development of 
recommendations for new standards and flight procedures. At least two objectives will be 
pursued in this regard. First, distributions developed from flight and simulation test results 
will be used as evidence of the capability of aircraft equipped with modem flight 
management systems to achieve scheduled arrival times. From these observations, a 
number of alternatives will be considered with regard to developing a metric by which to 
express the performance of any aircraft as a probabilistic distribution. Subsequently, the 
separation functions developed herein will be used to demonstrate how a minimum interval 
between aircraft can be determined while being constrained to an acceptable probability of 
collision.
1.3. Research Questions
The preceding problem statement is reformulated in this section as three questions this 
research effort attempts to answer. These questions are presented to assist with delineating 
the scope of this research.
• How can the time-based performance of an aircraft be quantified as a metric that 
provides adequate design flexibility while maintaining sufficient control of underlying 
parameters of the error distribution?
• How can the probability of collision be determined for aircraft operating in a time- 
based operational environment?
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• How can the density of air traffic be increased to meet expected demand while 
maintaining an acceptable level of collision risk?
2. Background
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2.1. Evolution o f Separation Standards
In order to fully understand the concepts developed in this study, it is beneficial to first 
understand how air traffic management systems and procedures evolved over the past 
century, beginning with the earliest days of commercial aviation, and continuing through 
present day operations to a reasonably forecastable point in the future. It is especially 
important to understand the origins of distance-based separation standards in order to 
conceptualize the inherent advantages, perhaps even necessity, o f returning to the roots of 
air traffic control, and reverting to a time-based standard.
In the earliest days of aviation, fledgling pilots took to the sky only when visual 
conditions allowed ground reference to be maintained. Due to characteristics of aviation 
physiology that cause human sensory systems to be misled while flying, pilots are not able 
to rely on “seat of the pants” feel to maintain aircraft attitude. As a result, early pilots were 
required to maintain continuous reference to the horizon and terrestrial landmarks both for 
control of the aircraft as well as navigation. As commercial opportunities for aviation 
emerged, demand for technology allowing aircraft to be flown without ground reference 
grew. To satisfy this demand, two of the most influential technological breakthroughs in 
aviation history occurred in the years following World War I.
One of the first revolutionary innovations in aviation was introduced by the Sperry 
Gyroscope Company in England. Based on stabilized three-axis platforms being 
developed for maritime navigation applications, Sperry introduced the first artificial 
horizon known as the “Blind Flying Panel,” providing sufficient attitude information to
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allow pilots to safely fly through clouds, at night, or during periods of low visibility 
(Sullivan, 1963). Once pilots could maintain control of their aircraft without ground 
reference, the ability to navigate came next. Frank Adcock, a British engineer, developed 
a radio direction finding antenna that provided pilots with a method by which to measure 
relative bearing from ground stations (Adcock, 1919). The US Army and Post Office built 
upon this technology and developed ground stations for aerial navigation in 1926, and by 
the 1930’s, pilots were able to navigate by a growing number of radio beacons (Johnson, 
2003).
An unexpected side effect of these technological improvements was a substantial shift 
in the density of air traffic. Prior to the development of ground antennae, pilots flew 
directly from one airport to another, and only during conditions that allowed for other 
aircraft to be seen and avoided. Once instrument navigation became feasible, flight 
operations could be conducted in any visibility conditions, and the number of aircraft flying 
between the limited numbers of radio beacons available for navigation increased local air 
traffic density, leading to a dramatic increase in collision risk. The effect of implementing 
these beacons is illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Effect of Adcock Antennas on Traffic Density
With concern for air traffic safety growing in the mid 1930’s, the US Commerce 
Department created the first air route traffic control centers in Newark, Cleveland, and 
Chicago. Controllers in these centers used maps and blackboards to create models of air 
traffic based on perceptions of aircraft speed, direction of flight, and elapsed time. These 
perceptions were derived from flight plans and the reception of periodic communications 
from aircraft, relayed by various ground stations. The controllers then modeled their 
perceptions by moving miniature airplanes referred to as “shrimp boats” across maps to 
reflect their understanding of position information and to track aircraft progress as that 
information was updated. The Federal Radio Commission appointed ARINC to provide 
essential communications between air carriers and air traffic control, introducing 
capabilities that included phones, radios, and teletypes to receive rapid updates of aircraft 
positions at corresponding times and to relay deconfliction instructions back to pilots 
(ARINC, 2013). Due to the round trip communication time and the positional uncertainty 
associated with navigation accuracy in that era, time-based separation standards were 
introduced to ensure adequate collision avoidance time, and as refinements to
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communication and navigation technology emerged, the standards evolved to reflect the 
incremental changes in capability (NATCA, 2010).
Separation standards experienced a game-changing event during the Battle of Britain 
in 1940 when RADAR was introduced by the Royal Air Force. This new technology 
allowed air traffic controllers to see the relative position and distance between aircraft, but 
not time. As a result, distance-based standards were introduced to approximate existing 
time-based separation requirements. In the US, a high profile collision over the Grand 
Canyon in 1956 prompted the national government to invest heavily in RADAR 
technology, leading to widespread implementation as well as the development of 
complementary technologies such as the transponder (NATCA, 2010). At the same time, 
navigation precision advanced with developments of both ground based and airborne 
navigation improvements. Land based navigation aids such as early low frequency long 
range navigation systems (LORAN), VHF Omni Directional Radio Range (VOR) and the 
military Tactical Air Navigation System (TACAN) all served to steadily improve the 
accuracy of overland navigation (DOT, 2001). Simultaneously, airborne navigational 
capabilities such as inertial navigation systems allowed improved navigation in all phases 
of flight, including oceanic flight where reference to ground stations and RADAR 
surveillance were not possible. These technological improvements both in the air and on 
the ground allowed distance-based separation requirements to evolve until modem 
standards were reached, resulting in current requirements for five nautical miles of 
separation in the en route environment and three nautical miles in comparatively slower 
terminal environments (FAA, 2012).
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2.2. Trajectory Based Operations
Trajectory Based Operations are a cornerstone of future air traffic management 
systems in both Europe and the United States. The concept retains existing requirements 
for precise navigation in three dimensions (latitude, longitude, and altitude), and adds a 
new dimension: time. As systems are developed to enable trajectory based operations, 
regulatory agencies like the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) will be called upon to make decisions with regard to 
regulations governing performance standards for avionics on aircraft, ground based support 
systems, and air traffic management procedures that ensure acceptable levels of collision 
risk, environmental sustainability, and adequate system capacity. Expected increases in 
demand for air travel in the coming decades will require increasing the density of air traffic 
in the US National Airspace System (NAS) and in Europe’s international airspace system 
as well as other airspace systems around the globe. As air traffic density is increased, an 
associated requirement emerges for unprecedented levels of navigation precision in all four 
dimensions if desired capacity increases are to be achieved in concert with desired levels 
of safety. To ensure today’s systems are developed with the precision necessary to execute 
tomorrow’s operations, it is essential that flight standards and regulations be equally 
precise in prescribing performance requirements.
In the United States, the FAA has embarked on a multi-decade capital investment 
program to develop NextGen, and this system is founded largely on trajectory based 
operational concepts. European Union aviation regulation is provided by a parallel 
organization called the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA, 2012), and its partner 
organization, Eurocontrol, which is pursuing similar time-based initiatives under the Single
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European Sky program (Eurocontrol, 2012). The seemingly revolutionary concept of 
trajectory based operations that both of these systems depend on effectively requires a 
reversion from two-dimensional surveillance and distance-based separation procedures 
back to the origins of air traffic management and a return to a methodology employing 
time-based sequencing and separation of aircraft.
Since the advent and refinement RADAR and radio communication technologies in 
the mid-twentieth century, air traffic control in both Europe and the US has evolved as a 
system to increase the efficiency and safety of air traffic operations. The systems are based 
primarily on an air traffic controller’s ability to observe the position of aircraft either 
visually or electronically. The routing and separation of aircraft is accomplished by 
orchestrating aircraft movements through the issuance of instructions called clearances 
that are designed to maximize capacity while ensuring an adequate distance between 
aircraft is maintained in various operating environments. A potential change associated 
with future air traffic management is the transfer of a significant portion of the 
responsibility for sequencing and separation to pilots supported by avionics automation 
capabilities. This change requires aircraft to arrive at various points in space not only with 
currently required positional accuracy in three dimensions, but additionally at a specified 
time. This method of air traffic management is commonly referred to as Four Dimensional 
Trajectory Based Operations (4D TBO).
A number of support systems and procedures have been developed in an effort to 
sequence aircraft by time, and several tests of these new capabilities have been executed 
on both continents. In the cockpit, a number of leading avionics manufacturers, including 
Honeywell, General Electric, and Thales have added a required time of arrival capability
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to their flight management systems, allowing the aircraft auto-pilot system to be guided by 
commands that adjust speed such that the aircraft arrives at a three-dimensional fix at the 
time specified by the flight crew. In en route air traffic control centers, the Traffic 
Management Advisor (TMA) system automatically schedules runway threshold crossing 
times for arrivals as well as associated crossing times at flow control points referred to as 
meter fixes. However, most tests conducted to evaluate the potential of time-based systems 
have met with limited success or failure in terms of demonstrating an implementable 
solution to safety and capacity challenges expected in the coming decades. Existing 
literature describing the research to date indicates the limiting factors are most often 
attributed to an inability to maintain adequate separation distance between aircraft when 
sequencing them by time. The lack of progress has prompted the FAA to pursue alternative 
approaches that appear to be more achievable, and substantial investment is being made to 
determine the requirements and capability necessary for ground systems to issue speed 
commands in an attempt to deliver aircraft to various flow control points at desired times 
(Levitt & Weitz, 2011). This initiative, referred to as interval management, includes two 
subsets of operations. Flight Interval Management (FIM) is a cockpit technology that 
allows aircraft to modulate speed to maintain a constant interval between sequential 
aircraft, but virtually abandons the objectives of previous time-based sequencing concepts 
defined in strategic documents. Its counterpart, Ground Interval Management (GIM), is 
based on ground systems estimating aircraft performance and environmental conditions 
and then issuing speed commands to aircraft in order to deliver them to desired three 
dimensional points at scheduled times. However, substantial evidence has been collected 
through flight and simulation testing of such concepts, and the evidence indicates that due
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to unsolvable uncertainty associated with environmental parameters such as wind, 
temperature, pressure, and operator-dependent aircraft performance limitations, it is not 
feasible for ground stations to issue speed commands with the frequency and fidelity 
necessary to achieve desired objectives (Moertl, Arthur, Pollack, Stein, & Zheng, 2009).
The theory developed in this study is that the failures experienced in various trajectory 
based operations experiments have been, at least in part, the result of attempting to 
sequence aircraft using a new time-based methodology while attempting to manage 
collision risk using legacy distance-based separation criteria. Therefore, the position of 
this paper is to advocate a migration of air traffic management philosophy toward trajectory 
based operations that not only sequence aircraft by time, but separate them by time as well.
2.3. Airspeed Expressions
Terminology used to describe the speed of an aircraft is important when considering 
time versus distance-based criteria for separation. The speed of an aircraft in flight is 
expressed in nautical miles per hour, or knots, but important characteristics of aerospace 
physics requires airspeed to be described in several different ways. An understanding of 
the differences between various airspeed expressions as well as their application is 
important to the arguments that follow. One of the oldest and most commonly used 
airspeed measurement processes compares dynamic air pressure measured by pitot tubes 
and static ports on the exterior of the aircraft, and is referred to as indicated airspeed, or 
more formally, knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). This measurement has historically been 
the value displayed to the pilot in the cockpit. When this value is corrected for gauge 
errors, the result is referred to as calibrated airspeed (KCAS), and today is commonly 
displayed in modem aircraft equipped with air data computers that automatically account
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for these errors. When calibrated airspeed is corrected for the compressibility of air, the 
result is a value called equivalent airspeed (KEAS). At low airspeeds, the differences 
between KIAS, KCAS, and KEAS are typically negligible. As altitude increases and the 
density of air decreases, yet another airspeed value can be expressed to quantify the speed 
the aircraft travels through the air mass. This speed is referred to as true airspeed (KTAS). 
The air mass itself is constantly in motion, and adjusting true airspeed for the influence of 
wind results in a value that is of great importance to both navigation and air traffic control, 
that being ground speed (KGS), the speed at which the aircraft is traveling over the earth’s 
surface. Ground Speed also provides an opportunity for common reference as it is the 
speed reported by the Global Positioning System, and can be approximated by air traffic 
control systems through measurement of the change in observed position over time. To 
complete a summary of air speed expressions, one final value should be mentioned. At 
very high speeds aircraft often express speed as a fraction of the local speed of sound. This 
value is referred to as Mach number (M) and has important aeronautical engineering 
properties with regard to the design and limitations of the airframe.
2.4. Literature Review
A review of the available literature in the area of time-based air traffic management 
(ATM) reveals several important insights. First, there is virtually no discussion or 
investigation of the influence of aerospace physics on the amount of separation that exists 
between aircraft that are sequenced via time-based schedules, leading to a conclusion that 
this topic has yet to be explored in depth. Further, while many documents assert that future 
air traffic control systems will need to ensure an acceptable level of safety, few researchers 
define what this would mean in quantitative terms or how the desired level of safety would
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be achieved. Surprisingly, while there has been little focus on safety metrics, suggestions 
have nonetheless been published with regard to performance specifications for systems that 
are necessary to enable the future vision of trajectory based operations, including its safety. 
However, these specifications have been stated as single parameter, or a “bookend” 
standard that is not robust enough to ensure the performance of the airspace system will 
meet the stated objectives. In fact, unexpected consequences of initially proposed 
standards are possible even if vendors meet design specifications and provide independent 
testing to validate compliance of their products with the currently envisioned standards. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly in terms of the justification of the research proposed 
herein, while multiple studies have been conducted to assess the feasibility and value of 
sequencing aircraft by time, all of the research to date has been based on an assumption of 
retaining distance-based separation requirements similar to those that have been in place 
since the 1950’s.
The literature cited in this review is derived from two primary sources:
(1) Documents published by various regulatory organizations, reviewed to establish 
existing or envisioned policy with regard to air traffic management. These include:
• US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
• European Aviation Safety Administration (EASA)
• Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA)
• European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE)
• Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)
• Eurocontrol.
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(2) Journal articles, conference proceedings, and test reports that describe related research 
regarding the development of the NextGen, Trajectory Based Operations (TBO), Required 
Time of Arrival (RTA), merging (or sequencing) and spacing, and aircraft collision 
probability.
The literature is reviewed by topic under the following broad categories:
• Articles that describe the evolution of distance-based standards in parallel with the 
development of RADAR and radio technology
• Documents outlining the vision for a future air traffic management system
• Articles describing controlled time of arrival studies
• Articles describing interval management studies
• Articles discussing the results of controlled or required time of arrival flight tests
• Articles presenting methods of determining collision probability.
The vast majority of the experimentation conducted to date has focused on the en route 
phase of commercial aircraft flight, including transition to the terminal phase of flight, and 
therefore the majority of the documentation reviewed describes operations within these 
domains. However, the methods developed herein are equally applicable to all phases of 
flight. Additionally, General Aviation (GA) operations, typically consisting of light 
civilian aircraft being flown privately, have not yet been a focus of time-based air traffic 
management research, and thus no reference to this category of aircraft is cited in this study. 
However, the methods of time-based separation developed in this research are applicable 
to future general aviation operations conducted under applicable instrument flight rules.
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2.4.1. Historical Perspective
In order to fully understand the concepts developed in this study, it is helpful to review 
literature describing the history of air traffic management systems and procedural 
evolution. It is especially important to understand the origins of distance-based separation 
standards in order to understand arguments supporting a reversion to a time-based standard. 
The National Air Traffic Controllers Association provides an excellent overview of the 
history of air traffic control in a presentation format on their website (NATCA, 2010). 
Another brief explanation of the development of air traffic control, focusing on objectives, 
is included in a NASA document proposing a new method of separation referred to as 
Autonomous Flight Rules (Wing & Cotton, 2011). A somewhat dated, but still relevant 
historical article describing development of gyroscopic technology by the Sperry 
Corporation in the early 1900’s is also helpful in establishing a historical framework with 
regard to the evolution of flight instruments and the need for air traffic control as aircraft 
developed the ability to fly in low visibility conditions (Sullivan, 1963). Similarly, a series 
of three articles published in 2003 editions of the Journal of Air Transportation describe in 
detail the origins of aeronautical communication, navigation, and surveillance systems 
(Johnson, 2003). Finally, one of the most comprehensive documents available describing 
many of the historical developments of early 20th century air traffic control is authored by 
one of the founding fathers of air traffic management, Glen A. Gilbert. Published in the 
early 1970’s, his description of the development of the Air Traffic Control System is an 
original account of the system’s history as viewed by one of its earliest operators (Gilbert, 
1973). Together, these documents help to illustrate how the amount of time required to
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recognize and avoid collisions has been provided by ensuring a measurable distance exists 
between aircraft under RADAR control.
Equally as important to understanding the past is to have a realistic expectation o f the 
future. Two documents produced by the FAA attempt to project the demand for air travel 
in the coming decades as well as the anticipated level of investment the country is willing 
to make in order to meet that demand. In its annual Aerospace Forecast, the FAA projects 
a steady growth in the demand for air travel in the coming decades, with an increase from 
approximately 800 million passengers in 2012 to 1.2 billion passengers embarking by 2030 
(FAA, 2013a). To support this increased demand, Congressional budget projections 
indicate a corresponding increase in financial investment. Over the next five years of that 
period, the FAA Capital Investment Plan calls for expenditures of $2.78 billion in 2014, 
gradually increasing to $3 billion by 2018 (FAA, 2013b).
2.4.2. N EXTG EN and Trajectory Based Operations
The vision for US air traffic management in the coming decades is described in several 
documents. The highest level document addressing NextGen is published by the 
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, and is called “Destination 2025” to 
highlight the agency’s goal of implementing a new system of air traffic management by 
that time (FAA, 2011). A more detailed description of specific elements of this plan can 
be found in the NextGen Concept o f  Operations, which presents eight key concepts 
associated with the implementation of this new system. Among these is Trajectory Based 
Operations, defined in the document as a method that “dynamically adjusts a flight path in 
space (longitude, latitude, altitude) and time using a known position and intent; more
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accurately allowing the decrease in separation and increase in National Airspace System 
capacity” (JPDO, 2010, p. 3).
A closely related document is a report published by the JPDO regarding Trajectory 
Based Operations. This document provides detailed analysis of existing capabilities and 
overviews of implementation challenges that are directly related to this study. The first 
involves flight performance of avionics systems, and recognizes that “today’s avionics 
were not built for TBO” (JPDO, 2011, p. 92). It goes on to acknowledge that different 
algorithms produce different performance, and a need is envisioned for common avionics 
performance standards for manufacturers of both avionics and ground based air traffic 
management automation systems. Another portion of this document focuses on TBO 
safety, and the discussion provides an indication of the current mindset with regard to 
safety. The document states that “One objective of TBO is to increase safety to meet the 
increase in traffic, reduction in separation, and greater use of automation to manage traffic” 
(JPDO, 2011, p. 99). This statement provides insight into the common understanding 
among today’s air traffic control community that distance-based standards will continue to 
be relied upon for future separation, and subtly acknowledging that with an increase in 
traffic, there will be a necessary reduction in the distance between aircraft in order to 
achieve capacity goals. Notably absent is discussion of a new method of separation, such 
as one in which a time-based standard is developed for the separation of aircraft. Finally, 
this document mentions a new concept, referred to as “Required Time Performance 
(RTP),” where “the objective is to meet the required time with a precision consistent with 
the density of traffic” (JPDO, 2011, p. 104). This statement once again provides insight 
into the nature of the current thinking regarding time-based operations, and reflects an
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arrival mentality whereby the system is considered from the perspective of an arrival 
facility. Specifically, the notion that accuracy requirements increase as aircraft get closer 
to their destination is expressed, potentially overlooking requirements for accuracy that 
may exist even in low density traffic environments, such as jet route crossing points in high 
altitude en route sectors or merge points between jet routes as traffic arriving from 
numerous origination points experience a funnel effect en route to meter fixes. 
Additionally, no consideration is given to aerospace physics and the influence of air 
density, temperature, and wind, all of which may exert significant influence on the system 
and result in requirement variations as crossing altitudes vary vertically.
The issue of safety is one that cannot be overlooked when proposing changes to the 
National Airspace System. The methods by which safety risk must be assessed whenever 
such changes are made to the US National Airspace System are outlined in the FAA Air 
Traffic Organization Safety Management System Manual (FAA, 2008a). This document 
provides detailed methodologies for identifying hazards that may be introduced when 
changes are made, determining the likelihood of hazards being realized, and the severity 
of the potential outcomes. A particularly relevant portion of the document provides 
guidance for determining the acceptable probability for any catastrophic event, such as a 
mid-air collision between two aircraft (FAA, 2008a, p. 42). A closely related document is 
the Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions, which provides additional 
detail regarding the safety requirements for systems being developed for use in support of 
air traffic management operations (FAA, 2008b).
The numerous government-produced documents available clearly identify the 
objective of using trajectory based operations as a platform for the nation’s next generation
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air traffic control system, but while time-based sequencing alternatives are discussed, there 
is no mention of using time for separation of aircraft. Instead, all references to flight safety 
and separation assume the use of existing or modified distance-based standards. The next 
section further investigates literature related to the use of time to sequence aircraft by 
assigning arrival times.
2.4.3. Controlled or Required Time o f Arrival
Controlled Time of Arrival (CTOA) procedures are not included as standard operating 
procedure either in the United States or in Europe, and therefore, there are not yet flight 
standards in place to govern their operational use. However, both European and US 
aviation standards development organizations have suggested parameters that must be met 
regarding arrival control parameters. The European Organization for Civil Aviation 
Equipment (EUROCAE), and its US counterpart RTCA, have released documents that 
prescribe requirements for industry that currently serve as the basis for evaluation of 
current capability. For example, in a standards document published by RTCA, while a 
time of arrival control function is not mandated, it stipulates that if one does exist, it “shall 
control the time of arrival at a specified lateral fix in the flight plan with a 95% accuracy 
of 30 seconds” (RTCA, 2003, p. E53). This document has been updated since its original 
publication, and additional updates are anticipated to address time of arrival control 
standards in more detail.
Several studies have been conducted to investigate theories that suggest efficiency 
benefits can be achieved through a process of controlling aircraft arrival time. One of the 
first such studies was presented in Europe, and discussed the utility of sequencing aircraft 
by time in an attempt to reduce controllers’ workload (Graham, Hoffmann, Pusch, &
26
Zeghal, 2003). The general recommendation of the study was to sequence aircraft in the 
en route phase by time to establish a more uniform flow of traffic for controllers in the 
terminal environment. This study was cited by a group of researchers at the NASA Ames 
Research Center, who conducted experiments to explore the possibility of implementing 
such a process. Notably, Prevot reported results with regards to the delivery accuracy of a 
modem flight management system (FMS), and this is the earliest available study to report 
usage of an experimental Required Time of Arrival (RTA) function on an FMS (Prevot, 
Lee, Callantine, Smith, & Palmer, 2003). An interesting feature of this study was the 
objective of the data collection which was to measure the time between aircraft crossing a 
meter fix. The group used a ground based system, the Traffic Management Advisor 
(TMA), to calculate the amount of time in seconds that should be assigned to aircraft in 
order to achieve a resulting distance between aircraft expressed in nautical miles, with 7 
nautical miles being the desired separation for their test. This variable is selectable in TMA 
via an adjustable value referred to as a “Stream Class Setting,” and a detailed explanation 
of the method by which a desired separation distance is achieved by converting the 
requirement to a time-based separation is provided in a NASA document describing 
functionality of the “Dynamic Planner” (Wong, 2000, p. 35). In hindsight, this is an 
interesting development as the team clearly demonstrated an awareness of a relationship 
between time and distance, but still chose to use distance as the metric by which separation 
was judged. A note in their results section foreshadows results obtained in future studies, 
including this dissertation. It states “Aircraft less than 58 seconds apart had less than five 
NM lateral separation and were therefore delivered at different altitudes to avoid the 
separation loss” (Prevot, et al., 2003, p. 4) With regard to delivery accuracy, the Prevot
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study reported a mean accuracy of 1.43 seconds more than their desired interval with a 
standard deviation of 18.75 seconds. One other note from the Prevot study is that aircraft 
were required to cross the arrival meter fix at 11,000 feet and 250 KIAS, a condition that 
is not specifically discussed in the study, but is noteworthy as different altitude and airspeed 
combinations at the meter fix influence the results of similar subsequent studies.
In 2007, David De Smedt and Gerhard Berz published results of FMS simulation 
testing, pointing out variances in system performance levels and providing summary data 
on overall accuracy of the systems in use at the time (De Smedt & Berz, 2007). This study 
included substantial investigation of the effect of wind on the achievability of an RTA 
clearance, and documented a conclusion that in order to achieve desired distance-based 
spacing requirements, “FMS algorithms would need to be robust enough to consistently 
achieve arrival times within a small fraction of a minute -  possibly less than the current 
state of the art of +/- 6 seconds” (De Smedt & Berz, 2007, pp. l.D.5-8). However, there is 
no further justification or defense of the suggestion that a 6 second accuracy level is 
achievable either currently or in the future. It appears that these researchers assume that 
the lowest time error tolerance setting on the General Electric FMS, 6 seconds, would result 
in a maximum crossing time error of six seconds. However, later testing has demonstrated 
that this is not the case.
Another analysis performed by De Smedt, working with Joel Klooster of General 
Electric (GE) Aviation Systems, a major manufacturer of Flight Management Systems, 
stated an objective of evaluating the distance between aircraft sequenced by time at a meter 
fix. The study, which included over 30,000 simulation events, asserted a primary benefit 
of using RTA is more efficient sequencing and spacing at a metering fix, reducing the
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variance of aircraft arrival times over that fix (Klooster & De Smedt, 2011). The 
experiment was designed to evaluate the frequency with which separation losses, defined 
as less than 5 NM separation and less than 1000 feet vertical separation, occur between 
pairs of aircraft assigned to cross the meter fix at 8,000 feet with a 90 second time interval 
scheduled between them. After observing initial disappointing results, the test was re-run 
with a 120 second interval. The results indicate that approximately five percent o f the 
aircraft pairs suffered separation losses (Klooster & De Smedt, 2011) with a 90 second 
interval, and 2.5% when the interval was increased to 120 seconds. The study did not 
consider the influence of the comparatively low meter fix crossing altitude of 8,000 feet on 
the results, and all discussion of separation is based on current distance-based standards. 
The study goes on to recommend development of a complex support tool to alert controllers 
to situations that may result in less than 5 NM of separation, effectively conceding that 
controller intervention will be necessary to achieve acceptable collision risk levels if 
distance-based standards are maintained.
2.4.4. Interval Management
Another approach to sequencing aircraft using time has been proposed. In contrast to 
using time for sequencing and separation, interval management concepts focus on using a 
variety of systems to deliver speed guidance to aircraft in an effort to deliver them to meter 
fixes at scheduled times while maintaining a constant distance or time between aircraft 
through cockpit-based applications. This subject is briefly reviewed as efforts in this area 
may complement, or potentially replace, separation objectives currently associated with 
trajectory based operations.
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The NASA Langley Research Center has tested a time-based airborne inter-arrival 
spacing tool that capitalizes on the emergence of Automatic Dependent Surveillance -  
Broadcast (ADS-B) to maintain a constant time between arrival aircraft. The tool, 
Advanced Terminal Area Approach Spacing (AT A AS), computes speed commands for the 
aircraft to maintain a desired time interval behind another aircraft. The stated objective of 
the tool is to allow aircraft to vary speeds to reduce excess spacing that occurs in traffic 
streams (Lohr, Oseguera-Lohr, Abbott, & Capron, 2003), and the tool shows promise, 
delivering a mean accuracy of less than 1 second more than the desired interval with an 8 
second standard deviation. However, a number of challenges are noted in the document, 
including an accordion effect as aircraft speed oscillates in an effort to maintain spacing. 
While a number of benefits of using this tool are envisioned, no documentation exists to 
report demonstration of these benefits or to provide evidence that they are achievable. 
However, it may be a valuable tool to enhance the ability of aircraft to maintain a time- 
based interval in a TBO environment.
A similar study was conducted by the MITRE Corporation in cooperation with United 
Parcel Service at the Louisville, KY International Airport. The test evaluated an Airline 
Based En Route Sequencing and Spacing (ABESS) tool, designed to predict the time of 
arrival at a meter fix, and then issue speed commands to aircraft in an effort to achieve a 
uniform separation between arriving aircraft (Moertl, et al., 2009). The concept proved 
unsuccessful as errors exceeded an average of 1 minute on 50% of the test days, an 
unacceptable level of variability.
While new applications of time-based intervals such as the preceding two examples 
have recently been tested, the concept of using time to separate aircraft is not a new idea,
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nor is it only a relic of aviation’s early history. In fact, the majority of the planet’s skies 
currently employ this method of separation as it is the primary means of deconflicting 
trans-oceanic flights that operate in non-radar environments. Pilots make position reports 
to oceanic controllers via HF radio, or via digital data link systems, reporting the time they 
crossed a specific latitude and longitude as well as a projection of the time they will cross 
a future point on their flight plan. Beginning with the first trans-Atlantic flights in 1919, 
overwater navigation systems have included inherent inaccuracies as methods of 
determining position evolved from dead reckoning to celestial navigation, and eventually 
to the use of inertial navigation systems. However, even advanced inertial systems suffered 
from position errors significant enough to require excessive amounts of time between 
aircraft, making application of the concept in radar environments infeasible due to lack of 
efficiency. Of note, in a 2011 article, Ryoto Mori suggests methods by which collision risk 
may be calculated between aircraft separated by time on oceanic routes, and suggests the 
amount of time currently required between flights may be safely reduced. Additional 
collision risk modeling documents are described in a subsequent section. The objectives 
and underlying assumptions behind Mori’s work are different from those of this study, but 
he clearly identifies a mathematical relationship between time interval and collision 
probability (Mori, 2011).
Another paper, presented at the Integrated Communications Navigation and 
Surveillance Conference in 2012, summarized data obtained through flight and simulation 
testing of the RTA function of GE Flight Management Systems used on board Alaska 
Airlines Boeing 737 aircraft. The paper discusses relevant aerospace physics concepts that 
influence the amount of distance that results when aircraft are separated by time at various
31
altitudes. The paper goes on to develop a probability distribution from flight and 
simulation test samples, and suggests avenues by which standards for sequencing and 
separation might be developed to achieve acceptable risk levels (Bell, 2012). However, 
the method of determining collision probability presented in that paper is iterative in nature 
and limited to a determination of the point at which maximum collision probability is 
observed rather than total probability of collision.
Finally, the United States Navy uses time to separate aircraft in order to achieve 
precise intervals between fixed wing arrivals to aircraft carriers. A Cold War era 
operational requirement to recover aircraft at sea with no emissions from radar or radio 
forced development of a time-based system of sequencing and separating aircraft that 
optimized recovery efficiency in an effort to minimize the time the aircraft carrier was 
required to steam into the prevailing wind. The procedures for accomplishing this are 
delineated in the Aircraft Carrier Naval Aviation Training and Operating Procedures 
Standardization (CV NATOPS) document, portions of which are re-printed in individual 
aircraft flight manuals. However, these documents are not publicly available.
2.4.5. Flight Tests
In addition to documents developing the theory of time-based operations and 
simulations, several flight tests and simulations have been performed by the FAA and 
Eurocontrol to evaluate the performance of modem flight management systems as well as 
the ability of aircraft to cross a three dimensional fix at a specified time. The published 
reports of these tests will be briefly reviewed in this section, and a more thorough review 
of the data collected during these tests as well as its application to this research is presented 
in Chapter 4.
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Two recent flight trials have been conducted in Europe and two additional flight 
demonstrations of a similar nature have been conducted in the US. In each of these tests, 
aircraft were assigned crossing times at various arrival fixes, and data was collected with 
regard to the actual crossing times achieved by the aircraft. In Europe, the tests were 
conducted by the CTA/ATC System Integration Studies (CASSIS) program, and featured 
a variety of aircraft and flight management systems. These aircraft included Boeing 737 
variants with a modem GE FMS, Airbus A321 and A330 with a Honeywell Pegasus FMS, 
and McDonnell Douglas MD-80, which does not include an FMS with RTA functionality, 
but instead features only an estimated time of arrival (ETA) function, requiring pilots to 
manually adjust speed to meet timing requirements. The US flight trials consisted entirely 
of Boeing 737 aircraft equipped with a GE FMS.
The CASSIS program outlined results in two reports, one for each of the flight trials. 
In the first trial, data was captured on 308 arrivals to Stockholm Arlanda Airport, and 
results were summarized as follows:
The results show that aircraft equipped with the most advanced Flight 
Management Systems were able to meet an assigned time with 30 second 
accuracy in 88% of the CASSIS trials. Even MD80 pilots who adjusted 
speed manually to meet a CTA could do so with 30 second accuracy in 73% 
of the case.” (Swedavia, 2009, p. 6)
Another interesting and relevant result is captured in tabular format, expressing the 
numeric accuracy of the various aircraft involved in the testing. Airbus aircraft, using a 
Honeywell FMS, tended to be early with a mean crossing time of 8.33 seconds early. In 
contrast, the GE FMS on the 737 aircraft tended to arrive late, with a mean crossing time
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of 1.1 seconds late. It is also interesting to note that the manually piloted MD-80 aircraft 
also demonstrated a tendency to arrive early, but with much greater variance (Swedavia, 
2009).
The second CASSIS trial results, once again evaluating the performance of Stockholm 
arrivals, were summarized by stating “90% met their assigned time with 30 second 
accuracy and 97% met their CTA with 60 second accuracy” (Eurocontrol, 2010, p. 5). 
Once again, differences with regard to the proprietary FMS systems existed, showing a 
tendency for the Airbus and manually flown MD-80 aircraft to arrive earlier than the 737, 
and substantially higher variance in manually flown arrivals than those controlled by an 
FMS (Eurocontrol, 2010).
Similarly, flight trials in the US were reported using a series of categorical outcomes 
based on a 20 second performance measure. There is no explanation provided for use of a 
this measure, but flights that crossed the assigned fix within 20 seconds were considered 
successful, while those that were outside of that tolerance were considered failures. In the 
comparatively limited 2010 flight trial, 92% of the 38 arrivals to Seattle, WA met the 20 
second tolerance, and 94.7% arrived within 30 seconds (Smith, 2011). The second flight 
trial was considerably more robust, with 595 arrivals completing RTA crossings. Of that 
sample, 86.4% crossed within 20 seconds and 96.6% crossed within 30 seconds (Wynnyk 
& Gouldey, 2012).
The consistent theme of documented flight trials involving controlled time of arrival 
experiments is an identical method of evaluation that involves measuring aircraft 
performance against an arbitrary standard, foregoing the opportunity to fit the data to a 
continuous distribution in favor of treating each arrival as an independent Bernoulli trial.
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If this method of testing and data reporting is used by manufacturers of flight management 
systems for the purpose of demonstrating compliance with standards, unexpected 
consequences may result as demonstrated in recent literature (Bell, Gheorghe, & Hester, 
2013).
2.4.6. Collision Risk Modeling
Few researchers over the past half century have attempted to quantify airborne 
collision probability through analytic methods. Airborne collisions are rare events, and 
due to their infrequent nature, it is generally not feasible to assess collision probability 
through observation of the frequency of events, including those observed through 
simulation due to the dependency of simulation results on error distributions used in their 
formulation. Due to the complexity of formulating a three-dimensional stochastic collision 
model, most efforts to quantify collision probability have been attempted by 
mathematicians who are forced to make tradeoffs between the utility of the model as a tool 
that can be understood and employed by aviation regulatory authorities, and limitations 
that result from reliance on a variety of underlying assumptions that serve to simplify the 
problem.
One of the seminal works in aircraft collision probability determination was authored 
by British mathematician P. G. Reich. His article dealing with separation standards was a 
follow on to a series of papers he published in 1964 dealing with separation standards for 
the North Atlantic, and originally published in three parts by the Journal of Navigation in 
1966. With virtually no other significant work published in this area during the three 
decades that followed, it was republished in its entirety in 1997 by the same Journal. 
Reich’s influence on subsequent articles is clear, with even the most recent articles on
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collision risk citing Reich’s original papers. Indeed, the objectives of this research parallel 
those of Reich’s original work, which are in his words, “to set out the basic requirements 
for definitive estimates of collision risk; that is to say, estimates which are meant to 
influence choice of procedural separation standards or to specify the quality of navigation 
which is needed for given standards to be safe” (Reich, 1966, p. 437).
However, Reich’s methods, and those who have followed his initial assumptions, are 
not as applicable to 21st century trajectory based operations in which time rather than 
distance is used to manage air traffic. The premise of Reich’s calculations is that collision 
risk arises from unintended deviations in aircraft position. He introduces a box of airspace 
surrounding an aircraft that he refers to as a proximity shell, and asserts that if one aircraft 
remains clear of another’s proximity shell, neither aircraft will be exposed to a collision 
risk. His logical development of a model effectively asserts that collision risk is a function 
of the navigational position error expressed in units of distance from intended position, and 
calculations are based on limiting cases of error probability distributions. These 
distributions arise due to the inability of 1960’s researchers to gather data regarding the 
true position of an aircraft versus the position estimated by navigators, a drawback that led 
Reich to view the development of accurate probability distributions as an intractable 
problem. Therefore, in the absence of data from which probability distributions could be 
formulated, he set an upper bound on position error probabilities to ensure a conservative 
estimate of collision risk.
Reich also presents seven rules for the development of separation standards that are as 
valid today as they were when first authored. Of particular interest is Reich’s seventh rule, 
in which he states “a requirement which is almost self-evident, but seldom met: Estimates
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should be presented in a form suitable for executive use” (Reich, 1966, p. 446). It is the 
intent of this dissertation to hold true to that rule.
Reich’s paper and model serve as the basis for collision risk determination in nearly 
all subsequent efforts. As an example, Qu Yuling and Han Songchen of Nanjing University 
in China published an article proposing a modification of Reich’s model to account for 
variable distances between aircraft tracks (Yuling & Songchen, 2010). In 1979, D. A. Hsu 
attempted to explain navigation position variances and apply the resulting distribution to 
Reich’s model (Hsu, 1979). He followed that article by proposing a method by which 
collision probability at intersections could be calculated, once again using a position error 
distribution (Hsu, 1981).
No authors have been as widely published on the subject of collision probability than 
mathematician L. M. B. C. Campos of the University of Lisbon’s School of Engineering 
and his colleague, Professor JMG Marques of the Lusofona University, also in Lisbon. 
Campos and Marques have published numerous articles relating to the calculation of 
aircraft collision probabilities and frequently cite Reich in their work. Only a sampling of 
their publications is reviewed in this section.
A 2001 article by Campos on the probability of collision of aircraft drew upon Reich’s 
intuition that collision risk is a function of navigational position error (Campos, 2001). The 
following year, Campos teamed with Marques to publish an article suggesting aircraft 
separation safety metrics in which they develop a root mean square error (rms) that serves 
as an important parameter in their calculations, both in this initial article and numerous 
subsequent articles (Campos & Marques, 2002a). That same year, a similar article focused 
on the use of collision probabilities as the basis for separation standards (Campos &
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Marques, 2002b). Of note, in 2007, when separation standards in the oceanic region were 
being reviewed to allow aircraft to climb and descend with reduced separation standards, 
they published an article addressing collision risk associated with this operation (Campos 
& G. Marques, 2007). Among numerous other publications, one recent publication is of 
particular interest to this work. Their 2011 paper discussing the probability of collision for 
crossing aircraft addresses high aspect collision probabilities, demonstrating an 
enhancement to baseline collision risk models that assess the collision risk of aircraft 
operating along a common track (Campos & Marques, 2011). However, while Campos 
and Marques have emerged as the leading experts in the field of aviation collision risk, 
their work is still fundamentally based on Reich’s 1966 paper, and depend entirely on 
distance-based metrics.
As future air traffic management concepts inevitably migrate toward time as the 
governing tool for sequencing and separating aircraft, distance-based methods that depend 
on quantification of position errors become less relevant. When Reich first developed his 
collision risk model, navigational position error was the dominant uncertainty in aircraft 
navigation, and Reich hypothesized that collision risk was primarily a result of this 
uncertainty. However, his model has never been validated, despite the numerous academic 
publications that have expanded on his initial theories and regulatory guidance that is based 
on his results and those of his successors. The advent of satellite navigation has 
revolutionized aircraft navigation and resulted in unprecedented accuracy levels in both 
vertical and horizontal azimuths. Aircraft position can now be determined with a degree 
of accuracy that makes position errors far less likely in virtually any collision risk 
calculation, and in subsequent sections, this research echoes assertions of international
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governance documents that the improvements in navigational accuracy actually create an 
inherent increase in collision risk rather than the expected decrease (ICAO, 1998). As a 
result, it is concluded that conversion to a time-based collision risk model for use as the 




Research methods supporting aviation safety studies are typically governed by 
research paradigms that fall into one of two categories, described as either quantitative or 
qualitative methods by authors of research design such as Creswell and Leedy. 
Alarmingly, evaluation of numerous safety assessments and research reports indicates that 
while research designed to develop air traffic control systems is primarily accomplished 
through quantitative methods, safety analyses performed by the FAA are largely qualitative 
in nature, and depend heavily on estimates of relevant values by subject matter experts who 
rely on intuition developed through experience applying legacy air traffic control 
paradigms.
In contrast to most of the existing literature, the approach to this study does not follow 
either of these traditional methods. According to Leedy, if the research does not fall into 
one of the two defined categories of research, it must be a mixed method approach that 
draws from each of the available methods such that “all aspects substantially contribute to 
a single, greater whole” (Leedy, 2013, p. 258). However, this research is not simply a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, and a deeper understanding of the 
methods applied, the canons associated with those methods, and justification of their use 
is necessary to build a foundation from which the research can be discussed, critiqued, and 
defended. To that end, the research methods will be described by investigating three 
divisions of research: the mode of reasoning, the ontological philosophy, and the
epistemological approach.
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Each division of research includes a spectrum along which the research falls, with each 
end of the respective spectrum labeled to describe its nature. The modes of reasoning fall 
into either inductive or deductive categories, ontology is described as either positivist or 
constructivist, and the epistemological position is characterized as either empiricist or 
rationalist (Siangchokyoo & Sousa-Poza, 2012). These divisions of research may be 
illustrated in the form of a cube, an example of which is shown in Figure 4. Note that 
classic quantitative methods as defined by both Creswell and Leedy fall into the lower, left, 
front portion of the cube, depicted in red, while qualitative methods appear in the upper, 
right, front portion, depicted in green. In addition to providing an overview of these 
divisions as a framework for discussion and defense of the selected methods, it also allows 
deeper insight into the results of this research and perhaps more importantly, the limitations 
of its conclusions.
Positivist <- -> Constructivist
Inductive
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Figure 4: Research Methods Cube with CreswelPs Traditional Methods
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To begin with, this study employs an inductive mode of reasoning. The process of 
inductive research involves analysis of data, and subsequent abstraction of a theory through 
identification of patterns or other features that suggest explanations for its variance. This 
method is in stark contrast to deductive methods which begin with some form of hypothesis 
and use confirmatory methods to either accept or reject a hypothesis based on results of 
experimentation. In this study, the data analyzed involves thousands of flight and 
simulation events in which aircraft were assigned crossing times at three dimensional fixes 
in space, and their performance in achieving those times recorded in data sets. From this 
large combined data set, consisting of many different types of aircraft, environments, and 
operators, trends emerge with regard to performance, and these trends can be expressed 
quantitatively using statistical data analysis methods. More specifically, the data can be 
presented in the form of tables and histograms, and with sufficient sample sizes, the data 
can be reasonably fitted to known probability density functions. Through observation of 
these data, a generalized theory may be developed to predict the future performance of 
similar aircraft systems being flown under similar circumstances, and a model can be 
developed to express the theory as well as provide a platform from which to extract these 
predictions.
Another division of research methods is made with regard to its ontological position. 
Ontology refers to the nature of reality, and there are two possible positions. While Leedy 
confines the mind-dependent nature of the constructivists to qualitative methods, he 
eloquently describes the division in his introduction to qualitative research (Leedy, 2013, 
p. 139). He begins by describing the positivist position in which the researcher aims for 
objectivity, avoiding any influence of the researcher due to impressions or bias. Thus, the
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positivist in a general sense is represented by a philosophy in which research describes the 
elements of the real world without need of interpretation -  it is mind independent. Results 
of a positivist approach would be expected to yield objective conclusions, and those should 
not be significantly different among different researchers who study the topic. The 
opposing view is a constructivist approach in which the research is formulated through 
mind-dependent processes, relying on subjective evaluation of reality by participants or the 
judgment of experts in the field. To quote Leedy, “the [constructivist] researcher is an 
instrument in much the same way an oscilloscope, sociogram, or rating scale is an 
instrument” (Leedy, 2013, p. 139). The research proposed for this dissertation is heavily 
weighted toward a positivist position in that the theory developed through this research is 
largely based on the data described above. Finally, since the concept of acceptable risk is 
inherently dependent upon human judgment, implying there must be some level of mind- 
dependent influence, this paper relies primarily on well-established quantitative 
expressions for acceptable collision risk, defined by both the FAA in the United States and 
by the International Civil Aviation Organization on behalf of the international aviation 
community. Once defined, the separation functions developed herein treat collision risk as 
a dependent variable without further interpretation. Indeed, the value of collision risk 
modeling lies largely within the expected standardization of the process and uniform 
application by clients, necessitating a positivist methodology that may be replicated not 
only by other researchers, but by practitioners in similar fields.
Finally, research is also influenced by its epistemological approach, a concept that 
refers to the method by which human beings develop understanding of reality. Once again, 
the possibilities are divided to describe two ends of a spectrum with one end being referred
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to as empiricist and the other rationalist in nature. Empiricism suggests that research is 
accomplished through observation, while rationalism seeks knowledge through reasoning. 
While a substantial data set has been accumulated and studied in preparation for this 
research, the approach to developing a working collision risk model is largely rationalist 
in its nature, and is not dependent on the data itself. The observation of modem, 
commercial aircraft, nearly all of which are equipped with state-of-the-art flight 
management systems, allows insight into the limits of their performance. By observing the 
performance of these aircraft from an external perspective, it is not necessary to understand 
the complex, and often proprietary, algorithms that govern aircraft performance. Instead, 
by quantifying the performance of a wide range of aircraft, and using this as one of the 
independent variables in the collision risk model, the requirement for improved 
performance beyond current capability can be inferred through a rationalist argument that 
ties expected future demand to required performance levels. Similarly, observation of 
degraded performance in malfunctioning or less capable systems allows insight into the 
magnitude of system capacity limitations when managing aircraft that cannot meet 
optimum performance levels. Ultimately, a metric capable of describing performance 
levels is envisioned for development through a subsequent rationalist argument. Further 
explanation for this expectation is provided in subsequent chapters.
In summary, the research process described in the next section will be accomplished 
through application of an approach that has been described as a synthetic method and is 
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Figure 5: Research Method for Development o f  Separation Functions
This method is executed by applying an inductive mode of reasoning in combination 
with rationalist and positivist research philosophies. The result is the development of a 
mathematical theory, expressed as a stochastic model that allows management to prescribe 
standards for system performance and to make decisions with regard to system capacity 
necessary to meet demand while maintaining an acceptable level of risk.
3.2. Research Process
This section provides an overview of the process developed for answering the research 
questions presented in Section 1.3 and ultimately developing recommendations for aviation 
regulatory authorities. The first step in the research process is to present a method by which 
the performance of the aircraft may be quantified as a performance metric. Once that is 






between aircraft that is necessary to both meet capacity goals as well as result in an 
acceptable level of collision risk. The objective of the final research question is to 
determine the level of performance future aircraft will need to achieve in order to sequence 
aircraft with an interval that safely accommodates expected demand.
The process begins with collection and analysis of data regarding the demonstrated 
performance of aircraft in capturing assigned crossing times as reported in flight and 
simulation reports. Using both graphical and numerical descriptive statistics, and by fitting 
the data to continuous probability distributions, insight can be achieved as to the magnitude 
of the error that has been demonstrated by a large sample of aircraft, and should be expected 
of the general population when modem aircraft operated with a variety of flight 
management systems are assigned discrete crossing times at various points in three 
dimensional space.
Once this data analysis is complete, a functional relationship may be developed 
between the variables of interest; namely the interval between aircraft expressed in terms 
of time, the risk of collision, and the performance metrics of the aircraft. This functional 
relationship allows for manipulation of the variables to achieve estimates of desired 
performance requirements that can then be used as the basis for the formulation of flight 
standards as well as performance standards for avionics designed to support four 
dimensional trajectory based operations.
For the purpose of developing the desired recommendations, the primary independent 
variable is the performance of aircraft in capturing assigned crossing times. Using the data 
set created from the flight and simulation test results, inductive principles are exercised to 
quantify time-based performance such that all aircraft can be certified for time-based air
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traffic management operations with a degree of accuracy corresponding to the certification 
level of their platform. It is an objective of this research to develop a performance metric 
that is consistent with existing flight standards, including navigation performance 
standards that are governed by the same guidance documents expected to govern time of 
arrival control standards.
Once the various levels of aircraft performance are expressed in quantitative terms, it 
is then necessary to estimate the level of risk that is considered acceptable by governmental 
regulatory authorities. Numerous publically available documents may be consulted to 
determine the level of risk with regard to mid-air collisions that is acceptable. 
Subsequently, this value may be considered a constraint for use in determining the 
minimum interval that may be assigned between aircraft of varying performance levels in 
order to achieve an acceptable level of collision risk. The ability to determine the necessary 
interval for aircraft of varying performance capability is essential to the development of 
flight standards governing future trajectory based operations. It should be noted however 
that collision risk is not the only variable that must be considered when establishing 
minimum interval requirement as other factors beyond the scope of this research, such as 
wake turbulence, may be limiting factors.
Another application of this research is to inform aviation regulators as to decisions 
that need to be made with regard to certification standards of avionics used in support of 
future trajectory based operations. This is done through a different manipulation of the 
relationship between the previously described variables. An identical constraint with 
regard to acceptable collision risk is developed in the same way as described above, and 
should be applied consistently between applications. However, in this application, the
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future demand for air transportation is used to estimate the interval between aircraft that 
will be necessary to accommodate that level of demand. By converting the interval variable 
to the independent variable, and the performance of the aircraft to a dependent variable, it 
is then possible to determine a level of performance that will be required to meet future 
system demands, allowing this level of performance to be prescribed as a new performance 
standard for future flight management systems.
The following model attempts to graphically depict the approach to the research with 
an objective of deriving a mathematical separation function driving stochastic models that 
can be used as the basis for submitting recommendations for the development of flight 
standards for both the manufacture of flight management systems and management of 
separation of aircraft by time.
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Figure 6: Research Process
Within the model, three symbols are used to differentiate the type of information 
presented. Circles represent uncertain data that must be collected in support of the study. 
A rectangle with rounded edges represents the result of combining two or more uncertain 
data types into a single uncertainty, providing categories of aircraft and flight management 
system performance expressed as parameters of a continuous probabilistic distribution. A 
double circle represents a deterministic function whereby if the inputs are known, the 
outputs are known precisely. For the purpose of this research, this symbol describes the 
functional relationship between the variables of interest. Finally, the outputs of the study 




Numerous definitions of risk exist in literature and popular culture. The International 
Standards Organization defines risk as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives” (ISO, 
2009). This definition allows broad application of the concept of risk, and allows for both 
positive and negative outcomes to be considered within the context of risk. Within the 
aviation community, definitions of risk are more narrowly focused and generally apply 
only to negative outcomes. The International Civil Aviation Organization defines “safety 
risk” in its Safety Management Manual as “The predicted probability and severity of the 
consequences or outcomes of a hazard” (ICAO, 2013, p. xii). With this term in mind, 
numerous authors of publications discussing collision risk refer to a “target level of safety.” 
This reference can be traced to the ICAO Safety Management Manual and its definition of 
“Acceptable level of safety performance,” which it defines as the “minimum level of safety 
performance of civil aviation in a State . . .  as defined in its safety management system, 
expressed in terms of safety performance targets and safety performance indicators” 
(ICAO, 2013, p. xii). To provide one example, Campos and Marques frequently set a value 
of 5 x 1 O'9 as the target level of safety and reference ICAO standards as being the source 
of this value (Campos & Marques, 2010, p. 1).
Whenever two or more aircraft operate in proximity to one another, there is some 
probability of collision. Experience has shown that in addition to the definitions presented 
in the preceding section regarding the severity of aircraft collisions, these events normally 
result in the loss of one or both aircraft involved as well as the passengers and crew
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members of those aircraft. While it is recognized that accidents between larger aircraft 
carrying more people are more severe than accidents between smaller aircraft with less loss 
of life, it is not the intention of this research to quantify the value of human life or to 
differentiate between accidents in which differing numbers of passengers might be 
involved. Instead, this research follows the conventions established in regulatory 
documents cited previously that consider any collision between aircraft a catastrophic 
event. The result of this practice is to equate collision risk solely with the probability of 
collision rather than an alternative approach that would establish a risk metric that 
considers the combination of an accident’s total loss value in concert with the probability 
of the event.
The ICAO definitions lead aviation regulatory agencies such as the FAA in the United 
States to define their own performance targets for various activities. Within the FAA, the 
Air Traffic Organization is responsible for air traffic management services, and publishes 
a Safety Management System Manual. This document redefines risk as “The composite of 
predicted severity and likelihood of the potential effect of a hazard in the worst credible 
system state” (FAA, 2008a, p. 14). The manual goes on to categorize the severity of 
possible outcomes by assigning five classification levels. The most severe outcome is 
classified as “catastrophic,” a category it defines as “conditions resulting in a collision 
between aircraft, obstacles, or terrain” (FAA, 2008a, p. 39). The manual then categorizes 
likelihood into five classification levels as well, and clearly indicates that the only region 
of acceptable risk occurs in the “extremely improbable” category. It goes on to define this 
level of likelihood as being a probability less than 1 x 10‘9 per operational flight hour (FAA, 
2008a, p. 42).
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4.1.1. The Nature o f Collision Risk
Since the advent of RADAR and the implementation of distance-based separation 
standards, a common perception of collision risk is that it is the probability that the distance 
between two aircraft reaches zero. As a result of this understanding of collision risk, it is 
easy to believe that by increasing the required separation distance between aircraft, the 
resulting collision risk should be reduced, and vice versa. However, this intuition fails 
when applied to many applications. As an extreme example, consider the US Navy flight 
demonstration team, the Blue Angels. Six of their aircraft are routinely operated within 
inches of each other while performing complex aerial maneuvers, and yet they operate with 
acceptable collision risk and it is likely that they will continue to operate indefinitely 
without experiencing a serious collision. At another extreme, consider two aircraft that are 
separated by the required five nautical miles in an en route airspace environment, but are 
traveling in opposite directions on the same jet route at the same altitude. If each aircraft 
is traveling at 600 knots ground speed, closure between the aircraft is such that they will 
collide in 15 seconds if neither aircraft maneuvers to avoid the collision.
In a more general example, consider two pairs of aircraft traveling in opposite 
directions along parallel flight tracks at a routinely flown airspeed such as 480 KTAS, and 
separated longitudinally by five nautical miles. Now consider the influence of a 120 knot 
wind, a common jet stream speed experienced in the en route domain, on the available 
collision avoidance time. As depicted in Figure 7, the aircraft traveling with the wind have 
substantially less time separating them than aircraft traveling against the wind.
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Figure 7: Effect o f Wind on Separation Distance
This example provides insight into the nature of collision risk and collision avoidance. 
Since collision risk depends upon the amount of time available for conflict detection and 
resolution, it is not a function of the distance between aircraft, but the time. As a result, a 
more appropriate definition of collision risk is the probability that two aircraft will occupy
mitigation should be to provide sufficient time for operators to recognize a potential
Further evidence of the validity of this reasoning with regard to collision avoidance is 
found in the design of the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). This 
system is installed on commercial aircraft worldwide and uses a transponder interrogation 
technique to judge the relative position of proximate aircraft. The logic of the algorithms 
used in this system are based on the work of Dr. John S. Morrell, and his theory of collision 
avoidance which states the “concept is based on time, rather than distance, to the closest 
point of approach in an encounter” (FAA, 2000, p. 6). Dr. Morrell’s development of a 
variable labeled “tau” in the TCAS algorithms refers to the time remaining before CPA
the same point in space at the same time. It then follows that the objective of collision risk
conflict and for at least one of the operators to take action to avoid a potential collision.
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and when a threshold value is reached, the system issues an advisory to the pilot to perform 
a collision avoidance maneuver. The use of a time-based metric as the basis for collision 
avoidance functions in TCAS is a compelling indication that the use of time over distance- 
based methods is emerging as a preferred tool. Further evidence of the acceptance of time- 
based collision avoidance with respect to TCAS is the existence of numerous mandates by 
nations around the world that require all aircraft capable of carrying 30 or more passengers 
to be equipped with TCAS, and a recent European Union mandate that requires aircraft 
carrying more than 19 passengers in European airspace to be equipped with the latest 
version of TCAS (Eurocontrol, 2011).
4.1.2. Acceptability o f Collision Risk
The probability of collision is treated as a dependent variable in this research. 
However, for the purpose of recommendations formulated on the basis of the results 
reported herein, a probability of collision less than 1 x 10‘9 per operational flight hour will 
be treated as a constraint that must be met for any recommendation to be considered 
feasible. While the majority of international researchers use a more aggressive value as a 
target level of safety, the nature of this research is to develop a basis from which viable 
recommendations may be made for safety standards governing trajectory based operations 
in the United States and Europe. Therefore, to ensure appropriately conservative 
recommendations are formulated, and to conform to current guidance as published in the 
FAA Air Traffic Organization’s Safety Management System Manual, the maximum value 




A number of studies, demonstrations, and experiments have been conducted to 
evaluate potential benefits of trajectory based operations, such as increased capacity, 
reduced fuel consumption, reduced carbon emissions, and improved safety. While several 
studies have shown great promise in achieving some of these objectives, none of the studies 
have been able to demonstrate that the benefits can be achieved while satisfying existing 
distance-based separation standards. Similarly, studies that have achieved required 
separation minimums fail to show any measurable benefit over existing procedures. This 
perplexing outcome should not be surprising in light of basic optimization theory, as 
attempting to sequence aircraft by time while maintaining existing separation standards is 
effectively a case of operating the same system with a time restriction being added as an 
additional constraint. In order to achieve both the benefits of trajectory based operations 
and acceptable separation minimums, it is necessary to not only sequence aircraft by time, 
but also to separate them by time. This is true for two reasons. First, use of a distance- 
based standard results in varying amounts of time between aircraft separated by a uniform 
distance at each altitude and airspeed combination, and the variability is increased by 
changes in environmental conditions such as wind and temperature. In contrast, a time- 
based standard allows a uniform flow of traffic with equal time intervals that are 
independent of altitude, airspeed, and environmental conditions. Secondly, and most 
importantly, employing a time-based standard allows aircraft to be safely separated at 
distances that are significantly less than those required today under certain circumstances 
as described herein. These concepts are further illustrated through observation of test 
results and the theoretical example that follows.
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Consider the results of the Required Time of Arrival (RTA) experiments conducted in 
the vicinity of Seattle International Airport using General Electric Flight Management 
Systems on Alaska Airlines B737 aircraft from 2010 to 2011. During initial simulation 
testing and flight trials, all aircraft were assigned required crossing times in whole minute 
intervals at the Olympia fix while the airport was in a south-flow configuration. This 
required aircraft to cross a meter fix called Olympia at 17,000 feet and at 270 KIAS (see 
Appendix A). At no time during the flight trials or simulations were any separation losses 
reported (Smith, 2011). However, during subsequent testing, with the airport operating in 
north flow configurations, aircraft were required to cross the same fix at 12,000 feet and 
250 KIAS. Under these lower and slower conditions, simulation testing conducted in 
preparation for the flight tests resulted in frequent losses of the required 5 NM separation 
between aircraft when a one minute interval was assigned. As a result, a decision was 
made to employ a two minute interval for the live flight testing. These tests proved to be 
extremely successful with regard to the crossing time accuracy achieved, but the two 
minute intervals produced excessive spacing between aircraft, especially at the high and 
fast crossing points. In a summary table describing potential variations between high and 
low altitude crossings over a typical range of ground speeds with a maximum time error of 
20 seconds, the report demonstrates the range between sequential aircraft could be as little 
as 1.3 NM at the low altitude fix if separated by only 1 minute and as high as 26.7 miles at 
the high altitude crossing if separated by 2 minutes (Teller, 2011, p. 41).
To view the problem from another perspective, consider two aircraft crossing a meter 
fix at 250 KIAS with a 30 knot headwind at two different altitudes: 19,000 feet, such as is 
the case on arrivals to Denver, and 12,000 feet, such as the arrival to Seattle. These two
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examples are also representative of the flight and simulation testing performed by the FAA 
in recent years. Due to reduced air density at 19,000 feet, on a standard day the aircraft 
travel at 337 KTAS, and due to the effect of the wind, 307 KGS. If they cross the fix with 
a 60 second interval between them, they are separated by 5.1 NM, satisfying existing 
separation criteria with sufficient time for collision avoidance. However, due to the 
comparatively higher air density at 12,000 feet, the same aircraft travel at 300 KTAS, and 
270 KGS. If they cross the same fix with the same 60 second interval between them, they 
are separated by only 4.7 NM, and the exact same amount of collision avoidance time is 
considered inadequate solely due to a failure to meet an arbitrary distance-based separation 
standard. From the perspective of a person standing on the ground and looking straight up 
at the aircraft as they cross however, the same observation is made -  two aircraft crossing 
with a 60 second interval. This situation is depicted in Figure 8 below:
Figure 8: Separation Distance Variations with Equal Time Intervals
It is the assertion of this dissertation that because the time available for collision 
avoidance is equal for both pairs of aircraft, the risk of collision is also equal. It follows
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that in all cases represented by this example a time-based separation standard allows lower 
and slower aircraft to be sequenced with reduced distance between them, allowing a desired 
increase in system capacity while retaining an adequate safety margin. This potential 
benefit provides the motivation for the research described in the following sections.
4.3. Data Sources
Several flight and simulation experiments have been performed in recent years to 
assess the ability of a modem aircraft to cross a three dimensional fix in space at an 
assigned time. These experiments have been done in the United States and Europe by 
aviation regulatory authorities in partnership with airlines, flight management system 
manufacturers, and local air traffic controllers. The results of these experiments have been 
compiled into a data set for use in quantification of the nature and magnitude of the errors 
that should be expected when air traffic is managed using controlled time of arrival 
methods. This section describes the experiments that have been performed and discusses 
the data reported as a result of each experiment.
4.3.1. 2008 CASSIS Flight Trials
One of the first flight trials conducted to evaluate the time-based performance of 
aircraft was sponsored by Eurocontrol and executed at the Stockholm Arlanda International 
Airport in 2008. The flight trial consisted of three phases with the first phase being 
conducted in June, the second in September, and the final phase concluding in December. 
Boeing 737 aircraft and McDonnell-Douglas MD-80 aircraft served as test aircraft for all 
three periods and Airbus A300 and A330 aircraft participated in the final test period. Of 
note, the General Electric flight management system was in use on 737 aircraft. This
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system includes full phase Required Time of Arrival (RTA) functionality that computes a 
four dimensional trajectory for the aircraft and allows the flight crew to enter the assigned 
arrival time either manually or through receipt of a data link message. Once the RTA is 
entered, the FMS can be commanded to execute the RTA, allowing the aircraft autopilot 
system to be governed by the FMS as needed to cross the assigned fix on time. In stark 
contrast, the MD-80 aircraft has no time of arrival capability associated with its flight 
management system, requiring pilots to manually adjust speed to achieve the desired 
crossing time. Airbus aircraft participating in the third phase of the trial were equipped 
with a Honeywell flight management system that provided RTA functionality, but with 
limited time of arrival capability as compared to the General Electric system.
Arrival times were issued by air traffic control between 25 and 40 minutes prior to the 
estimated fix crossing time as determined by ground automation systems. Once a crossing 
time was assigned, aircraft progress was monitored via RADAR and trial aircraft were 
separated from non-participating aircraft as necessary through standard air traffic control 
practices. When multiple trial aircraft were predicted to arrive at or near the same time, 
crossing time assignments were issued with two or three minute intervals at the discretion 
of the controller.
The results of this trial included qualitative results generated from surveys of 
participating pilots and air traffic controllers and quantitative results of the crossing time 
performance. Quantitative results are also provided in the form of a summary table and 
histogram of crossing times for all aircraft. However, closer inspection of the data reveals 
there may be inadvertent sources of bias within the data. According to the report, “Prior 
to the trials, a tolerance of ± 30 seconds was seen as the appropriate tolerance for metering
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of traffic towards a TMA entry point” (Swedavia, 2009, p. 23). There is no justification 
for this value, but it seems to have become a success criterion in which flights arriving 
within 30 seconds were considered a success while those outside of this window were 
considered failures, effectively categorizing the data. Evidence of this possibility is easily 
seen by observing that 70 of the 308 flights are reported to have crossed the meter fix with 
exactly 0 seconds of error. A detailed histogram of the flight trial crossing times is shown 
in Figure 9 with 100 intervals of 1 second each.
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Figure 9: CASSIS I Crossing Time Errors
It can easily be seen from the spikes in the data that researchers displayed a strong tendency 
to round crossing time errors to the nearest five second interval. More importantly, 25% 
of the crossings are recorded as having zero crossing time error, implying that at least some
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of the researchers recorded crossing time errors of less than 30 seconds as successes, and 
attributed no crossing time error to these events.
As a result of the apparent bias associated with these data, the quantitative results 
have not been used as the basis for quantification of aircraft performance capability in this 
research. However, the general trend of the results is still of use in assessing the 
consistency of result trends with other experiments. Also, the CASSIS flight trials are the 
only known flight trials to date that have attempted to evaluate the ability of an aircraft 
being flown without an RTA function in the FMS, providing qualitative insight into the 
nature of the expected error times associated with manually flown aircraft.
4.3.2. 2009 CASSIS Flight Trials
With the results of the initial flight trials considered promising, a second round of 
flight trials was conducted in October and December of 2009. A similar lineup of aircraft 
were evaluated, including the Boeing 737 with a General Electric FMS, McDonnell 
Douglas MD-80 with no RTA capability, and Airbus A330 and A300 aircraft with a 
Honeywell FMS. However, Novair’s Airbus A321 aircraft were also added and are 
reported to have utilized a Thales FMS.
Qualitatively, the report of the 2009 CASSIS flight trials indicates improved 
performance over the 2008 trials. Interestingly, the improvement seemed to be confined 
to the performance of the 737 aircraft, and the reduced standard deviation of arrival time 
errors for this aircraft is attributed to an avionics adjustment. The General Electric FMS 
includes a user setting referred to as a time error tolerance (TET) value, and allows the 
flight crew to select a value between 6 and 30 seconds. Since the algorithms are proprietary
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to General Electric, it is unclear what the exact influence of this setting is, but the 2009 
setting of 10 seconds delivered better accuracy than the 30 second setting used in 2008.
Unfortunately, the quantitative results of the 2009 CASSIS flight trials indicate a bias 
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Figure 10: CASSIS II Crossing Time Errors
Once again, the results indicate a strong tendency to report crossing times in five 
second increments and approximately 35% of the 197 evaluated crossings were recorded 
to have achieved a perfect crossing time with zero error. While the general trend of 
improvement associated with the lower error tolerance on the General Electric FMS is 
noteworthy, the quantitative results of these trials are not used in this research as a basis 
for estimating the performance capability of modem aircraft. They are of value however 
in demonstrating the approximate range of values within which aircraft may perform, and
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as such, are included as an additional source of qualitative evidence supporting the findings 
of the current research effort.
4.3.3. 2010 FAA Human-in-the-Loop Simulation
Following the CASSIS flight trials, the FAA initiated a program to study Four 
Dimensional Flight Management System Required Time of Arrival capability in en route 
flight environments. An initial simulation was performed at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University in June 2010 to investigate the feasibility of a flight trial and to develop 
candidate procedures for such a trial. However, no quantitative data is available from that 
study.
4.3.4. 2010 FAA Flight Trial
In October 2010, the FAA partnered with Alaska Airlines to conduct a flight trial to 
evaluate RTA concepts at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. The flight trial included 
only Boeing 737 aircraft equipped with General Electric flight management systems and 
consisted of a small sample of flights. Over a seven day period, only 39 flights received 
time-based clearances and executed the clearances to completion such that data regarding 
crossing time errors could be evaluated (Smith, 2011). The results of this trial are provided 
in Appendix B.
4.3.5. 2011 FAA Human-in-the-Loop Simulation
In May of 2011, the FAA conducted another simulation to further explore and evaluate 
RTA concepts. This simulation was performed in the NextGen Integration and Evaluation 
Capability laboratory at the William J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, NJ. The
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aircraft simulated included the Boeing 737 with a General Electric FMS, Airbus A320 with 
a Honeywell Pegasus FMS that includes RTA functionality, and an Embraer 170 with a 
Honeywell Primus Epic FMS that does not provide RTA functionality and requires manual 
control by the pilot. In this simulation and in all subsequent FAA simulations, experienced 
pilots and controllers operated computer-based systems representative o f actual air traffic 
control and aircraft systems. Aircraft systems included operational flight management 
systems driven by proprietary PC-based emulations of controls and displays necessary to 
operate the aircraft being simulated. A typical pilot interface is shown in Figure 11.
Of note, the time error tolerance value for all flights during this simulation was set to 
a value of 20 seconds. It is not clear why this setting was chosen, but subsequent testing 
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Figure 11: Typical Pilot Interface for B737 Aircraft with GE FMS
While a twenty second value was used as a criterion for categorization of results, 
detailed quantitative data sets were also recorded and has been made available for this 
research. The information is provided in Appendix C. A total o f 87 crossing events were 
recorded during this testing.
4.3.6. 2011 FAA Flight Trial
In November and December of 2011, the FAA conducted a second flight trial in the 
vicinity of Seattle, and once again partnered with Alaska Airlines to evaluate the 
performance of Boeing 737 aircraft with General Electric Flight Management Systems. 
This flight trial was substantially more robust than any time of arrival control flight test 
conducted to that point, delivering 588 fully executed controlled time of arrival events. A 
time error tolerance of 20 seconds was used on all flights, and consistent with the previous
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simulation, success was categorized base on a 20 second evaluation criterion. Detailed 
performance information is available from this testing, and the complete data set is 
provided in Appendix D. This data set also has a significant influence on the performance 
estimates developed in subsequent sections of this document.
4.3.7. 2012 FAA Human-in-the-Loop Simulations
Following the second round of flight trials, the FAA continued research of controlled 
time of arrival concepts to further advance the concept of operations. The simulations were 
conducted in four parts between March and July of 2012, with each simulation being 
conducted over several days. An important aspect of these simulations is that the 
geographic operating environment used for testing was changed from Seattle to Denver. 
Due to the comparatively high altitude of the Denver airport, this resulted in experiments 
being conducted at high altitude, with a consistent altitude at the arrival crossing point of 
19,000 feet and en route crossing points in high altitude airspace above flight level 290. 
This resulted in higher true air speeds at the crossing point due to lower air density than 
might be expected at a crossing point used to sequence aircraft into a sea level airport. A 
number of other details were adjusted during these simulations that are of particular interest 
to this research. The time error tolerance value on the General Electric flight management 
systems was set to 20 seconds for a portion of the flights, while a 10 second value was used 
for the remaining flights. Also important is a change in procedure by which times were 
assigned in six second increments rather than in whole minutes, providing air traffic 
managers with more flexibility in assigning crossing times. The six second increment was 
chosen to allow easy mental conversion of crossing time assignments for aircraft that enter 
time in minutes and seconds as well as those that enter time in tenths of a minute. Finally,
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the series of simulations was designed to explore new concepts, adding complexity to the 
process of achieving time-based crossings. The increased demand on flight crew and 
avionics partially explains some of the variance observed in the data. The results of these 
simulations have been provided by the FAA, Mitre, and MIT Lincoln Labs and are included 
in Appendix E.
Each phase of the 2012 simulations was designed to evaluate specific elements of 
time-based air traffic management. The first phase was initially designed to assess the 
spacing that resulted from variations in intervals assigned to sequential aircraft executing 
required time of arrival clearances. The tests were governed by an expectation that a 90 
second interval would provide a safe and efficient balance between the 1 minute intervals 
used for the first flight trials and the 2 minute intervals used during the second trials. 
Results reported from this simulation conclude that 90 seconds “did yield a good balance 
between separation assurance and flow efficiency” (Teller, Alexander, Davis, & Phillips, 
2012, p. 23). However, the report also acknowledges that this conclusion is in contrast to 
the results of previously cited experiments by Klooster and DeSmedt (2011), which were 
conducted with a comparatively low 8,000 foot crossing altitude. The consistent theme 
between the reports is that the distance observed between aircraft separated by time during 
simulation is solely a function of ground speed. Researchers for this phase of the 
experiment even developed a look up table to provide controllers with guidelines for how 
much time to assign between aircraft to achieve a desired distance-based interval based on 
their groundspeed. It is important to stress that in all simulations conducted to date, 
evaluation of separation between aircraft has not been based on a collision risk probability, 
but instead, by simple evaluation of the distance between aircraft sequenced by time. It is
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clear that results of this testing, and the conclusion that a 90 second interval provides a 
good balance would have been significantly different if a low altitude crossing point had 
been used at a sea level airport.
The second phase of testing was designed to evaluate alternatives for absorbing delay 
during high density traffic periods, a state referred to as “metering conditions.” The 
methods tested the feasibility of using time-based clearances in conjunction with flight path 
offsets that effectively increased the distance flown by the aircraft as a means of delaying 
its arrival.
Phase three of the simulation tested the feasibility of integrating ground support tools 
being developed for air traffic management with the airborne capability of a flight 
management system. Specifically, the FAA’s Three Dimensional Path Arrival 
Management (3D PAM) tool was used to generate offset waypoints for aircraft to extend 
their flight paths in a manner similar to what was tested during phase two. However, the 
concept of operations associated with 3D PAM includes issuing a Mach number and 
indicated airspeed for the pilot to transition to during the descent phase of flight in order to 
achieve the desired crossing time. Phase 3 testing showed that a dramatic increase in 
crossing time accuracy is achieved when this system is employed with an RTA crossing 
time assignment at the meter fix. Recall that the results of FAA tests with UPS in Louisville 
concluded that using a ground-based automation system to issue speed commands in 
attempt to guide aircraft to accurate crossing times was not feasible. The data generated 
during this testing provides compelling evidence to validate that conclusion. A comparison 
of the crossing time accuracy achieved by the ground automation system versus the 
airborne flight management system is presented in Figure 12 as a box plot allowing the
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magnitude of the difference between the two systems’ performance to be better understood. 
In this graphic depiction, the top row of data describes the crossing time errors of flights 
that executed speed commands as issued by ground automation systems while the bottom 
row of data describes crossing time errors achieved by airborne flight management systems 
executing RTA clearances. The blue boxes are bounded by the 25th and 75th percentiles, 
also referred to as upper and lower quartiles, and the entire width of the blue box is known 
as the inter-quartile range. The black vertical bar in the center of the blue box is the median, 
or 50th percentile. The “whiskers” on either side of the box represent a range of 1.5 times 
the inter-quartile range. Values that lie outside this range are represented by red stars and 
may be outliers. These results deserve investigation and consideration for removal from 
the data set if the cause of the outliers can be determined, such as case in which a data entry 
error is found or a simulation malfunction event occurred. The horizontal axis represents 
time in seconds, with time zero representing the assigned crossing time for all flight events.
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Figure 12: Comparison o f Ground versus Airborne Automation System Performance
The final phase of testing in 2012 was designed to further evaluate the feasibility of 
integrating ground based automation systems with airborne RTA capabilities. This testing 
included a new capability, departure RTAs, wherein aircraft on the ground were issued 
crossing time assignments prior to takeoff for the same arrival meter fix as airborne en 
route aircraft. This application of the required time of arrival concept has not been 
documented in any previous research, and results indicate that while a number of new
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uncertainties associated with pre-takeoff ground operations emerged, performance of 
aircraft in meeting assigned crossing times is comparable to both en route and arrival 
applications.
4.3.8. 2013 FAA Human-in-the-Loop Simulations
The 2013 FAA simulations continued research initiated during the 2012 simulations 
and included two periods of testing in fiscal year 2013. The first testing took place on 
December 4th and 5th, 2012, and provided additional data collection opportunities for time- 
based operations in all phases of flight, including departures, en route, and arrival 
operations. The aircraft simulated included the Boeing 737 with a General Electric FMS, 
but differed slightly from previous tests in that the software version used was updated to a 
new version (U10.8A). The testing also included evaluation of Boeing 757 aircraft with 
Honeywell FMS using research prototype software referred to as “red label” software. 
Results indicate a significant advance in both functionality and performance of this 
software as compared to previous versions of Honeywell systems (Teller, Alexander, 
Davis, & Phillips, 2013).
A second phase of testing was conducted from July 8-12,2013, and further expanded 
testing to include the same aircraft tested in Phase 1, but added two aircraft that had been 
used in previous testing for the purpose of additional data collection purposes. The Airbus 
A320 aircraft with a Honeywell Pegasus FMS and an Embraer 170 with a Honeywell 
Primus Epic FMS were simulated during these tests. This round of testing featured 
continued evaluation of departure RTA operations in which aircraft at an airport were 
assigned crossing times at fixes in the en route structure. The testing also provided a 
platform from which to evaluate the feasibility of a prototype system that can be hand-
71
carried by flight crew and used in the cockpit of an aircraft that is not equipped with a full- 
phase RTA capable FMS. This application is analogous to the use of a hand-held GPS, but 
with the added functionality of providing speed guidance calculations necessary to meet 
time of arrival control assignments. This type of system is generally referred to as an 
“electronic flight bag” (EFB) (Alexander, Davis, Phillips, & Teller, 2013, p. 5). As of the 
writing of this document, initial results have been reviewed, but final data set is not yet 
available and is therefore not included in this analysis.
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5. Separation Function Derivation
The process of deriving a separation function for use as an engineering tool for 
management of trajectory based aviation operations is divided into several parts, with each 
portion of the research designed to develop the independent and dependent variables. The 
first step involves a review of previous efforts to model collision risk in the aviation 
environment. The next step is to conduct an analysis of data to develop insight as to the 
nature of the errors that should be expected when aircraft are required to cross three- 
dimensional points in the airspace system. Once that has been accomplished, a method 
must be developed to express this capability in the form of an implementable performance 
metric. Finally, an expression must be developed to calculate the probability of collision 
between aircraft, including aircraft with dissimilar performance capabilities. Once these 
steps are complete, the functional relationship developed to relate the performance 
capability of the aircraft, the probability of collision, and the interval between them can be 
applied to the management of air traffic.
5.1. Collision Risk Modeling
Numerous articles have been published over the past half century regarding methods 
by which collision risk may be estimated. Nearly all of these models are based on upon 
the seminal work of P.G. Reich in 1966, with subsequent models generalizing or building 
upon the initial model. Indeed, the International Civil Aviation Organization adopted a 
variation of Reich’s model for use in its Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for 
the Determination o f  Separation Minima (ICAO, 1998).
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One of the key insights to the Reich model is that it is a distance-based model that 
assumes collision risk is a function of navigation position error. This approach to collision 
risk modeling is a natural outgrowth of the challenges faced by aviators in the two decades 
following World War II. Autopilot systems had not yet achieved a level of reliability that 
ensured precision in the vertical dimension, and position determination was limited to the 
fidelity of instruments that presented bearing and later, slant range information to pilots. 
In oceanic operations, the intended application of Reich’s model, substantial navigation 
errors developed as pilots and navigators relied on principles of dead reckoning and 
celestial navigation to estimate position, frequently resulting in large cumulative errors that 
justified substantial separation distances between trans-oceanic tracks and between aircraft 
transiting along those tracks. Reich’s modeling of this environment is based on his 
conceptualization of the problem in which two aircraft transiting the ocean on parallel 
tracks could each develop errors in their position estimate. If the tracks were from east to 
west, as in the North Atlantic, while both aircraft estimated their position as being along 
one of the tracks, the actual position of the northern aircraft could be somewhere south of 
the track. At the same time, the southern aircraft could be north of its estimated position. 
Reich theorized that if the sum of the two position errors was equal to the distance between 
the tracks, the two aircraft would be on the same effective track somewhere in the middle, 
and satisfying this condition would expose the aircraft to collision risk.
In the years that followed, the introduction of inertial navigation systems improved 
navigation performance, but position errors associated with these systems increase over 
time due to nuances of Schuler oscillations. This oscillatory cycle creates drift rate errors 
caused by the system’s inability to distinguish between acceleration due to gravity and
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those due to aircraft maneuvers, leading to significant errors in position estimates over time 
(Fogg & Janus, 1990). Human errors operating these systems were also possible due to 
poor interface designs, with the most notable navigation error of this type being that of 
Korean Airlines Flight 007, which drifted over 200 miles off course and was shot down 
over Sakhalin Island in 1983 by a Soviet Su-15 (Degani, 2004).
The Reich model uses pair-wise comparisons of two aircraft and assumes there is a 
function to describe navigation system errors for each aircraft. It then considers the 
probability of each aircraft being off its intended course given some nominal separation 
distance. Reich did not have any data from which to construct a density function 
representing the probability of error distances, and so to overcome this limitation, he 
established an upper bound that he considered a maximum value likely to be encountered 
with an objective of developing a conservative standard with respect to collision risk.
In addition to navigation position errors in a horizontal plane, the Reich model 
considers deviations from intended course to be three dimensional, including a vertical 
component requiring a probability of collision to be developed for each dimension. This 
construct allows users to either focus on a single dimension, such as in the case of 
considering a reduction in vertical separation standards, or to combine the dimensional 
components for a complete quantification of the collision probability through convolution 
of multiple random variables.
A final important note with relevance to this research is that the ICAO version of the 
Reich model makes an important assumption influencing its longitudinal collision 
calculation. That is, commercial aircraft generally operate in a manner that results in 
relatively stable operating conditions with infrequent speed changes. Further, when speed
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changes are required, they are generally small changes in comparison to the overall speed 
of the aircraft, such as an when an aircraft changes a cost index or slows from an optimum 
cruise airspeed to a turbulent air penetration speed. The result of this assumption is a 
conclusion that a pair of aircraft operating in proximity to one another will not pass each 
other more than once in any given period of interest (ICAO, 1998).
Some of the baseline principles of the Reich model apply to the model developed for 
this research. To begin with, there is an assumption that an error distribution exists 
regarding the time-based performance of the aircraft. Inherent within this assumption is 
that any navigational position error that may exist will be accounted for through 
observation of the actual crossing time. To explain further, if the aircraft navigation system 
estimates the aircraft position as being at the designated crossing point exactly on time, but 
the actual aircraft position is behind the estimated position, the aircraft will be observed to 
cross the point late with some measurable time error as a result of the navigation error. 
Thus, any navigation error is inherently accounted for within the data recording crossing 
time errors and the distribution of navigation errors increases the variance of time-based 
errors.
Once the error distributions are quantified, the model developed for this research then 
uses the distribution from each aircraft to calculate a probability of collision. An 
assumption that no two aircraft will pass each other more than once in the longitudinal axis 
is also required, and consistent with the Reich model.
Substantial differences also exist between the respective methods as the premise of 
this research is that time, rather than distance, is the critical metric used to separate aircraft 
in trajectory based operations. More specifically, the assumption that collision probability
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is a function of a navigation error is changed. Instead, due to the precision of modem 
navigation systems that include GPS and conform to required navigation performance 
standards, this assumption is reversed to assume that navigational position error is 
negligible in the context of collision risk modeling. Similarly, redundant sources of altitude 
information along with automated features such as reliable altitude hold capability make 
the likelihood of a large height deviation, loosely defined as one greater than the height of 
the aircraft, negligible as well. A Reich model would consider these assumptions 
tantamount to a claim that there is zero collision risk since it assumes the probability of 
collision is a function of navigation position error. Referring once again to Figure 3, it is 
the claim of this research that the improvements in navigational accuracy have the opposite 
effect, and increase collision probability due to an increase in the density of traffic that are 
exactly on their intended course much in the same way early implementation of the first 
radio beacons increased the density of traffic traveling between terrestrial navigation aids. 
The logic driving this assumption is that in previous generations, two aircraft that 
inadvertently attempt to cross the same point in space at the same time might miss each 
other due to the navigation inaccuracies of legacy systems, deviating either vertically or 
laterally. With very little position error in their navigation systems, modem aircraft are 
much more likely to be precisely on their intended course and altitude, with the effect being 
that they fly through narrow tubes of air with higher probability of collision than aircraft 
of previous generations that would experience random navigation errors when flying under 
the same conditions.
Another substantial difference between the early Reich model and this research is the 
availability of a substantial data set documenting the performance of the aircraft. The
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robust nature of testing in both flight and simulation environments has allowed the 
development of probability density functions representing the time-based performance of 
existing modem aircraft equipped with RTA capable flight management systems. 
Additionally, this data allows the inductive process of projecting the degree of capability 
that will be necessary in future generations of air traffic management systems as 
demonstrated in subsequent sections of this document. Finally, in keeping with one of the 
rules set forth in Reich’s original work, the important assumptions of accurate navigation, 
both vertically and laterally, provides a result that requires far less complexity in its 
calculus-based probability computations, and therefore becomes more easily understood 
and suitable for executive application.
5.2. Data Analysis
In order to develop an estimate of the collision risk that exists between aircraft 
operating in a trajectory based operations environment, a practical first step is to quantify 
the probability of an aircraft arrival time given that it is assigned a crossing time at some 
three dimensional fix. To accomplish this objective, the data reviewed in Chapter 4 can be 
analyzed to gain insight into the nature of this probability. This section will provide 
numerical and graphical representations of selected results of flight and simulation 
experiments from which information is available regarding the assigned and actual crossing 
times of aircraft conducting required time of arrival operations. Based on the results of 
this analysis, a generalization of performance levels will be inferred and used in subsequent 
portions of this research.
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5.2.1. CASSIS I & II Data
Data collected during flight tests conducted at Stockholm’s Arlanda International 
Airport included evidence of researcher bias toward recording some results in five second 
increments and a strong tendency to record arrivals judged to be successful as crossings 
with zero error. For this reason, the quantitative results of those trials are not used as part 
of the evidence supporting estimates of performance capability developed through this 
research. However, the CASSIS trials are of value in that they demonstrate general trends 
that are consistent with subsequent research, and that they included human pilots manually 
controlling an aircraft to a required time of arrival without the aid of FMS automation. Due 
to the biases noted, it would not be reasonable to directly compare the numeric results of 
the CASSIS trials to other trials, but since the bias appears to have been applied equally to 
all participating aircraft, it might be reasonable to draw a comparison between aircraft 
equipped with automation capability and aircraft that are not so equipped within this trial 
itself. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of these two groups of aircraft for the purpose 
of allowing comparison between the results reported for each group. The Boeing aircraft 
with a General Electric FMS and the Airbus aircraft with a Honeywell FMS both have 
RTA capable systems, while the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 aircraft has no RTA 
capability.
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Table 1. Automated and Manual RTA Performance Comparison for CASSIS Flight Trials
Aircraft with FMS RTA MD-80 with No FMS RTA
Number of Crossings 333 127
Earliest Crossing -70 seconds -85 seconds
Latest Crossing 95 seconds 110 seconds
Mean 0.45 late -4.6 seconds
Median 0 0
Standard Deviation 19.2 seconds 30.6 seconds
As indicated in Table 1, 127 arrivals were flown manually, providing the largest data 
set available to describe the performance of manually flown aircraft in this environment. 
It can be seen that pilots who manually flew their aircraft to comply with required time of 
arrival clearances had a tendency to arrive early, and the standard deviation of their arrival 
times was roughly one-third larger than those with automated systems.
5.2.2. Seattle Flight Trials Data
Two flight demonstrations of required time of arrival concepts were conducted in the 
vicinity of Seattle, Washington between November 2010 and December 2011. The first of 
these events was limited in scope to exploring time of arrival control operational concepts 
with existing airborne and ground-based air traffic management systems. The second event 
is the most robust flight trial to date, assessing the crossing time performance of nearly 600 
Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 aircraft with General Electric Flight Management Systems 
during routine arrivals to the Seattle-Tacoma International airport. A statistical summary 
of the data collected during these trials is presented in
8 0
Table 2: Summary of Seattle Flight Trials Data
2010 2011 Combined
Number of Crossings 39 588 627
Earliest Crossing -39 seconds -47 seconds -47 seconds
Latest Crossing 16 seconds 73 seconds 73 seconds
Mean -5.9 seconds 9.0 seconds 8.1 seconds
Median -7 seconds 9 seconds 9 seconds
Standard Deviation 12.1 seconds 11.4 seconds 12 seconds
The most noticeable difference between the two experiments is the difference in mean 
and median crossing times, with the 2010 flights demonstrating a tendency to arrive early 
while the 2011 flights showed the opposite tendency. However, the small sample size in 
2010, combined with the introductory nature of the procedures for both aircrew as well as 
air traffic controllers suggests little relative weight should be placed on the results of the 
first trial. The displacement of the mean crossing time error to the left in 2010, indicating 
a tendency for the aircraft to arrive early, could also be explained by constraints in the test 
procedures. Unlike the 2011 test where arrivals from all directions were evaluated with 
the airport in any operational runway configuration, the 2010 flights were limited to 
arrivals from the south only. Furthermore, these southerly arrivals were only evaluated 
when the airport was in a south flow configuration in which the prevailing surface winds 
were from the south, dictating the use of runways 16 left, right, and center. Since prevailing 
high altitude winds in the Pacific Northwest are from the north and west, it is likely that 
these aircraft experienced a substantial change in winds during their descent phase, 
beginning with a headwind, and then changing to a tailwind at some point during the 
arrival. If this occurred, due to the difficulties associated with forecasting and modeling 
wind in such a dynamic environment, it is plausible that these arrivals experienced wind 
conditions in which the headwind components experienced were less than expected (or
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conversely, tailwind components greater than expected). If this occurred, the effect would 
be to “push” the aircraft toward the crossing point at a higher than expected ground speed, 
and with the throttles already at idle, there would be little capability for the aircraft to 
further reduce thrust and few other options available to reduce true airspeed to compensate 
for the errors. This possibility, or a similar anomaly, could explain the predominantly early 
arrival times observed over this small sample.
For the purpose of fitting the data to a probability distribution, since arrivals o f the 
type flown during the first trial were also a subset of the second trial, the two flight trials 
have been combined into a single data set. The results of fitting the data to three candidate 
distributions is shown graphically in Figure 13. Goodness-of-Fit tests indicate a Johnson 
SU distribution or a Logistic distribution represents the data well. A Gaussian distribution 
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Figure 13: Seattle Flight Test Crossing Time Error Distribution
It is important to note that all of these results were obtained from aircraft operating the 
same flight management system, built by General Electric. The tendency for these aircraft 
to arrive late on a consistent basis can have serious safety implications if operated in an 
airspace system in which other flight management systems produced by different 
manufacturers tend to deliver aircraft with opposite tendencies. The possible safety 
implications of failing to control the mean crossing time error through regulation are 




Required time of arrival concepts have been tested in a series of simulations sponsored 
by the FAA and conducted at the William J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, NJ, 
and at the Mitre Corporation in Mclean, VA. Relevant details of these tests are described 
in Section 4.3, and raw data gathered during this testing are presented in the Appendices. 
Aircraft types modeled include numerous variants of Boeing 737 and 757, Airbus A320, 
and Embraer E l70. The flight management systems tested include the General Electric 
system used in both European and US flight trials, the Honeywell Pegasus FMS, and the 
Honeywell Primus Epic FMS. Of note, some of the more recent tests of the Honeywell 
Pegasus FMS included research software provided by Honeywell. Experiments were also 
conducted using an electronic flight bag, a hand-held tablet device used to calculate speeds 
required to achieve a required time of arrival, and envisioned for use by pilots of aircraft 
that are not equipped with an RTA-capable FMS.
While the simulation testing was conducted to address specific research questions, the 
focus of this section is to present numeric and graphical depictions of the crossing time 
error data gathered during this testing for subsequent use in estimating the performance 
levels that are currently possible with today’s state-of-the art systems as well as to inform 
projections as to what may be possible with regard to future designs. The complete data 
sets from which this information is drawn are included in the appendices.
5.2.3.1. FY-11 Simulation Data
The May 2011 simulation testing was conducted at the NextGen Integration and 
Evaluation Capability and Target Generation Facility at the William J. Hughes Technical
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Center in Atlantic City, NJ. The study was conducted in preparation for the second round 
of flight trials in Seattle, WA in late 2011. As such, the bulk of the testing focused on the 
Boeing 737 aircraft with General Electric flight management systems which represented 
all of the aircraft flown by Alaska Airlines, the FAA’s commercial airline partner for the 
flight trial. However, additional information was collected on the Airbus A320 and the 
Embraer E l70 aircraft.
Selected parameters of the data collected during this simulation are shown numerically 
in Table 3 below.
Table 3: FY-11 Simulation Crossing Time Error Data Summary
B737 A3 20 E170 Total
Number of Crossings 68 14 5 87
Earliest Crossing -47 seconds -29 seconds -60 seconds -60 seconds
Latest Crossing 38 seconds 51 seconds 90 seconds 90 seconds
Mean 5.8 seconds 4.9 seconds 33 seconds 7.1 seconds
Standard Deviation 13 seconds 25 seconds 58 seconds 21 seconds
Unlike previous flight trials both in Europe and the US that had demonstrated a 
tendency for aircraft to arrive early, all aircraft demonstrated the opposite tendency in this 
simulation, a performance that was repeated in the subsequent flight trial. The very small 
sample size of the E l70 aircraft being flown manually expands the minimum and 
maximum errors and contributes to the comparatively large standard deviation observed 
during this trial. If the five manually flown arrivals are removed from the data set, the 
mean crossing time shifts to 5.6 seconds with a 15.5 second standard deviation. It is also 
important to note that the time error tolerance setting on the FMS was set to 20 seconds for 
all aircraft participating in this testing.
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Since the objective of this section is to gain insight into the capability of aircraft 
equipped with flight management systems to capture required arrival times, the histogram 
presented in Figure 14 only the B737 and A320 data, and attempts to fit a distribution to 
these observations.
Density-Histogram Plot
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Figure 14: FY-11 Simulation Results
In a result similar to that seen in the data for the Seattle flight trial results, a Johnson 
SU distribution appears to be the best-fitting distribution. A normal distribution is once 
again displayed for comparison purposes.
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5 2 3 2 .  FY-12 & FY-13 Simulation Data
Following the second round of Seattle flight trials, a series of simulations were 
conducted at the Mitre Idea Lab in Mclean, VA. These simulations were designed to build 
on the results of the previous testing by exploring the application of required time of arrival 
capabilities to a number of other emerging technologies and procedures associated with 
NextGen. These human-in-the-loop simulations are described in the reports of their 
findings as “real-time simulation that integrates the human participants and interactions, 
typically embedded in complex human-machine systems . . .  to explore, evaluate, and 
document candidate procedures and processes in medium fidelity operational 
environments” (Alexander, et al., 2013). Four simulation periods were conducted during 
FY-12 and two periods during FY-13. Results from each of the first five of these six test 
periods have been studied and included in the analysis performed for this research. Initial 
analysis of preliminary data from the final test period appear to be consistent with previous 
research, but these results are not included. The complete data sets from all five 
simulations used for this analysis are included in the appendices.
One of the most interesting and relevant findings over the course of these simulations 
is the effect of changing the time error tolerance setting on the General Electric FMS from 
an initial value of twenty seconds, as used in previous simulations and flight tests, to a 
value of ten seconds. While the exact influence this setting has on the internal algorithms 
is not known due to the proprietary nature of that information, the effect of the change is 
clear. The following table illustrates the data collected for all crossings simulated during 
these tests using each of the values.
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Table 4: Time Error Tolerance Performance Data for Simulation
20 Second TET 10 Second TET
Number of Crossings 90 222
Earliest Crossing -47 seconds -34 seconds
Latest Crossing 38 seconds 81 seconds
Mean 5.3 seconds 3.1 seconds
Standard Deviation 12.6 seconds 11.4 seconds
The reduced mean crossing time error and lower standard deviation associated with 
the smaller time error tolerance setting is consistent with the findings of the CASSIS flight 
trials that used 30 second and 10 second values. The results above include all crossing 
times for all flights with recorded data regardless of the phase of flight or application being 
tested. The insight of showing clear performance improvement is important evidence of 
the influence of the algorithm design and the potential for improved future performance 
through adjustment of significant variables within these algorithms.
Another important insight obtained through data analysis is the relative performance 
of aircraft executing time-based clearances in level cruise flight versus aircraft executing 
time-based clearances to meter fix crossings in the arrival phase. The difference between 
these two flight environments is dramatic. In level cruise flight, many of the most 
important variables are relatively constant, allowing for the possibility of very accurate 
crossing time performance. In contrast, the descending flight environment associated with 
the arrival phase, or similarly, the climbing environment associated with departures, 
includes a transition through a dynamic environment in which numerous variables such as 
wind, temperature, and pressure are simultaneously and continuously changing. The 
continuous nature of the changing parameters makes modeling of the environment 
challenging, and the expected result is a lower accuracy threshold. Aircraft engine
parameters during this phase also contribute to the expectation of reduced accuracy. 
During the descent phase, arrivals are typically flown with engines at or near the flight idle 
power setting to minimize fuel bum. With a constant low thrust setting on the engines, 
common practice is to maintain airspeed by adjusting rate of descent. However, when a 
three dimensional flight profile must be maintained with strict adherence to crossing 
altitudes at geographic reference points, if engine thrust is not adjusted, airspeed will vary 
in response to random variables, with the strongest influence apparently being from that of 
local winds. It is also important to understand that jet engines are unresponsive at low 
power settings, and small throttle adjustments result in negligible changes in engine thrust. 
The practical effect of this characteristic is that in order to maintain a precise speed in a 
descent, large throttle movements would be necessary to make the small speed corrections 
necessary to overcome inevitable time errors that emerge during descent as a result of the 
differences between the environment modeled within the FMS and that actually 
experienced by the aircraft in the real world. Designing an FMS algorithm to perform 
speed corrections with the frequency and magnitude required for highly accurate time of 
arrival performance is not desired by commercial air carriers as it has two immediate costs. 
The first is increased engine wear associated with engine speed modulation, leading to 
higher total operating costs. The second is associated with diminished comfort and 
confidence of the passengers who are not accustomed to rapid changes in engine setting 
that are easily detected due to the audible changes in engine pitch and volume.
While departure events were executed with clearances to en route fixes, the vast 
majority of data collected during simulation involves level flight and descents in the arrival 
phase.Table 5 illustrates a breakdown of the data collected during the third and fourth
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simulations in which aircraft executed a time-based clearance during level cruise flight to 
an en route waypoint, followed immediately by a second time-based clearance to an arrival 
meter fix. Because these aircraft performed identical maneuvers under the same simulated 
environmental conditions, it is the most direct comparison available between these two 
operational performance envelopes.
Table 5: Comparison of Level vs. Descending Flight Performance
Cruise Flight Descending Flight
Number of Crossings 113 109
Earliest Crossing -18 seconds -34 seconds
Latest Crossing 41 seconds 41 seconds
Mean 5.6 seconds 4.7 seconds
Mode 0 seconds 6 seconds
Median 5 seconds 5 seconds
Standard Deviation 8.8 seconds 10.5 seconds
Due to the vast differences in operating environments, and the substantial challenges 
associated with the descending phase of flight, it is a somewhat surprising result that 
performance in level flight is roughly equal to that of descending flight. The explanation 
for the similarity is found within anecdotal descriptions provided by FMS system engineers 
of the algorithms that govern the corrections commanded by the flight management 
systems and the designed response to errors. Regardless of the environment, the FMS is 
not likely to command a thrust change to correct for minor variations in speed discrepancies 
as the aircraft experiences environmental conditions that vary from those forecasted and 
programmed into the system. This logic routinely allows for offsetting discrepancies to 
cancel each other out, such as when the headwind initially experienced is slightly greater 
than forecast, but slightly less than forecast at a subsequent portion of the flight. A system 
that is tuned too finely would apply two corrections in such cases, whereas the current
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configuration makes no correction while achieving the same end result of an on-time 
crossing. However, when a pre-determined threshold difference between the speed 
calculated to achieve an on-time crossing time and actual speed is reached, the system 
applies a correction to overcome the environmental uncertainty with a thrust change. The 
thresholds at which these corrections are made are not necessarily symmetric. The 
resulting performance is a random distribution that provides some insight into the nature 
of the corrections and error tolerances programmed into the systems.
Perhaps the most interesting characteristic of the system however, is a comparison of 
the distribution of simulated cruise crossing time errors with those of descending flight. 
Due to the nature of the models employed by the flight management system, which input 
expected wind values at some number of discrete flight levels and then apply some method 
of interpolation to estimate wind speeds at intermediate altitudes, the flight management 
system does not perfectly model winds in descending flight even in a simulated 
environment. For comparison purposes, the descending flight data set is presented 
graphically in Figure 15.
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Figure 15: Crossing Time Error for Descending Flight
Note that once again, a Johnson SU distribution is the best-fitting model available. 
Consistent with previous graphical depictions, a normal distribution is also provided for 
reference.
Observing the data for level cruise flight reveals an interesting feature of the 
performance of the flight management systems when tested in simulation. In these 
operations, the aircraft demonstrates the ability to consistently arrive within a half second 
of the assigned crossing time on a substantial number of flights, while demonstrating a 
distribution that is virtually identical to descending flight for all other crossings. 
Throughout the simulation periods, environmental conditions were adjusted such that 
during some events the FMS was programmed with wind values that matched the
simulation environment while in others events the simulation environment winds were 
deliberately set to values that differed from those programmed in the FMS. It has been 
hypothesized that the spike in the data observed at zero seconds is a result of executing 
flights with perfect wind information, but investigation of the simulation records provides 
no correlation to allow that hypothesis to be accepted, or more precisely in statistical 
analysis, for an alternative hypothesis to be rejected. These results suggest that additional 
research should be conducted to determine whether this spike is an artifact of simulation, 
or is the result of some performance characteristic of the FMS. From the non-zero crossing 
times, the evidence seems convincing that when the system is exposed to any variations 
from the forecasted values of the variables it models, it makes corrections in exactly the 
same manner during level flight as it does during the descent phase. More importantly, it 
is clear that despite the advantages of operating in an environment with relatively constant 
environmental conditions and at an engine setting that would allow for significantly more 
accurate performance with virtually undetectable throttle movements, the FMS does not 
take advantage of these opportunities for increased precision, and no correction is made 
until the single threshold error value is reached. Once that threshold is reached, a correction 
is applied (possibly a single correction) to compensate for the differences between the 
modeled conditions and actual conditions. The result for all crossings is a probabilistic 
distribution that is virtually identical to that observed during descending flight, but is 
slightly skewed toward zero due to the number of zero error crossings observed in 
simulation. These results are illustrated graphically in Figure 16 to clearly depict the 









It is important to note that these results were not collected and recorded by human 
observers as was the case during the CASSIS trials, and is not the result of researcher bias. 
Instead, these results are derived from the reported output of the simulation hardware.
5.3. Performance Metrics
One of the research questions identified in Section 1.3 asks how can the time-based 
performance o f an aircraft be quantified as a metric that provides adequate design 
flexibility while maintaining sufficient control o f  underlying parameters o f the error 
distribution? This section answers that first research question.
interval Midpoint in Seconds (negativedenotes earty)
B  44 intervals of width 1 fjf 1 - Johnson SU
Figure 16: Crossing Time Error for Cruise Flight
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The expected increases in air traffic density in the coming decades will require 
unprecedented levels of navigation precision in all four dimensions to achieve desired 
capacity increases and safety improvements. The method by which these precise standards 
are communicated both to industry as well as operational activities has not yet been 
specified. The following sub-sections develop a metric by which sufficient control may be 
exerted over key performance parameters using a clear format that provides a robust 
complement to existing required navigation performance standards.
5.3.1. Metric Format Alternatives
By observing the performance of modem aircraft equipped with flight management 
systems featuring required time of arrival functions, as well as the performance of aircraft 
without such equipage, trends in the data can be identified. From these trends, it is possible 
to create performance metrics that will describe the performance of any aircraft, including 
both current and future models, depending on the type of systems available on each aircraft. 
The objective of developing such a metric is two-fold. First, it establishes a convention by 
which the time-based performance of aircraft may be quantified for use in air traffic 
management functions such as sequencing and separating aircraft. This convention has the 
added benefit of providing a means by which human operators may develop intuition 
regarding the relative performance levels of various aircraft operating in the airspace they 
control. Second, it provides guidelines for industry with respect to the design of avionics 
intended to support trajectory based operations. With these objectives in mind, it is useful 
to consider similar existing performance standards found in aviation regulations to 
establish a precedent from which new performance standards may be developed.
One alternative is to express a window of time in which an aircraft that is assigned a 
crossing time is expected to arrive along with some confidence level. This is the method 
by which time of arrival control standards have been expressed at the regulatory level to 
date. Initial time of arrival control standards did not require manufacturers to include a 
time of arrival control function on flight management systems, but specified that if such a 
function is included, it “shall control the time of arrival at a specified lateral fix in the flight 
plan with a 95% accuracy of 30 seconds” (RTCA, 2003, p. 24). The weakness of this 
standard is that it fails to control the shape of the underlying distribution. This flaw allows 
for the possibility that manufacturers who attempt to optimize the efficiency of a single 
aircraft descent profile will design algorithms that meet the standard, but lead to 
asymmetric control schemes resulting in consistently early or late arrivals. If multiple 
manufacturers produce systems that achieve certification through individual system 
testing, there is a potential for unacceptable collision risk to be introduced into the system 
if those systems are then combined operationally within the airspace system with other 
certified systems that display opposite tendencies (Bell, et al., 2013).
A more robust alternative is to develop a simple category system to express the relative 
performance of all aircraft. This practice is common within the aviation discipline and 
numerous examples exist within the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) governing 
aviation activities in the United States. One such example is found in Title 14 CFR §97.3 
of these regulations and describes aircraft as falling into one of five categories based on 
their approach airspeed. This category system serves as the basis for determining the 
minimum weather conditions under which an aircraft may execute an instrument approach 
to a runway for landing (GPO, 2012). A standard of this nature has been proposed for time
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of arrival control avionics and flight standards using a similar five category system to 
provide limits on the mean and standard deviation of expected crossing time errors (Bell, 
2013).
A final method by which aircraft performance can be described is accomplished by 
setting a performance value. This method was pioneered to express navigational position 
accuracy and is described through the application of a Required Navigation Performance, 
denoted by RNP-X, where X is a variable describing the aircraft navigation performance. 
The method by which this is accomplished is depicted graphically in Figure 17 and 
explained in detail below.
95% RNP-x
Actual position
' \ 1 '  Estimated position Desired track
99.999%
R N P - 2 x
Figure 17: Required Navigation Performance Metrics
The figure shows the estimated position of an aircraft with regard to some desired 
track as determined by the navigation system. This estimated position is what is reported 
to air traffic control either by voice report, through a digital data link system, or by the 
emerging Automatic Dependent Surveillance -  Broadcast (ADS-B) system. However, the 
actual position of the aircraft may be at some other point. The actual position of the aircraft
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is its true position, and can be determined through independent observation by air traffic 
control via sources such as RADAR or visual observation. RNP-X values are used to 
describe the likelihood of the discrepancy between estimated and actual position in 
probabilistic terms. By definition, the value of X describes the 95% confidence interval 
within which the aircraft is likely to be contained, expressed in terms of nautical miles. 
Additionally, the RNP definition states that the probability of the actual position being 
more than two times the value of X from its estimated position is 1 x 10"5. For example, if 
a system is certified as RNP-4, there is a 95% probability that the aircraft will be within 4 
miles of the desired track, and 99.999% probability that it will be within 8 miles 
(Nakamura, 2000).
5.3.2. Required Time Performance
As discussed in the previous section, there are significant safety concerns over the use 
of a standard that provides nothing more than bookend values of desired time-based 
performance. The use of a simple categorical standard is a preferred alternative due to its 
implicit control over key parameters of the error distribution. However, there are 
drawbacks to using a categorical standard as well. Namely, an aircraft that demonstrates 
performance that is just barely good enough to achieve certification in some category is 
treated identically to another aircraft whose performance falls just short of the next highest 
category. There is no graduated level of performance within any category, and therefore 
no benefit to any performance improvement within a category. Additionally, a category 
system that attempts to govern performance by controlling specific parameters of a 
distribution limits industry design flexibility as failure to meet the specification for any
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parameter results in a failure to meet the desired certification, regardless of how much the 
system might exceed performance requirements in other parameters.
The concept of a Required Time Performance standard is attractive for a number of 
reasons. In both name and function, it serves as a complement to existing standards used 
to describe navigation performance. Further, it allows incremental benefits to be realized 
with incremental gains in performance that are not arbitrarily constrained by a category 
system. Thus, aircraft and avionics manufacturers can assess the cost and practicality of 
achieving a desired time-based performance level and make informed decisions with regard 
to the tradeoffs associated with various algorithm design strategies. Finally, strategic 
documents defining the vision of NextGen have identified development of this standard as 
a pre-requisite to initiation of trajectory based operations (JPDO, 2011). The challenge of 
developing an RTP standard is in finding a way to adequately control the parameters of the 
underlying error distribution as a categorical standard does.
As a pre-requisite to providing a performance metric in an RTP format, the nature of 
the underlying distribution must be justified. Since the event of interest is that of all future 
time-based arrivals at any possible three-dimensional fix, the population being estimated 
is effectively infinite. An inductive mode of reasoning allows a finite sample of sufficient 
size to be used to infer the nature of that population. The research process depends upon 
employment of the central limit theorem in an attempt to generalize the time-based 
performance of aircraft. If the resources necessary for flight and simulation testing were 
not limited, an infinite series of tests could be developed to further explore the time-based 
performance of aircraft until the data set became saturated such that the addition of more 
data points would no longer influence the statistics describing aircraft performance. The
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central limit theorem asserts that if the mean value of each of these tests is fitted to a 
probability distribution, regardless of the underlying distribution from which the data itself 
originated, the result will be a normal distribution (Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 2002). It is this 
theorem that justifies the use of a normal distribution to describe the long-term expected 
performance of aircraft despite reported results indicating that individual test results are 
best represented by something other than a normal distribution.
With a normal distribution serving as the basis for an RTP standard, the RTP standard 
itself can be fully developed. In the same way that the Required Navigation Performance 
is communicated, the RTP standard is formulated with a variable value associated with it. 
If Y is assigned as a variable to represent this value in a RTP-Y format, the value of Y can 
be set as follows:
Y = 2Qi + <r) (1)
where p represents the mean and a represents the standard deviation of the long-term 
expected crossing time error distribution of an aircraft.
To illustrate the effect of formulating Y as depicted in Equation (1), consider a normal 
distribution such as the one illustrated in Figure 18 that might describe the long-term 
performance of some aircraft. The key parameters of this sample distribution are a mean 
of 0 seconds and a standard deviation of 10 seconds.
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Figure 18: Example RTP-20 Crossing Time Error Distribution
It can be shown that the 95% confidence interval of this distribution ranges from -19.6 
seconds to +19.6 seconds, roughly equal to the success criteria used in the evaluation of 
the Seattle flight trials. Since the 95% confidence interval of a normal distribution is 
approximately equal to two standard deviations, the value of Y approximates the 95% 
confidence interval when the mean of the distribution is zero. If the distribution in Figure 
18 represented the performance of some aircraft, it would be certified under this proposal 
to a level of RTP-20. However, if certification testing showed the aircraft had a tendency 
to arrive late as has been observed in numerous tests to date, such as a case in which the 
mean crossing time error was +3 seconds, the Y value would increase such that the aircraft 
would be certified as RTP-26. If the manufacturer wished to design the system such that 
it meets a performance specification of RTP-20, conceivably to allow the aircraft to 
participate in operations requiring this level of performance, and for some reason did not 
wish to adjust the mean crossing time error, Figure 19 illustrates how design changes that 
reduce the standard deviation of test results would allow this certification level to be
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achieved. The burden on the manufacturer would then be to show the standard deviation 
to be seven seconds or less. Assuming this is technically feasible, a comparison of these 
two potential distributions provides important insight for the sections that follow.
Normal Distribution 
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Figure 19: Two Alternative RTP-20 Distributions
Note that while the mean crossing time of the second distribution, shown in red, has 
noticeably shifted to the right, the tail of that same distribution drops more rapidly and 
approaches zero faster than the initial distribution with a zero mean. It can be shown that 
with regard to the dispersion of expected crossing times, a zero mean crossing time error 
is the limiting case when calculating the end points of the largest 95% confidence interval 
for any combination of mean and standard deviation values. From the perspective of a 
manufacturer, this function of Y results in a mathematical penalty for any deviation from 
the mean that must be overcompensated for with a reduction in standard deviation in order
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to achieve certification at a desired RTP-Y level. The importance of this feature of the 
standard will be further described in the following section.
5.4. Collision Probabilities
The second research question identified in section 1.3 asks how can the probability o f  
collision be determined for aircraft operating in a time-based operational environment? 
This section answers that question demonstrating a method by which collision probability 
may be calculated using stochastic modeling techniques.
5.4.1. Scope o f Calculations
The calculations developed for the purpose of this research are limited to aircraft 
operating in proximity to one another under two different scenarios. The first is a low 
aspect scenario in which both aircraft are assigned crossing times at some three- 
dimensional fix, and approach the fix along the same course, or nearly the same course. 
This is a routine operation that takes place on a nearly continuous basis in controlled 
airspace all over the world. An example of this type of operation can be seen in the 
Olympia 7 arrival to Seattle-Tacoma International Airport shown in Appendix A. The fix 
labeled Olympia is a meter fix that is used as a flow control point for southerly arrivals and 
is one of the points used for testing during both Seattle flight trials. Aircraft arriving from 
the south may first fly over the point labeled Battleground and then fly the prescribed 
course to Olympia. If two sequential aircraft fly this same profile, and both are assigned 
crossing times at Olympia, there is some probability that they will arrive at Olympia at the 
same time, resulting in a collision. However, it is also possible for a collision to occur at 
some other point along the route prior to reaching Olympia. If each aircraft arrival is
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considered independently, and the closest aircraft is assigned to cross the fix at some time 
prior to the furthest aircraft, it is possible that the aircraft assigned to cross the fix first will 
cross at some time after the second aircraft. If this is the case, the second aircraft must 
have passed the first aircraft somewhere prior to the crossing. Two previously discussed 
assumptions become important to the calculations that follow. First, the navigation error 
of each aircraft is assumed to be negligible such that the approach to the crossing fix is 
considered to be a tube of air that only one aircraft can fly through at a time. Secondly, it 
is assumed that if one aircraft overtakes another, this event will happen no more than once. 
The result of this formulation is conservative from a risk estimation perspective in that the 
event of the second aircraft arriving before the first leads to an assumption that a collision 
must have taken place at some point prior to the fix crossing. In this example, the collision 
would occur somewhere between Battleground and Olympia.
It is acknowledged that these assumptions may not be true in practice. The scenario 
described above may occur as described, and due to the random nature of navigation errors, 
one aircraft may pass the other with some horizontal or vertical clearance that does not 
result in a collision. Similarly, it is possible that the aircraft beginning further from the 
point is flying higher and faster than the closer aircraft, and may pass the closer aircraft 
with vertical clearance by design. If these variations are included in the collision risk 
calculations, each event considered would reduce the probability of collision by some 
amount. However, by not including them, the probability of collision will always be less 
than or equal to the value obtained by the calculations described herein.
The second scenario considered is the high aspect crossing case that occurs when two 
aircraft cross the same point at an intersection of two flight paths or at the merge point
between two converging flight paths. This geometry can be seen once again on the arrival 
to Seattle such as a case in which only one aircraft arrives from Battleground while the 
other aircraft arrives from Newberg. In this case, the probability of collision is solely a 
function of crossing time error as the two tracks are not coincidental until reaching 
Olympia. Consistent with the previous description of low aspect geometries, the method 
of calculating the probability of collision provided in this research will be conservative in 
nature, slightly overstating the risk of collision between merging traffic by assuming that 
collisions will not be avoided due to chance errors in navigation. Since the calculated 
collision probability is treated as a constraint that must be satisfied for operational 
feasibility, future research efforts may achieve more aggressive results if constraints 
imposed by the assumptions of this effort are relaxed, leading to more complex time-based 
collision risk models that allow for further increases in system capacity. However, the 
objective of this research is limited to development and demonstration of a general method 
by which collision probability may be assessed in the most frequently experienced 
encounters in the airspace system, and therefore additional geometries such as vertical 
crossings are beyond the scope of this research.
5.4.2. Collision Probability Calculations
In the calculations that follow, it is assumed that the aircraft are not initially co-located, 
in which case a collision occurs at time 0. Instead, this research assumes that the aircraft 
are minimally separated by some amount that satisfies either current distance-based or a 
future time-based separation standard.
To introduce variables used in the development of these models, consider two aircraft, 
represented by j and k, where aircraft j is initially closest to the crossing point. The aircraft
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may then be assigned clearances to cross some three-dimensional fix at specific times, T j  
and Tk, with some interval, I, scheduled between them and I being expressed in units of 
time such that I > 0. The actual arrival times will be represented by lower case tj and tk, 
respectively, with the difference between assigned and actual crossing time being referred 
to as crossing time errors. These crossing time errors are assumed to be distributed 
according to some function /j(t) and /k(t) respectively. Additionally, let ln represent the 
length and v* represent the ground speed of any aircraft n. The exposure time at the 
crossing point may then be defined by a variable 6n as follows:
5 n =  —
vn
In this formulation, 6n represents the amount of time between the leading edge of the 
aircraft n arriving at the crossing point and the trailing edge exiting the crossing point.
For convenience of expression regarding the equations to follow, two additional 
variables, a, and P, are introduced to describe certain aspects of the time between the arrival 
of aircraft j at the crossing point and the relevant exposure times of aircraft j and k. The 
formulation and use of these variables will be further described in the sections that follow:
a = tj — Sk 
(3 = tj +  Sj
5.4.2.1. Low Aspect Collision Probability
For two aircraft traveling along the same or nearly the same three-dimensional track 
to an assigned crossing point, it is possible that the aircraft will each exhibit crossing time 
errors such that they arrive at the same point in space at the same time anywhere along the 
track between their point of origination and the crossing point.
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If the first crossing time is assigned to aircraft j, and a subsequent crossing time is 
assigned to aircraft k, there are three possible events that could take place. First, aircraft 
k’s arrival time, tk, could occur before the arrival time of aircraft j, tj. In this case, aircraft 
k must have passed aircraft j, and since modem navigation systems demonstrate very little 
position error, it is conservative to assume that aircraft k collided with aircraft j at some 
point prior to reaching the crossing point. Second, tk could occur sometime after tj, but 
before aircraft j has exited the crossing point, a time defined as (3. This would result in a 
collision at, or very near, the crossing point. Finally, tk could arrive at some time after (3, 
resulting in a crossing without a collision. The following equation summarizes these three 
scenarios and lays the groundwork for a stochastic model describing the probability of 
collision in this geometry.
P(Collisiori) = P (tk < /?)
Now suppose each aircraft has demonstrated its ability to capture time-based 
clearances through some certification process. It is reasonable to believe that the expected 
errors expressed by the probability density functions fj{\) and /k(t) are independent of each 
other. If this is true, the scenario can be depicted graphically with both density functions 
on a timeline as illustrated in Figure 20. These density functions have been chosen 







Figure 20: Two Aircraft Crossing-Time Error Distributions
Of interest is the probability that aircraft k arrives at the same time as aircraft j, or at 
any time prior to aircraft j exiting the crossing point, time (3. This probability is calculated 
by integrating over all possible arrival times of aircraft j and the probability of aircraft k 
arriving at or earlier than p. Thus, the probability is calculated according to the following 
equation:
'Pr°° r
P[tk < P ] =  f j ( 0 d t  f k( t)d t  
Jo IVo
(2)
The function Fk(t) is commonly used to denote the probability distribution function of k, 
and it can be seen that the probability of aircraft k arriving at or before p is by definition 
the distribution function of k. This allows Equation (2) to be simplified to the following 
expression.
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P[tk < p ] =  f  f j ( t ) * Fk(t)d t  
Jo
(3)
As discussed in section 5.3.2, the long term crossing time errors for any aircraft are 
expected to take on the characteristics of a normal distribution. This allows the functions 
of j and k to be described entirely by their means, pj and pk, and standard deviations, Oj and 
Ok. Further, if the distribution of aircraft j errors is expressed as S = N(ps, a s), and the 
distribution of aircraft k errors is expressed as R = N(pr, or), then a new function can be 
introduced as
Z = R — S
In this expression, aircraft j ’s crossing time is arbitrarily set as time tj = 0. It follows that 
ps = pj + 6j and pr = I' + Pk. Once again assuming the performance of each aircraft is 
statistically independent, it can be inferred that the variable Z is also a normal random 
variable and the properties of normal distribution functions allows the following 
relationship to be expressed (Haidar & Mahadevan, 2000):
P[tk <p ]  = P[Z<  0]
Using the customary Greek letter ® to denote the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution, it can now be seen that equation (3) can be used to define the 
probability of collision as
P[Z < 0] = 0
0 -  (nr -  Us)
\ J a r 2 +  <rs 2 .




5A.2.2. High Aspect Collision Probabilities
The event of a collision occurring at a crossing point such as the merge point or 
intersection of two routes requires a more complex function to account for the elimination 
of collision probability prior to arrival at the crossing point. When the only common point 
of flight is the intersection of two flight paths, there are only two possible collision 
scenarios. Aircraft j can arrive while aircraft k is exposed in the intersection, or vice versa. 
Graphical depictions are useful for visualizing the mathematical relationships that describe 
these events. The vectors in Figure 21 represent any aircraft, n, of any length and 
groundspeed, and thus their magnitude is 6n. Similarly, all other variables used in the 
following formulation are consistent with those defined in the previous sections.
(a) (b) I (c)
tk = tj + 6i tk =  ̂ tk = tj - 6k
Aircraft J 
Aircraft K
Figure 21: Range o f Possibilities for High-Aspect Collision Geometries
In Figure 21, scenarios (a) and (c) represent the limiting cases of the two collision 
possibilities while scenario (b) depicts the midpoint between the two extremes. In scenario
(a), aircraft j arrives at some time tj, and the last moment in time that a collision can occur 
is if aircraft k’s arrival time, tk, occurs as the trailing edge of aircraft j is about to exit the 
crossing point. Scenario (b) simply depicts the arrival of both aircraft at exactly the same
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moment in time. Finally, scenario (c) depicts a case in which aircraft k arrives prior to 
aircraft j. In this scenario, tk must occur such that tj will occur while aircraft k is still 
exposed at the crossing point.
The collision risk model for high aspect geometries is subsequently derived from the 
limiting cases illustrated in scenarios (a) and (c). Of interest is the probability that tk occurs 
earlier than the time depicted in scenario (a) and later than the time depicted in scenario
(b). Figure 21 depicts this range of time on the same timeline used in Figure 20.




Figure 22: Graphic depiction of Possible High-Aspect Collision Times
To develop a collision risk model for this geometry, the probability that tk is less than 
or equal to p is once again necessary. However, from this value, the probability that tk is 
less than or equal to a  must be considered as well, and this value must be subtracted. The 
process of deriving this model is shown through the series of equations presented below:
I l l
P(collision) = P(a < tk < /?)
= P(tj)  * P({tfc <  /?}) -  P(tj) * P({tk <  a})
= Pfe) * [P({tfc < /?}) -   ̂a})]
= ["/yCOdtff^/fcCOdt- fVfcCOdtl (5)
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With these two models, it is possible to calculate a collision risk between any two 
aircraft scheduled to cross a point in space with some interval between them. The next 
question to be considered is how the interval should be managed. That question is the 
addressed in the following section as the application of these models to the management of 
air traffic in a trajectory based operations environment is demonstrated.
5.5. Interval Analysis
The final research question to be addressed is how can the density o f  air traffic be 
increased to meet expected demand while maintaining an acceptable level o f  collision risk? 
This section provides an answer to that question. The method developed is to apply the 
separation functions developed through this research to collision risk models that may be 
used to determine how the interval between sequential aircraft influences the collision risk 
and the capacity of the system. To accomplish this, the models are formulated with two 
aircraft of variable performance capability, as indicated by an assumed RTP-Y certification 
level, operating in an uncertain environment. In this way, the results of the analysis may 
be easily applied to represent any two sequential aircraft scheduled to cross a fix with some 
amount of time between them. Once the model is constructed, it may be used as a tool to 
provide specific recommendations for standards governing four dimensional trajectory 
based operations as demonstrated in the following sections.
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5.5.1. Aircraft Operating Environment Modeling
A unique characteristic of aviation operations is the dynamic nature of the 
environment in which the aircraft operate. There are numerous variables that must be 
considered in order for a model to be meaningful in its representation of aircraft operations. 
The variables involved include airspeed, wind, pressure, air density, and temperature.
Some of the variables used in the model developed to support this research are 
selectable by the user. These variables include the headwind component, the altitude in 
thousands of feet, the sea level temperature, and the interval assigned between sequential 
aircraft in seconds. A temperature lapse rate of 3.5 degrees per 1,000 feet is assumed to 
apply from sea level to flight level 450, the highest altitude currently modeled, and a flight 
level temperature is calculated for any altitude selected by the user. The default sea level 
temperature is set to 59 degrees Fahrenheit, the value specified for sea level in the 1976 
US Standard Atmosphere (NOAA, NASA, & USAF, 1976). The temperature is also 
converted to degrees Kelvin (K) for use in other airspeed calculations described below. 
The air density at the selected altitude is then calculated using data from tables included in 
the US Standard Atmosphere document.
Airspeed expressions were discussed in section 2.3. The model developed through 
this research considers the differences between indicated, equivalent, and calibrated 
airspeed to be negligible, and calibrated airspeed is used to represent any aircraft speed 
restriction expressed in nautical miles per hour such as the ones specified on the standard 
arrival to Seattle depicted in Appendix A. Once a calibrated airspeed is selected, a true 
airspeed is then calculated. The formula for this conversion is shown below.
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2 On
TAS = CAS —  
, P
where po is the air density a sea level on a standard day, 1.225 kg/m3, and p is the density
of the air in which the aircraft is flying. Ground speed may then be determined by simply 
subtracting any headwind component (or adding a tailwind component) to the true airspeed. 
As a final speed reference, Mach number is then calculated using the following expression.
Where ao is the standard speed of sound at sea level, 661.47 knots; T is the static air 
temperature in degrees Kelvin; and To is the temperature at standard sea level, 288.15 K.
One final parameter is calculated by the model to allow comparisons to be drawn 
between current distance-based separation standards and time-based separation standards 
proposed herein. If each aircraft were to arrive at the specified crossing point exactly at its 
assigned time and at the designated airspeed, it is possible to determine the physical 
distance between the aircraft using the same calculations the Traffic Management Advisor 
uses in its stream class setting. This value is calculated by the model via the following 
equation.
With these user inputs and calculations completed, the user may then enter the mean 
and standard deviation of the crossing time error distribution for each aircraft. Based on 
these inputs, the model generates a graphical depiction of the mathematical model similar 
to that shown in Figure 20. Additionally, the model calculates the probability of collision
TAS
Mach =




for the selected parameters using either Equations (4) or (5), depending on the aspect ratio 
of the intersection.
5.5.2. Application o f the Performance Metric
In Section 5.3.2 a performance metric was developed in an RTP-Yformat. This section 
will use the interval analysis model to demonstrate the application of this metric and the 
limiting case of a zero mean crossing time error.
The following parameters are drawn from either the US Standard Atmosphere, 
requirements for the Standard Arrival to Seattle shown in Appendix A, or as calculated by 
the model based on the user input values.
Table 6: Sample Values from Interval Analysis Model
Calibrated Airspeed 250 knots
Altitude 12,000 feet
True Airspeed 300 knots
Headwind 0
Sea Level Temp 59 deg F
Ground Speed 300 knots
Interval 60 seconds
Separation Distance 5 NM
It can be observed that if the procedures for the arrival to Seattle are followed exactly, and 
the 5 NM separation standard is also exactly adhered to, the resulting time-based interval 
will be 60 seconds. This is simply a coincidence and this relationship does not hold true at 
crossing points associated with all arrivals.
Using this data set, consider two aircraft whose time-based performance is certified at 
RTP-14. To begin with, this performance will be assumed to have been achieved by 
identical aircraft demonstrating a zero mean crossing time error and a seven second
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standard deviation, roughly the best performance level demonstrated by any aircraft to date. 
It can be shown by applying Equation (4) using values from Table 6, the collision 
probability is 6.8 x 10"10. The scenario is depicted graphically in Figure 23.
Aircraft/ Aircraft*
Figure 23: Sample Crossing Time Error, Initial Scenario
Now consider a variation of the scenario in which Aircraft j achieves an RTP-14 
performance certification with a mean crossing time error of 2 seconds late and a standard 
deviation of 5 seconds, while aircraft k remains unchanged. The new probability of 
collision is lowered to 7.8 x 10'12. The reason for this reduction becomes clear when the 
relationship between the tails of each distribution are observed in the graphic depiction of 
the new scenario shown in Figure 24. The red curve depicts the new density function with 
a mean crossing time error of two seconds late, and the corresponding steeper vertical drop 
toward a zero value that is reached prior to the original curve.
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Aircraft j Aircraft k
A A
T,
Figure 24: Sample Crossing Time Error, Updated Scenario
The scenario depicted in Figure 24 can be generalized to any sequence of aircraft with 
known RTP-Y values such that the highest probability of collision is calculated when both 
aircraft are treated as if their RTP-Y value is achieved with a zero mean crossing time error.
5.5.3. Relating Interval to Capacity
As described in previous sections, a number of strategies have been developed in 
recent years to increase the efficiency by which delays are absorbed during peak operating 
hours. However, the objective of programs such as NextGen and Single European Sky is 
to increase capacity rather than to simply reduce the cost of delays introduced when 
demand exceeds capacity. In order to accommodate current demand during peak 
operational periods, as well as projected future demand, the density of air traffic will need 
to be increased by some measurable amount. From Figure 2, it can be seen that demand is 
projected to be approximately 1.5 times greater than current demand by 2030, with the 
expected number of passengers increasing from about 800 million to roughly 1.2 billion. 
It can be concluded from the methods demonstrated in this research that a feasible approach 
to accommodating rising demand by increasing traffic density while maintaining an
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acceptable level of risk is available to air traffic management authorities. This section will 
demonstrate such application.
Consider the following example. If an operation currently involves acceptance of 60 
arrivals per hour, in the future it will need to accommodate 90 arrivals per hour to meet an 
expected demand that is 1.5 times greater than current demand. Another way of stating 
this same problem is that if the operation currently accepts one arrival every 60 seconds, 
future demand will require acceptance of one arrival every 40 seconds. The collision risk 
models allow determination of how accurate flight management systems must be to allow 
aircraft to operate with this level of separation while maintaining an acceptable probability 
of collision.
Using the same general data from Table 6, but with the time-based interval changed 
to 40 seconds, the collision risk increases to 2.7 x 10‘5, an unacceptably high risk as defined 
by relevant regulatory documents. However, if the crossing time error performance of the 
aircraft is improved, the risk can be reduced. Through application of the methods described 
in this paper, it can be shown that if the aircraft could be certified to an RTP-9.4 
performance level, the collision risk would be returned to an acceptable level, in this case 
8.8 x 10‘10. Given the nature of “book end” standards that have been considered to date, it 
is interesting to note that this level of performance would be equal to a window of ±9.2 
seconds with 95% confidence. As an alternative, if regulators wish to express RTP-Y 
standards with Y being constrained to an integer value, the same interval analysis model 
can be used to show that if both aircraft are certified to a level o f RTP-10, the minimum 
interval that can be safely assigned between the aircraft is 43 seconds.
One final variation on this example is worth highlighting. Suppose that instead of 
identical aircraft, the aircraft are dissimilar. Recall that two aircraft separated by 60 
seconds were shown to achieve an acceptable low-aspect collision risk if they are both 
certified as RTP-14. If aircraft j is such an aircraft, but due to enhanced algorithm design, 
aircraft k is able to meet requirements for certification at the RTP-10 level, the interval 
between the two aircraft may be safely reduced to 52 seconds. The important insight is 
that incremental gains are possible as any aircraft that is able to deliver improved 
performance in a trajectory based operations environment will contribute a measurable 
benefit to the system as a whole.
While no publically available data provides evidence that current aircraft are capable 
of achieving performance exceeding RTP-14, innovative designs powered by economic 
incentive may allow accomplishment of this performance level in the near future, allowing 
tomorrow’s aircraft to operate in higher density environments while enjoying today’s 
margin of safety.
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6. Recommendations and Future Research
There are a number of recommendations that emerge from this research, and additional 
questions that arise suggesting the need for additional research. This section briefly 
summarizes recommendations that emerge as a result of this effort and provides 
suggestions for additional studies that will enhance these initial findings.
6.1. Time-Based Performance Metric
The need to develop a performance metric that is robust enough to ensure control of 
key parameters of crossing time error distributions has been made clear in recent literature, 
and is reinforced in this document. The safety of the flying public must be accounted for 
in the development of complex systems such as NextGen, and the precision that will be 
necessary to meet the stated objectives of such programs demands development of robust 
standards for future trajectory based operations.
The RTP-Y metric proposed in this research provides numerous advantages over 
previously considered alternatives. Its format is virtually identical to that of existing 
required navigation performance standards, allowing seamless integration with those 
standards and providing a comparatively intuitive method of quantifying performance. The 
simplicity of the formula used to compute the value of Y does not imply that the standard 
is not robust. As demonstrated in the previous section, a standard in this format provides 
adequate control over the critical parameters of the error distribution and allows for 
conservative estimates of collision risk in an operational setting as well as a clear metric 
by which industry may engineer future flight management system algorithms.
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The combination of RTP and RNP performance standards has the potential to provide 
greater effects than either standard might allow for in isolation. As an example, their 
combined use allows a new solution to the problem of existing capacity shortfalls in the 
oceanic regions. Most of the world’s oceanic airspace currently uses time-based 
longitudinal separation standards in conjunction with distance-based lateral separation 
standards. The use of distance-based collision risk models such as the one pioneered by 
Reich in the mid 1960’s are simply not applicable to the time-based longitudinal separation 
standards. This flaw has led some regulatory agencies, including the FAA, to attempt a 
conversion from time-based to distance-based standards for procedurally separated aircraft, 
a decision partly influenced by the simple fact that they have yet to find a credible method 
by which to assess collision risk in the longitudinal axis. In fact, when current distance- 
based collision risk models are applied to aircraft separated by time, the result is that 
collision risk becomes a function of environmental conditions such that collision risk is 
quite literally determined by which way the wind blows. More seriously, this practice leads 
to a requirement for transition from existing procedural separation methods to tactical air 
traffic control methods due to extreme distance-based compression effects that result from 
frequent entry and exit from jet stream wind conditions common to the oceanic 
environment. This progression, which effectively parallels the conversion of time-based 
to distance-based standards in the 1940’s due to the emergence of RADAR, is considered 
infeasible by many experts in the field due to the lack of independent surveillance sources 
and communication challenges in the oceanic realm. Furthermore, it is a conversion that 
goes in the opposite direction from the vision described by both US and European air traffic 
management systems that advocate trajectory-based operations as a foundational tool.
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Reich models may still be applied effectively for calculation of the distance required 
between oceanic tracks to ensure an acceptable probability of collision between aircraft 
operating on parallel tracks. In this application, the use of an RNP performance metric fills 
a gap Reich considered intractable, that being the quantification of positional error via an 
evidence-based probabilistic distribution. Models developed by Campos and Marques 
appear to be at the leading edge of such developments. The power of an RTP metric is that 
it provides a similar quantification of crossing time errors in the longitudinal axis and 
allows for collision risk assessments that unlock reductions in separation standards that are 
unlikely to be achieved with distance-based standards alone.
6.2. Dual Time o f  Arrival Control Standards
A number of proposals have been presented to RTCA and Eurocontrol regarding 
standards for time of arrival control. One such proposal involves setting dual standards for 
certification of flight management systems. While the initial proposals are flawed in terms 
of their logic and are based on little more than intuition and round numbers, the idea of a 
dual standard itself might be worthy of consideration.
The initial proposal for a dual standard suggests that an aircraft assigned a required 
time of arrival in the descent phase, intuitively associated with aircraft arriving at airports 
for landing, must be capable of arriving within ±10 seconds with a 95% accuracy. Aircraft 
executing a required time of arrival in level cruise flight, where the density of traffic is 
expected to be lower, would be required to arrive within ±30 seconds with a 95% accuracy. 
The flaw in this proposal is that the modeling of the descent phase is far more complex and 
subject to more restrictive constraints. It is an easy case to make that if an aircraft is able 
to demonstrate crossings within 10 seconds of the assigned time in descent, it can easily
122
achieve this same level of performance in level flight. It is this logic, supported by the data 
collected during recent testing, that has led to the development of a single performance 
metric in this research. However, it seems possible that far greater accuracy could be 
achieved in level flight for two reasons. First, the environment itself is far less dynamic, 
with relatively constant environmental variables that require only small airspeed changes 
to overcome differences between expected and actual conditions. Second, level cruise 
flight is typically flown with jet engines operating at relatively high rpm where changes in 
thrust associated with small throttle movements are significant and sufficient to effect 
speed changes necessary to keep a continuously updated estimated arrival time equal to 
that of the assigned arrival time. Today’s flight management systems do not seem to 
distinguish between the level and descending environment, and appear to apply the same 
error tolerance thresholds before attempting to make corrections for errors. If this is the 
case, the time error tolerance in level flight may be adjustable to a level that allows time- 
based performance that significantly exceeds any demonstrated capability to date, allowing 
for tighter intervals between sequential aircraft. The lack of superior demonstrated 
performance in level flight is not unexpected as there has yet to be motivation for industry 
to provide more accurate time-based performance in level flight. Further, all indications 
from regulatory agencies to date have proposed standards indicating a lower level of 
performance will be expected in level flight.
6.3. Accuracy in Descending Flight
Most of the time of arrival control testing has been focused on the arrival phase of 
flight, and as described in the previous section, the design of the flight management 
systems and the dynamic nature of the environment suggest that the arrival phase is the
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limiting case with regard to the accuracy with which assigned crossing times may be 
captured. It should be expected that manufacturers of flight management systems design 
their algorithms to the specification of their customers, the aircraft manufacturers and 
operators. It is clear that the objective of each system is to optimize the flight profile of 
the individual aircraft by minimizing the total fuel burned during any phase of flight. In 
the descent phase, this leads designers to produce algorithms that calculate a descent point 
at which the throttles can be set at or near idle thrust and speed maintained by trading 
potential energy associated with the aircraft altitude for kinetic energy in the descent. 
However, what is optimum for a single aircraft may not be optimum for the airspace 
system, and a prisoner’s dilemma may exist regarding algorithm design.
There are important limitations on the design of flight procedures in the arrival phase. 
There are many variants of commercial aircraft, each with unique aerodynamic properties, 
and as a result, the optimum descent airspeed for each aircraft may be different. When a 
comparatively slow aircraft precedes a faster aircraft, one of the two is forced to fly at a 
sub-optimum speed or to accept vectors from air traffic controllers to achieve required 
spacing. Another important concept is that jet engines operating at idle thrust are 
unresponsive to small throttle movements, making precise speed control virtually 
impossible if a three-dimensional flight profile is prescribed. These two constraints pose 
substantial challenges for airspace designers and air traffic managers.
If these limitations could be overcome, it would be possible to achieve far greater 
accuracy in terms of time of arrival control. One method by which this could be possible 
is for aircraft to fly descents at higher power settings. This would necessarily involve 
beginning the descent further from the destination, but by requiring this type of descent
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profile, aircraft would descend with engines operating at a higher power setting, allowing 
for the possibility of making speed changes to overcome the uncertainties associated with 
descending flight. This method of approach is not without precedent. In what is arguably 
the most precise time-based flight environment in the world, carrier based jets operated by 
the US Navy fly power on approaches so that the engines are operated at a power setting 
that allows precise control over important parameters of their approach. Future research 
may find that the benefits of avoiding vectors for spacing and speed constraints associated 
with dissimilar sequential arrivals, as well as the ability to avoid delays at peak periods due 
to the increased capacity associated with improved RTP values may outweigh the marginal 
cost of introducing power on approaches.
6.4. Refining the Time-Based Collision Risk Model
Since the introduction of Reich’s distance-based collision risk model in 1966, 
numerous enhancements and updates have been published to support changes in airspace 
design, such as the reduction in distance between oceanic tracks in the North Atlantic 
region in 1981 (ICAO, 1998). Similarly, it is expected that enhancements to the initial 
time-based models presented in this document may be enhanced to account for vertical 
encounters such as sequencing a high, fast aircraft that is further away from a crossing 
point than a lower, slower aircraft, but has an earlier ETA. The exclusion of these scenarios 
from the initial collision risk models could lead to questions regarding the operational 
applicability of this research. By enhancing the collision risk models to account for the 
vertical geometry, confidence in the results may be increased sufficiently to allow the 
introduction of time-based operational procedures into the airspace system. Alternatively, 
recommendations for modifications to the existing airspace system itself such that these
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geometries do not arise by design might prove to be more palatable for regulatory 
authorities.
6.5. Revising the logic driving FMS algorithms
The exact nature of the logic driving today’s FMS algorithms is unknown as these 
models are proprietary in a highly competitive industry. However, general descriptions of 
the function of the algorithms by industry representatives indicates that the logic is based 
on a process whereby the FMS calculates the speed at which it must fly to achieve a desired 
crossing time. Adjustments to engine thrust are not made until the difference between 
calculated ground speed and required ground speed reaches some pre-determined threshold 
value. As a result, a small speed discrepancy, if it persists over a large period of time, 
could lead to large cumulative crossing time errors over long duration flights. As an 
alternative, since it is known that the FMS calculates and frequently updates an ETA at the 
RTA fix, the logic of the correction scheme could be adjusted to take advantage of this 
information. Rather than adjusting engine thrust as a result of a speed discrepancy, the 
algorithm could be updated to adjust engine thrust to modify speed when a time 
discrepancy is reached, and a time-based threshold could be applied. By applying this type 
of logic, the aircraft would be capable of overcoming any uncertain environmental 
condition encountered in flight, so long as the speed correction required remained within 
the operational speed envelope of the aircraft. If the general understanding of the FMS 
design is correctly understood, this change would allow substantial benefit in terms of air 
traffic management, especially if data communication capabilities could provide air traffic 
managers not only with an ETA a various fixes, but also with a minimum and maximum 
achievable time at those fixes. If this information could be made available, air traffic
managers could influence automated crossing time assignments such that aircraft are 
scheduled to arrive near the mid-point between their minimum and maximum arrival times, 
providing maximum flexibility to the aircraft for overcoming environmental uncertainty, 
and leading to improved crossing time accuracy.
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Figure 25: Standard Terminal Arrival to Seattle-Tacoma International Airport 



















AC Type TET Cl TMASTA Assigned
Time of 
Assign Crossing Error
1 RTA7 B737 20 45 21:26 21:26 20:54:15 21:25:45 -15
2 RTA12 B737 20 15 19:21 19:21 18:55:00 19:21:07 7
3 RTA13 B737 20 15 20:08 20:08 19:36:35 20:07:55 -5
4 RTA15 B737 20 15 20:13 20:13 19:42:12 20:13:12 12
5 RTA16 B737 20 45 20:15 20:15 19:45:47 20:14:48 -12
6 RTA17 B737 20 15 21:19 21:19 20:47:12 21:19:04 4
7 RTA18 B737 20 15 21:38 21:38 21:09:43 21:37:53 -7
8 RTA19 B737 20 15 21:58 21:58 21:27:30 21:57:46 -14
9 RTA22 B737 20 15 23:13 23:13 22:39:59 23:13:09 9
10 RTA34 B737 20 15 18:56 18:56 18:55:50 -10
11 RTA35 B737 20 15 19:30 19:30 19:03:50 19:29:47 -13
12 RTA36 B737 20 15 19:33 19:33 19:05:50 19:32:45 -15
13 RTA39 B737 20 15 21:18 21:18 20:54:00 21:17:49 -11
14 RTA41 B737 20 15 22:30 22:30 22:04:30 22:29:54 -6
15 RTA42 B737 20 15 23:28 23:28 23:04:00 23:27:44 -16
16 RTA43 B737 20 15 22:59 22:59 22:39:00 22:58:59 -1
17 RTA44 B737 20 45 19:05 19:05 18:36:00 19:05:11 11
18 RTA45 B737 20 15 19:38 19:38 19:15:00 19:38:05 5
19 RTA47 B737 20 15 20:01 20:01 19:30:00 20:01:06 6
20 RTA49 B737 20 15 20:54 20:54 20:24:25 20:54:12 12
21 RTA53 B737 20 15 23:10 23:10 22:38:39 23:09:53 -7
22 RTA55 B737 20 15 19:08 19:08 18:38:00 19:07:53 -7
23 RTA57 B737 20 15 19:59 19:59 19:31:00 19:58:54 -6
24 RTA58 B737 20 15 21:01 21:01 20:36:00 21:01:16 16
25 RTA60 B737 20 15 22:20 22:20 21:50:20 22:19:48 -12
26 RTA62 B737 20 15 22:36 22:36 22:14:45 22:35:50 -10
27 RTA65 B737 20 45 19:23 19:23 18:50:47 19:22:53 -7
28 RTA66 B737 20 45 20:00 20:00 19:28:50 19:59:43 -17
29 RTA67 B737 20 45 19:56 19:56 19:25:36 19:55:49 -11
30 RTA68 B737 20 45 20:13 20:13 19:43:15 20:12:52 -8
31 RTA69 B737 20 45 21:17 21:17 20:43:30 21:16:47 -13
32 RTA70 B737 20 15 22:01 22:01 21:26:30 22:00:58 -2
33 RTA71 B737 20 15 21:31 21:31 20:56:19 21:30:43 -17
34 RTA72 B737 20 45 21:52 21:52 21:19:23 21:52:10 10
35 RTA73 B737 20 15 23:19 23:19 22:49:20 23:19:04 4
36 RTA46 B737 20 15 19:34 19:34 19:06:00 19:34:06 6
37 RTA37 B737 20 15 20:00 20:00 19:35:00 19:59:38 -22
38 RTA40 B737 20 15 21:20 21:20 20:55:00 21:19:29 -31
39 RTA56 B737 20 15 20:01 20:01 19:34:00 20:00:21 -39
135
APPENDIX C: 2011 FAA Simulation Results
FK ACC Type Cl i
TMA Analysis 
ETA At STA
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Cross Fix - 
Time At
Cross Fix - 
Alt AAR


















0:33:27 00:01 0:33:26 
0:30:53 00:04 0:30:57 
0:29:25 00:12 0:29:13
0:33:27 00:25 0:33:02 
0:30:53 00:07 0:31:00 
0:29:25 00:15 0:29:10
0:30:50 0:33:02 0:33:23 































0:33:36 00:02 0:33:34 
0:38:48 00:05 0:38:53 
0:38:02 00:06 0:38:08
0:33:36 02:28 0:36:04 
0:38:48 01:12 0:40:00 
0:38:02 00:09 0:37:53
0:33:50 0:36:04 0:38:44 
































0:31:44 00:11 0:31:55 
0:26:44 00:01 0:28:45 
0:28:04 00:13 0:28:17
0:31:44 00:19 0:31:25 
0:28:44 00:05 0:28:39 
0:28:04 00:22 0:27:42
0:29:10 0:31:25 0:32:22 
































0:40:21 00:14 0:40:35 
0:39:37 00:04 0:39:41 
0:36:55 00:07 0:37:02
0:40:21 00:05 0:40:26 
0:39:37 02:45 0:36:52 
0:36:55 00:12 0:37:07
0:40:26 0:40:26 0:45:03 
































0:34:05 00:00 0:34:05 
0:39:02 00:05 0:38:57 
0:38:43 00:52 0:37:51
0:34:05 02:55 0:37:00 
0:39:02 02:27 0:41:29 
0:36:43 00:23 0:39:06
0:34:23 0:37:00 0:39:20 
































0:30:51 00:00 0:30:51 
0:29:02 00:04 0:29:06 
0:26:14 00:01 0:28:15
0:30:51 01:04 0:31:55 
0:29:02 00:32 0:29:34 
0:28:14 00:09 0:28:23
0:29:38 0:31:55 0:32:57 

































0:41:25 00:08 0:41:17 
0:36:32 00:02 0:38:30 
0:37:19 00:26 0:38:53
0:41:25 00:29 0:41:54 
0:38:32 00:57 0:39:29 
0:37:19 00:08 0:37:27
0:39:20 0:41:54 0:44:05 
































0:27:39 00:05 0:27:34 
0:31:24 00:39 0:32:03 
0:30:30 00:05 0:30:25
0:27:39 01:16 0:28:55 
0:31:24 00:22 0:31:46 
0:30:30 00:19 0:30:49
0:26:39 0:28:55 0:29:44 


































0:31:51 00:07 0:31:58 
0:28:59 00:03 0:29:02 
0:28:14 00:00 0:28:14
0:31:51 00:07 0:31:58 
0:28:59 00:27 0:29:26 
0:28:14 00:10 0:28:24
0:29:06 0:31:58 0:33:26 





































0:41:19 00:03 0:41:16 
0:39:36 00:04 0:39:40 
0:37:07 00:01 0:37:06 
0:42:35 00:00 0:42:35
0:41:19 00:09 0:41:10 
0:39:36 00:11 0:39:25 
0:37:07 00:39 0:36:28 
0:42:35 00:43 0:43:18
0:38:45 0:41:10 0:44:08 
0:37:12 0:39:25 0:39:32 









































0:27:35 00:07 0:27:28 
0:31:00 01:04 0:32:04 
0:30:45 00:01 0:30:44 
0:33:20 00:10 0:33:10
0:27:35 01:44 0:29:19 
0:31:00 00:53 0:31:53 
0:30:45 00:38 0:31:23 
0:33:20 02:16 0:35:36
0:26:51 0:29:19 0:29:54 
0:29:46 0:31:53 0:32:20 









































0:38:57 00:01 0:38:56 
0:36:10 00:01 0:36:11 
0:34:47 00:05 0:34:42 
0:42:59 00:05 0:43:04
0:38:57 01:22 0:40:19 
0:36:10 00:13 0:35:57 
0:34:47 00:13 0:35:00 
0:42:59 01:30 0:44:29
0:37:32 0:40:19 0:45:01 
0:34:17 0:35:57 0:36:21 









































0:28:44 00:00 0:28:44 
0:30:07 00:08 0:30:15 
0:32:01 00:07 0:31:54 
0:36:03 00:04 0:36:07
0:28:44 00:40 0:29:24 
0:30:07 00:45 0:30:52 
0:32:01 04:21 0:36:22 
0:36:03 01:57 0:38:00
0:27:36 0:29:24 0:29:42 
0:29:04 0:30:52 0:30:52 








































0:23:31 00:01 0:23:30 
0:30:22 00:02 0:30:20 
0:32:25 00:09 0:32:16 
0:30:53 00:08 0:31:01
0:23:31 00:31 0:24:02 
0:30:22 00:24 0:29:58 
0:32:25 00:35 0:31:50 
0:30:53 01:53 0:29:00
0:22:49 0:24:02 0:25:04 
0:28:14 0:29:58 0:30:48 



















273 3 Invalid Data
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Cross Fix - 
Time a t
Cross Fix - 
Alt AAlt























0:39:50 01:00 0:40:50 
0.38:28 00:19 038:47 
036:12 0:36:25 
041:14 01:54 0:43:08
0:39:50 00:58 0:38:52 
0:38:28 00:25 0:38:03 
0:36:12 00:23 0:36:35 
0:41:14 01:30 0:42:44
0:38:52 0:38:52 0.44:22 
0:37:30 0:38:03 0:39:57 








































027:14 00:11 0:27:25 
030:20 03:45 0:34:05 
0:29:17 00:33 0:29:50 
0:29:50 02:04 0:31:54
0:27:14 02:12 0:29:26 
0:30:20 00:08 0:30:12 
0:29:17 00:02 0:29:19 
0:29:50 01:10 0:31:00
0:26:35 0:29:26 029:36 
0:29:16 0:30:12 031:16 











































027:04 00:03 0:27:07 
028:50 00:19 0:29:09 
032:20 00:03 0:32:17 
0:32:47 00:50 0:33:37
0:27:04 03:17 0:30:21 
0:28:50 00:56 0:29:46 
0:32:20 00:50 0:33:10 
0:32:47 00:13 0:33:00
0:26:13 0:30:21 0:30:21 
027:55 029:46 0:29:46 









































0:34:54 00:36 0:34:18 
037:24 00:04 0:37:20 
0:37:05 00:30 0:36:35 
0:42:02 00:30 0:41:32
0:34:54 00:05 0:34:59 
0:37:24 00:16 0:37:08 
0:37:05 00:45 0:36:20 
0:42:02 05:04 0:36:58
0:34:05 0:34:59 039:06 
0:36:59 0:37:08 041:21 



















280 1 0 





















0:44:40 03:14 0:47:54 
041:06 01:00 0:42:06 
0:41:33 02:10 0:43:43 
0:45:13 04:55 0:50:08
0:44:40 00:24 0:44:16 
0:41:06 00:24 0:41:30 
0:41:33 00:12 0:41:21 
0:45:13 02:24 0:47:37
0:43:57 0:44:16 0:48:08 
0:39:26 0:41:30 0:41:44 





















Vector to RTA 





















0:53:31 04:31 0:58:02 
054:41 05:14 0:59:55 
057:41 04:12 1:01:53 
058:35 05:29 1:04:04
0:53:31 01:07 0:54:38 
0:54:41 02:24 0:57:05 
0:57:41 04:06 1:01:47 
0:58:35 00:25 0:59:00
0.52:07 0:54:38 0:57:07 
0:53:41 0:57:05 0:57:41 










































0:42:01 02:00 0:44:01 
040:28 01:52 0:42:20 
042:22 03:20 0:45:42 
0:45:02 02:21 0:47:23
0:42:01 01:27 0:43:28 
0:40:28 02:23 0:42:51 
0:42:22 00:38 0:43:00 
0:45:02 03:42 0:48:44
0:39:05 0:43:28 0:44:40 
0:41:46 0:42:51 0:45:32 











































0:51 04:48 0:55:48 
054:38 02:55 0:57:33 
1:01:25 01:44 1:03:09 
0:59:56 03:04 1:03
0:51:00 02:25 0:53:25 
0:54:38 00:13 0:54:51 
1:01:25 06:23 0:55:02 
0:59:56 02:04 1:02:00
0:49:45 0:53:25 0:59:59 
0:52:07 0:54:51 0:55:39 








































0:52:20 07:38 0:59:58 
0:54:39 07:15 1:01:54 
0:56:56 08:19 1:05:15 
0:43:06 05:16 0:48:22
0:52:20 01:20 0:51:00 
0:54:39 00:14 0:54:25 
0:56:56 01:28 0:58:24 
0:43:06 03:06 0:40:00
0:50:39 0:51:00 0:55:56 
0:53:10 0:54:25 0:56:22 










































0:41:36 04:38 0:46:14 
0:41:41 06:23 0:48:04 
0:43:42 08:02 0:51:44 
0:42:05 07:49 0:49:54
0:41:36 00:45 0:42:21 
0:41:41 00:30 0:41:11 
0:43:42 01:35 0:45:17 
0:42:05 01:05 0:41:00
0:39:15 0:42:21 0:44:06 
0:39:50 0:41:11 0:43:30 




















Vector to RTA 























0:54:52 06:08 1:01 
0:53:19 04:28 0:57:47 
0:49:15 06:42 0:55:57 
0:57:50 05:27 1:03:17
0:54:52 03:47 0:58:39 
0:53:19 00:14 0:53:33 
0:49:15 02:24 0:51:39 
0:57:50 01:52 0:59:42
0:54:19 0:58:39 1:05:38 
0:53:06 0:53:33 0:57:46 









































0:44:51 05:39 0:50:30 
0:41:40 06:34 0:48:14 
0:39:22 04:20 0:43:42 
0:44:40 08:06 0:52:46
0:44:51 00:02 0:44:53 
0:41:40 00:15 0:41:55 
0:39:22 00:32 0:38:50 
0:44:40 01:33 0:46:13
0:41:59 0:44:53 0:46:26 
0:40:00 0:41:55 0:42:11 





















Vector to RTA 
Vector to RTA 
Vector to RTA 
Vector to RTA
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Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS357 B738 20 18:39:00 18:39:58 58
AS601 B739 20 21:37:00 21:37:06 6
AS17 B738 20 19:35:00 19:36:25 NA
AS509 B737 20 00:24:00 0:24:19 19
AS469 B739 20 19:04:00 19:04:24 NA
AS503 B734 20 NaN 22:12:11 NA
AS303 B738 20 19:53:00 19:53:04 4
AS321 B738 20 19:18:00 19:22:05 NA
AS661 B737 20 23:35:00 23:37:18 NA
AS619 B739 20 19:28:00 19:26:18 NA
AS373 B738 20 23:17:00 23:17:14 14
AS679 B737 20 21:32:00 21:31:26 NA
AS21 B739 20 18:25:00 18:24:43 -17
AS603 B739 20 17:06:00 17:06:41 NA
AS307 B738 20 19:23:00 19:24:05 NA
AS1 B738 20 18:03:00 18:03:13 13
AS493 B737 20 17:35:38 17:45:09 NA
AS517 B737 20 18:32:00 18:31:53 -7
AS1 B738 20 20:38:00 20:38:12 12
AS679 B739 20 22:33:54 22:33:05 NA
AS515 B737 20 NaN 17:57:08 NA
AS357 B738 20 18:42:00 18:42:17 NA
AS503 B737 20 22:27:57 22:21:32 NA
AS527 B737 20 18:28:00 18:27:55 -5
AS305 B738 20 23:18:49 23:18:34 -15
AS509 B737 20 00:20:00 0:20:09 9
AS555 B734 20 01:09:00 1:09:03 3
AS539 B734 20 17:23:00 17:23:05 5
AS373 B738 20 22:57:00 22:57:09 9
AS365 B738 20 19:53:00 19:53:06 NA
AS227 B738 20 19:20:00 19:19:36 -24
AS501 B737 20 21:07:00 21:06:34 NA
AS327 B738 20 00:49:00 0:49:14 14
AS461 B738 20 00:27:00 0:26:58 -2
AS305 B738 20 22:45:00 22:47:26 NA







Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS517 B737 20 18:24:13 18:25:06 NA
AS461 B738 20 23:24:02 23:23:15 -47
AS611 B738 20 02:49:00 2:49:14 14
AS531 B737 20 03:47:00 3:46:41 NA
AS307 B738 20 19:06:00 19:07:28 NA
AS755 B739 20 04:15:00 4:15:13 13
AS483 B738 20 22:56:29 23:00:16 NA
AS507 B738 20 02:21:00 2:21:13 13
AS313 B738 20 02:35:00 2:35:09 9
AS455 B734 20 01:44:00 1:44:14 14
AS661 B737 20 23:42:00 23:43:30 NA
AS673 B737 20 02:57:08 2:57:17 9
AS487 B737 20 NaN 1:16:17 NA
AS357 B738 20 18:29:00 18:29:21 21
AS529 B737 20 21:33:00 21:33:36 NA
AS679 B737 20 21:14:00 21:16:13 NA
AS743 B738 20 04:05:14 4:05:38 NA
AS373 B738 20 22:58:00 22:58:18 18
AS495 B738 20 18:58:00 19:03:16 NA
AS1 B738 20 18:17:00 18:18:48 NA
AS601 B739 20 21:47:00 21:47:09 9
AS23 B738 20 01:40:00 1:40:26 26
AS3 B738 20 04:09:00 4:09:06 6
AS509 B737 20 00:04:00 0:09:05 NA
AS355 B737 20 03:23:00 3:23:16 16
AS671 B738 20 04:00:00 3:59:51 -9
AS345 B737 20 03:32:00 3:32:42 NA
AS39 B738 20 03:57:17 3:57:35 18
AS503 B737 20 21:39:00 21:39:15 15
AS3 B738 20 03:54:00 3:54:06 6
AS461 B739 20 23:38:00 23:37:57 -3
AS555 B734 20 01:00:00 1:00:20 20
AS373 B738 20 22:50:31 22:51:51 NA
AS305 B738 20 22:34:56 22:37:26 NA
AS511 B737 20 04:13:00 4:12:47 -13








Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS603 B738 20 17:13:00 17:13:35 NA
AS611 B738 20 02:29:02 2:29:14 12
AS17 B738 20 19:30:00 19:30:17 17
AS743 B738 20 03:49:00 3:48:49 -11
AS345 B737 20 03:19:00 3:19:20 20
AS233 B738 20 03:23:25 3:24:41 NA
AS661 B737 20 00:05:00 0:05:08 8
AS493 B737 20 17:10:00 17:10:13 13
AS313 B734 20 NaN 2:41:11 NA
AS619 B739 20 19:31:00 19:31:03 3
AS605 B738 20 NaN 23:53:16 NA
AS755 B738 20 04:05:00 4:04:54 -6
AS483 B738 20 23:03:00 23:03:05 5
AS503 B737 20 21:59:00 21:59:14 14
AS327 B738 20 00:44:00 0:44:46 NA
AS487 B734 20 01:13:41 1:14:05 24
AS469 B739 20 18:50:00 18:50:02 2
AS227 B738 20 19:07:25 19:07:26 1
ASH B738 20 18:07:00 18:07:03 3
AS671 B739 20 03:54:41 3:54:38 NA
AS601 B739 20 21:45:00 21:45:03 3
AS673 B738 20 03:15:00 3:15:15 15
AS533 B734 20 20:57:00 20:57:14 14
AS457 B739 20 04:06:24 4:06:32 8
AS23 B739 20 01:42:00 1:42:15 15
AS507 B737 20 02:15:00 2:15:01 1
AS1 B738 20 18:01:00 18:01:03 3
AS495 B738 20 18:55:00 18:54:57 -3
AS679 B737 20 22:19:00 22:19:01 1
AS365 B738 20 19:41:00 19:41:06 6
AS307 B734 20 18:59:00 18:59:03 3
AS39 B738 20 04:04:00 4:04:17 17
AS553 B734 20 03:06:00 3:06:08 8
AS603 B739 20 17:22:00 17:21:57 -3
AS307 B738 20 19:06:00 19:06:02 2
AS21 B739 20 17:41:00 17:40:50 -10
AS743 B738 20 03:45:00 3:45:12 12
AS601 B739 20 21:58:00 21:58:04 4
AS1 B738 20 17:46:00 17:45:56 -4







Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS507 B738 20 02:12:00 2:12:07 7
AS455 B734 20 01:48:00 1:48:16 16
AS555 B734 20 01:21:00 1:21:15 15
AS327 B738 20 00:45:00 0:45:18 18
AS39 B738 20 03:34:00 3:34:13 13
AS313 B738 20 02:31:32 2:31:55 NA
AS461 B739 20 23:36:00 23:36:13 13
AS671 B739 20 03:48:00 3:48:02 2
AS321 B738 20 19:03:00 19:04:33 NA
AS661 B737 20 00:26:00 0:26:02 2
AS509 B737 20 23:59:00 23:59:08 8
AS373 B738 20 22:50:00 22:50:08 NA
AS19 B738 20 04:34:00 4:34:19 19
AS605 B738 20 23:46:00 23:46:40 NA
AS483 B738 20 23:03:00 23:02:10 NA
AS229 B738 20 19:54:00 19:53:59 -1
AS619 B739 20 19:21:13 19:21:20 7
AS501 B737 20 20:50:00 20:50:07 7
AS305 B734 20 22:48:00 22:48:01 1
AS529 B737 20 21:32:00 21:32:14 14
AS355 B738 20 03:32:00 3:32:48 48
AS755 B738 20 04:03:00 4:03:09 9
AS517 B737 20 18:33:00 18:37:34 NA
AS503 B738 20 21:46:00 21:46:37 37
AS11 B738 20 17:29:00 17:29:00 0
AS23 B739 20 01:27:00 1:27:13 13
AS3 B738 20 03:58:39 3:58:20 NA
AS493 B734 20 17:24:00 17:24:12 12
AS469 B739 20 18:54:00 18:53:47 NA
AS611 B738 20 02:29:00 2:28:28 NA
AS455 B738 20 01:25:01 1:25:08 7
AS501 B737 20 20:40:00 20:40:09 9
AS603 B738 20 17:19:00 17:18:55 -5
AS357 B738 20 18:36:00 18:36:17 17
AS679 B739 20 21:12:00 21:11:50 -10
AS661 B737 20 23:42:00 23:42:08 8
AS305 B738 20 22:27:00 22:26:54 -6
AS529 B737 20 21:25:00 21:24:58 -2
AS307 B738 20 18:54:00 18:54:05 5








Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS327 B738 20 00:29:58 0:29:44 -14
AS743 B738 20 03:57:00 3:55:18 NA
AS555 B734 20 00:43:00 0:42:56 -4
AS531 B734 20 03:57:00 3:56:43 NA
AS483 B738 20 22:42:00 22:41:59 -1
AS671 B739 20 03:38:00 3:38:11 11
AS469 B739 20 18:41:00 18:40:59 -1
AS461 B738 20 23:26:00 23:25:56 -4
AS303 B734 20 19:45:44 19:46:38 NA
AS313 B738 20 02:27:00 2:26:55 -5
AS601 B739 20 21:57:00 21:56:54 -6
AS453 B739 20 20:07:00 20:06:59 -1
AS517 B737 20 18:14:00 18:13:59 -1
AS493 B734 20 17:21:00 17:21:14 14
AS605 B738 20 23:36:00 23:36:08 8
AS619 B739 20 19:04:00 19:04:00 0
AS461 B734 20 23:10:00 23:10:05 5
AS453 B738 20 20:07:11 20:07:14 3
AS373 B738 20 22:36:00 22:36:05 5
AS493 B737 20 16:51:00 16:51:11 11
AS601 B739 20 21:36:00 21:36:03 3
AS679 B739 20 21:19:00 21:21:14 NA
AS603 B738 20 16:55:00 16:55:02 2
AS611 B738 20 02:30:00 2:30:09 9
AS661 B739 20 00:06:00 0:06:15 15
AS509 B737 20 23:43:00 23:43:24 24
AS313 B737 20 02:23:00 2:23:07 7
ASH B738 20 17:40:00 17:40:14 14
AS631 B738 20 02:15:00 2:15:20 20
AS227 B738 20 18:55:00 18:55:08 8
AS511 B737 20 03:58:00 3:57:59 -1
AS345 B737 20 03:11:00 3:12:07 NA
AS515 B734 20 17:31:00 17:30:53 -7
AS501 B737 20 20:24:00 20:24:06 6
AS671 B739 20 03:42:03 3:42:21 18
AS17 B738 20 19:43:00 19:43:06 6
AS555 B734 20 00:44:00 0:44:00 0
AS355 B737 20 03:09:00 3:08:59 -1
AS303 B738 20 19:43:00 19:42:48 -12







Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS503 B737 20 21:46:00 21:46:02 2
AS233 B738 20 03:16:00 3:16:10 10
AS743 B738 20 04:11:00 4:11:17 17
AS307 B734 20 19:07:00 19:07:10 10
AS233 B738 20 03:18:00 3:18:24 24
AS303 B734 20 20:46:25 20:46:36 NA
AS685 B739 20 17:31:19 17:33:18 NA
AS509 B737 20 23:44:00 23:44:05 5
AS611 B739 20 02:27:19 2:27:29 10
AS501 B737 20 20:24:00 20:24:20 20
AS671 B739 20 03:50:00 3:50:09 9
AS603 B738 20 16:52:00 16:52:15 15
AS481 B734 20 20:12:35 20:12:14 NA
AS673 B738 20 03:02:00 3:02:06 6
AS529 B738 20 21:16:00 21:16:18 18
AS661 B739 20 00:06:00 0:06:05 5
AS487 B737 20 01:09:00 1:09:22 22
AS457 B738 20 03:33:01 3:35:48 NA
AS511 B737 20 04:05:00 4:05:18 18
AS555 B734 20 00:48:00 0:48:13 13
AS507 B737 20 01:54:01 1:54:40 39
AS455 B738 20 01:37:00 1:37:28 28
AS503 B737 20 21:38:00 21:38:13 13
AS495 B738 20 18:36:00 18:36:06 NA
AS527 B737 20 17:55:00 17:55:09 9
AS17 B738 20 19:57:00 19:57:21 21
AS517 B737 20 18:07:09 18:07:06 -3
AS321 B738 20 18:50:00 18:50:10 10
AS23 B739 20 02:00:16 1:59:20 NA
AS307 B734 20 18:48:00 18:48:20 20
AS229 B738 20 21:56:09 21:56:23 14
AS453 B738 20 20:26:00 20:26:08 8
AS679 B739 20 21:33:00 21:32:54 -6
AS493 B734 20 17:06:00 17:06:10 10
AS313 B738 20 02:39:49 2:40:06 17
AS605 B738 20 23:51:00 23:51:08 8
AS345 B737 20 03:24:00 3:23:43 NA
AS605 B738 20 23:40:00 23:40:13 13
AS461 B734 20 NaN 23:21:08 NA








Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS455 B734 20 01:34:00 1:34:18 18
AS673 B738 20 02:58:32 2:58:42 10
AS357 B738 20 18:29:00 18:29:02 2
AS685 B739 20 17:18:00 17:18:10 10
AS515 B737 20 17:37:00 17:37:04 NA
AS531 B734 20 03:35:00 3:36:33 NA
AS365 B738 20 19:53:00 19:52:58 -2
AS305 B737 20 22:46:00 22:46:03 3
AS679 B739 20 21:32:00 21:31:55 -5
AS501 B737 20 20:26:48 20:29:21 NA
AS233 B738 20 03:20:00 3:23:23 NA
AS553 B738 20 03:15:00 3:15:40 NA
AS481 B734 20 20:21:00 20:21:08 8
AS487 B737 20 00:57:00 0:56:54 -6
AS453 B738 20 20:19:00 20:19:07 7
AS17 B738 20 19:30:17 19:30:29 NA
AS529 B737 20 21:22:23 21:22:22 -1
AS509 B737 20 23:53:00 23:52:54 -6
AS1 B738 20 18:30:00 18:27:31 NA
AS555 B734 20 00:54:00 0:54:45 NA
AS633 B739 20 00:51:00 0:51:11 11
AS503 B737 20 21:37:00 21:37:20 20
AS611 B738 20 02:41:00 2:41:17 17
AS539 B734 20 16:46:00 16:46:02 2
AS469 B737 20 18:36:00 18:39:46 NA
AS517 B737 20 18:21:00 18:21:15 NA
AS661 B738 20 23:49:00 23:49:00 0
AS327 B738 20 NaN 0:38:21 NA
AS355 B737 20 03:25:00 3:31:10 NA
AS321 B738 20 18:51:11 18:51:23 12
AS487 B738 20 00:59:00 0:59:05 5
AS483 B738 20 22:33:00 22:33:04 4
AS17 B738 20 19:53:00 19:53:03 3
AS303 B734 20 19:37:00 19:37:11 11
AS679 B738 20 21:39:00 21:39:30 30
AS345 B737 20 NaN 3:31:04 NA
AS229 B738 20 19:43:00 19:43:13 13
AS493 B738 20 17:05:00 17:05:11 11
AS527 B737 20 18:02:00 18:02:07 7







Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS685 B738 20 17:48:00 17:48:13 13
AS619 B739 20 19:08:00 19:08:14 14
AS503 B737 20 21:46:00 21:45:56 -4
AS673 B738 20 02:45:00 2:45:19 19
AS469 B734 20 18:36:00 18:35:58 -2
AS495 B738 20 18:28:00 18:28:12 12
AS539 B734 20 16:51:00 16:51:01 1
AS501 B737 20 20:35:00 20:34:48 -12
AS555 B734 20 00:46:00 0:46:12 12
AS533 B737 20 20:08:09 20:07:38 NA
AS327 B738 20 00:29:00 0:28:59 -1
AS603 B739 20 17:07:00 17:07:14 14
AS23 B739 20 01:30:00 1:30:10 10
AS39 B738 20 03:40:00 3:40:42 NA
AS661 B738 20 23:45:00 23:45:18 18
AS511 B737 20 04:03:00 4:03:00 0
AS355 B737 20 03:08:00 3:08:02 2
AS531 B734 20 03:37:00 3:37:09 9
AS307 B734 20 18:45:00 18:45:09 9
AS 605 B738 20 23:31:00 23:30:59 -1
AS529 B737 20 21:25:00 21:25:12 12
AS461 B738 20 23:23:00 23:23:09 9
AS453 B739 20 20:00:00 20:00:16 16
AS507 B738 20 01:57:00 1:57:03 3
AS509 B737 20 23:38:00 23:37:49 -11
AS305 B737 20 22:35:00 22:34:48 -12
AS233 B738 20 03:22:22 3:22:26 4
AS1 B738 20 18:21:00 18:20:56 -4
AS313 B739 20 02:28:00 2:28:05 NA
AS455 B734 20 01:32:00 1:32:00 0
AS601 B739 20 21:19:08 21:19:16 8
AS553 B734 20 03:10:00 3:10:04 4
AS527 B737 20 17:55:00 17:55:05 5
AS509 B737 20 23:40:00 23:39:59 -1
AS357 B738 20 18:26:00 18:26:02 2
AS501 B737 20 20:20:00 20:20:12 12
AS515 B737 20 17:25:00 17:25:14 14
AS453 B734 20 20:03:00 20:03:12 12
AS345 B737 20 03:24:00 3:24:25 NA








Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS601 B739 20 21:36:00 21:36:18 18
AS555 B734 20 01:01:00 1:01:13 13
AS233 B738 20 03:12:22 3:12:26 4
AS23 B739 20 01:23:00 1:23:30 30
AS685 B739 20 17:36:00 17:36:10 10
AS1 B738 20 18:07:00 18:07:16 16
AS611 B738 20 02:17:00 2:17:04 NA
ASH B738 20 18:23:01 18:23:17 16
AS503 B737 20 21:34:00 21:34:07 7
AS227 B738 20 19:04:00 19:04:13 13
AS461 B734 20 23:36:06 23:36:15 9
AS517 B737 20 18:00:00 18:00:09 9
AS307 B734 20 18:47:00 18:47:12 12
AS3 B738 20 04:00:00 4:00:05 5
AS373 B738 20 22:34:00 22:34:10 10
AS305 B737 20 22:22:00 22:22:04 4
AS39 B738 20 03:42:00 3:42:31 31
AS671 B739 20 03:51:00 3:51:01 1
AS495 B738 20 18:23:00 18:23:19 19
AS605 B738 20 23:31:00 23:31:12 12
AS529 B738 20 21:24:00 21:24:20 20
AS755 B738 20 03:53:00 3:53:07 7
AS553 B734 20 03:27:00 3:27:06 6
AS507 B738 20 01:55:00 1:55:48 NA
AS493 B734 20 16:49:00 16:49:05 NA
AS603 B738 20 16:52:00 16:52:01 1
AS533 B734 20 20:23:00 20:23:18 18
AS743 B738 20 03:49:00 3:49:26 26
AS511 B737 20 03:53:00 3:53:24 24
AS365 B738 20 19:37:00 19:37:20 20
AS661 B738 20 23:36:00 23:36:04 4
AS17 B738 20 19:21:00 19:21:12 12
AS673 B738 20 02:37:00 2:37:17 17
AS487 B737 20 00:55:00 0:55:06 6
AS679 B739 20 21:18:00 21:18:18 18
AS17 B738 20 19:27:00 19:26:58 -2
AS461 B734 20 23:11:00 23:11:38 38
AS469 B737 20 18:33:00 18:33:20 20
AS619 B739 20 19:08:00 19:08:05 5







Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS233 B738 20 03:03:00 3:07:45 NA
AS501 B737 20 20:30:20 20:30:51 NA
AS511 B737 20 04:03:00 4:03:13 13
AS603 B738 20 17:04:00 17:04:02 2
AS495 B738 20 18:25:00 18:25:13 13
AS357 B738 20 18:29:00 18:29:24 24
AS685 B737 20 17:16:00 17:16:08 8
AS527 B737 20 17:55:00 17:55:15 15
AS555 B734 20 00:33:00 0:33:28 28
AS755 B738 20 04:02:00 4:02:19 19
AS533 B737 20 20:07:00 20:07:33 33
AS529 B738 20 21:20:00 21:20:22 22
AS39 B738 20 03:50:00 3:49:58 -2
AS743 B738 20 03:38:34 3:38:43 9
ASH B738 20 18:16:00 18:16:12 12
AS679 B739 20 21:12:00 21:11:57 -3
AS661 B739 20 23:55:00 23:55:13 13
AS307 B734 20 18:55:00 18:55:17 17
AS3 B738 20 03:43:49 3:43:56 7
AS373 B738 20 22:36:00 22:37:18 NA
AS313 B738 20 02:23:00 2:23:31 31
AS321 B738 20 18:45:00 18:45:09 9
AS453 B738 20 20:02:00 20:02:11 11
AS455 B734 20 01:40:00 1:42:15 NA
AS21 B739 20 17:49:00 17:49:17 17
AS605 B738 20 00:04:00 0:05:20 NA
AS673 B738 20 02:44:00 2:43:33 NA
AS611 B738 20 02:26:00 2:26:21 NA
AS457 B737 20 03:27:00 3:30:48 NA
AS507 B737 20 02:00:00 2:00:08 8
AS487 B737 20 00:52:00 0:54:00 NA
AS515 B737 20 17:27:00 17:29:10 NA
AS373 B738 20 22:56:00 22:56:19 NA
AS495 B738 20 18:49:00 18:51:09 NA
AS507 B737 20 01:54:38 1:54:45 7
AS673 B738 20 02:33:00 2:32:25 NA
AS483 B738 20 22:43:00 22:43:06 6
AS233 B738 20 03:16:16 3:16:32 16
AS327 B738 20 00:41:00 0:41:03 3








Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS671 B739 20 04:06:00 4:06:10 NA
AS17 B738 20 19:25:00 19:24:55 -5
AS365 B738 20 19:45:00 19:45:19 19
AS685 B739 20 17:13:00 17:13:07 7
AS503 B737 20 21:50:20 21:50:48 NA
AS601 B739 20 22:14:00 22:14:16 16
AS509 B737 20 23:43:17 23:45:24 NA
AS345 B737 20 03:12:00 3:12:29 NA
AS23 B739 20 02:11:33 2:11:24 -9
AS457 B739 20 03:34:00 3:34:30 NA
AS305 B737 20 23:02:00 23:02:10 10
AS453 B738 20 20:34:00 20:34:15 15
AS3 B738 20 03:53:00 3:53:09 9
AS501 B737 20 20:36:00 20:36:06 6
AS1 B738 20 18:04:00 18:03:58 -2
AS619 B739 20 22:06:00 22:06:18 18
AS631 B738 20 02:30:00 2:30:23 23
AS633 B738 20 00:44:00 0:44:29 29
AS603 B738 20 17:09:00 17:09:06 6
AS307 B734 20 19:01:00 19:01:03 NA
AS635 B734 20 02:37:00 2:41:06 NA
AS455 B734 20 01:38:00 1:37:35 NA
AS303 B734 20 19:56:00 19:56:02 2
AS555 B734 20 00:49:00 0:49:12 12
AS39 B738 20 03:49:00 3:49:00 NA
AS533 B734 20 21:55:00 21:57:42 NA
AS529 B737 20 21:40:00 21:40:36 NA
AS671 B739 20 04:02:00 4:02:14 14
AS365 B738 20 19:45:00 19:45:16 16
ASH B738 20 18:12:00 18:12:23 23
AS303 B734 20 19:47:00 19:47:10 NA
AS605 B738 20 23:34:42 23:34:54 12
AS511 B737 20 04:05:00 4:05:06 6
AS603 B738 20 17:04:23 17:04:31 8
AS481 B734 20 20:55:46 21:01:57 NA
AS313 B737 20 02:24:00 2:24:12 12
AS743 B738 20 04:08:00 4:08:15 15
AS529 B737 20 21:19:01 21:19:09 8
AS555 B734 20 00:47:00 0:47:12 12







Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS661 B739 20 00:01:00 0:01:12 12
AS611 B738 20 02:22:00 2:22:11 11
AS461 B738 20 23:21:00 23:21:22 22
AS483 B738 20 22:37:00 22:37:16 16
AS517 B737 20 18:17:00 18:16:51 -9
AS305 B737 20 22:34:00 22:34:11 11
AS17 B738 20 19:25:00 19:25:22 22
AS501 B737 20 20:51:00 20:51:09 9
AS515 B737 20 17:33:00 17:33:06 6
AS373 B738 20 22:40:00 22:40:11 11
AS619 B739 20 19:13:00 19:16:30 NA
AS39 B738 20 03:47:50 3:48:06 16
AS23 B739 20 01:33:00 1:33:10 10
AS553 B734 20 03:22:00 3:22:14 14
AS493 B738 20 17:00:00 17:00:11 11
AS495 B738 20 18:40:00 18:40:30 NA
AS685 B739 20 17:18:51 17:19:03 12
AS503 B737 20 22:00:00 22:00:04 4
AS355 B738 20 03:13:00 3:13:20 20
AS307 B734 20 18:56:00 18:56:03 3
AS673 B738 20 02:37:00 2:37:10 NA
AS601 B738 20 21:27:08 21:27:41 33
AS679 B738 20 21:05:00 21:05:29 29
AS469 B734 20 18:42:00 18:42:04 NA
AS755 B738 20 03:56:00 3:56:16 16
AS455 B734 20 01:30:00 1:30:12 12
AS527 B737 20 18:08:00 18:07:58 -2
AS357 B738 20 18:24:00 18:23:56 -4
AS611 B738 20 02:28:00 2:27:56 -4
AS23 B739 20 02:27:00 2:27:16 NA
AS515 B737 20 17:30:00 17:29:56 -4
AS305 B734 20 22:31:00 22:31:04 4
AS679 B739 20 21:32:00 21:32:10 10
AS345 B734 20 03:31:00 3:31:00 0
AS15 B738 20 05:12:00 5:12:07 7
AS495 B738 20 18:35:00 18:35:03 3
AS17 B738 20 19:43:00 19:43:16 16
AS529 B737 20 21:27:00 21:26:31 NA
AS453 B738 20 20:21:00 20:21:09 9








Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS673 B738 20 02:51:00 2:51:20 NA
AS3 B738 20 03:57:00 3:56:55 -5
AS507 B734 20 02:09:00 2:08:57 NA
AS555 B734 20 00:47:00 0:47:03 3
AS481 B737 20 20:19:00 20:18:59 -1
AS527 B737 20 18:11:00 18:11:01 1
AS517 B737 20 18:18:00 18:18:07 7
AS661 B739 20 00:03:00 0:03:07 7
AS755 B738 20 03:59:00 3:59:04 4
AS483 B738 20 22:53:00 22:53:14 14
AS509 B737 20 00:04:24 0:03:45 -39
AS461 B738 20 23:20:00 23:19:48 -12
AS327 B738 20 00:37:00 0:35:16 NA
AS39 B738 20 04:08:00 4:07:51 -9
AS307 B734 20 18:57:00 18:54:43 NA
AS357 B738 20 18:25:00 18:25:08 8
AS531 B734 20 03:33:00 3:33:11 11
AS457 B738 20 03:35:17 3:36:13 NA
AS373 B738 20 22:50:00 22:50:13 13
AS605 B738 20 23:47:00 23:46:52 -8
AS487 B737 20 01:15:00 1:14:24 -36
AS511 B737 20 04:10:00 4:09:56 -4
AS233 B738 20 03:24:00 3:24:07 7
ASH B738 20 18:10:00 18:10:35 35
AS601 B739 20 21:18:00 21:17:53 -7
AS493 B734 20 17:12:00 17:12:04 4
AS671 B739 20 04:02:00 4:02:09 9
AS553 B734 20 NaN 3:08:53 NA
AS469 B739 20 18:45:00 18:45:11 11
AS229 B738 20 19:53:00 19:55:29 NA
AS1 B738 20 18:21:00 18:21:13 13
AS227 B738 20 19:22:00 19:22:03 3
AS307 B734 20 19:46:00 19:45:53 -7
AS673 B738 20 02:57:00 2:57:07 7
AS685 B739 20 17:19:00 17:19:49 NA
AS539 B734 20 17:09:00 17:01:12 NA
AS327 B738 20 00:44:00 0:45:02 NA
AS469 B734 20 NaN 18:57:16 NA
AS23 B739 20 01:42:54 1:42:54 0







Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS611 B738 20 02:31:00 2:30:44 -16
AS619 B738 20 19:11:37 19:14:49 NA
AS345 B737 20 03:18:00 3:18:05 5
AS529 B737 20 21:28:00 21:28:06 6
AS503 B737 20 21:42:00 21:41:52 -8
AS11 B738 20 17:55:00 17:55:32 NA
AS9001 B737 20 17:29:00 17:31:43 NA
AS17 B738 20 19:25:23 19:25:59 NA
AS511 B737 20 04:24:00 4:23:04 NA
AS509 B737 20 00:08:00 0:08:13 13
AS19 B738 20 04:44:00 4:44:08 8
AS467 B737 20 00:31:04 0:31:29 25
AS743 B738 20 04:03:00 4:03:01 1
AS555 B734 20 01:05:00 1:05:04 4
AS671 B739 20 03:58:00 3:58:10 10
AS551 B738 20 20:36:14 20:35:37 NA
AS373 B738 20 22:50:00 22:49:54 -6
AS501 B737 20 20:33:00 20:34:11 NA
AS3 B738 20 04:21:00 4:21:03 3
AS305 B737 20 00:21:00 0:21:08 8
AS515 B737 20 17:42:14 17:45:09 NA
AS493 B739 20 17:35:00 17:35:17 17
AS517 B737 20 18:14:17 18:18:07 NA
AS755 B738 20 04:01:00 4:01:12 12
AS731 B738 20 04:46:00 4:46:03 3
AS365 B738 20 20:06:00 20:05:49 NA
AS457 B737 20 03:43:00 3:42:19 NA
AS527 B737 20 18:10:00 18:10:15 15
AS679 B739 20 21:24:00 21:23:59 -1
AS1 B738 20 18:09:00 18:09:20 NA
AS755 B738 20 04:30:48 4:30:56 8
AS619 B739 20 19:25:00 19:25:08 8
AS355 B739 20 03:25:00 3:24:56 -4
AS325 B738 20 21:57:00 21:57:07 7
AS303 B738 20 19:44:54 19:44:56 2
AS665 B739 20 16:46:00 16:46:11 11
AS307 B738 20 19:07:00 19:07:31 NA
AS555 B734 20 00:44:00 0:43:50 -10
AS487 B737 20 01:11:00 1:11:08 8








Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS551 B738 20 20:30:00 20:30:10 10
AS477 B737 20 16:43:00 16:43:21 21
AS17 B738 20 19:42:00 19:41:49 NA
AS467 B739 20 00:14:00 0:14:03 3
AS511 B737 20 04:18:00 4:17:58 -2
AS685 B739 20 17:39:00 17:39:22 22
AS329 B738 20 04:28:00 4:28:05 5
AS671 B739 20 04:17:00 4:16:51 -9
AS509 B737 20 00:12:00 0:12:11 11
AS1 B738 20 18:46:00 18:46:07 7
AS461 B734 20 23:07:00 23:07:13 13
AS533 B734 20 20:08:00 20:07:23 -37
AS743 B738 20 04:04:39 4:04:40 1
AS503 B737 20 21:52:00 21:52:00 0
AS39 B738 20 03:47:00 3:46:58 -2
AS345 B737 20 03:14:00 3:13:54 -6
AS469 B734 20 18:54:54 18:55:09 NA
AS661 B739 20 23:41:00 23:40:59 -1
AS229 B738 20 19:32:00 19:32:04 4
AS515 B738 20 17:52:00 17:52:22 22
AS23 B739 20 01:49:00 1:49:01 1
AS601 B739 20 21:25:00 21:25:14 14
AS305 B737 20 22:43:49 22:44:02 13
AS493 B734 20 17:08:00 17:08:23 23
AS603 B738 20 17:14:00 17:14:14 NA
AS233 B738 20 03:29:00 3:30:04 NA
AS25 B738 20 19:10:00 19:10:25 25
AS455 B734 20 01:31:00 1:31:02 2
AS37 B739 20 22:28:00 22:28:19 19
AS373 B738 20 23:09:54 23:10:07 13
AS321 B738 20 19:00:00 19:00:09 9
AS605 B738 20 23:33:13 23:33:07 -6
AS315 B738 20 16:51:00 16:51:04 4
AS501 B737 20 20:47:00 20:47:09 9
AS483 B738 20 22:49:00 22:49:48 NA
AS755 B738 20 04:15:04 4:15:48 44
AS327 B738 20 00:37:00 0:37:11 11
AS313 B738 20 02:42:00 2:42:06 6
AS601 B739 20 21:18:43 21:19:09 26







Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS325 B738 20 22:02:00 22:02:05 5
AS23 B739 20 01:46:00 1:46:32 NA
AS373 B738 20 22:47:00 22:47:16 16
AS685 B739 20 17:36:00 17:37:03 NA
AS553 B734 20 03:04:00 3:04:07 7
AS457 B738 20 04:30:00 4:30:11 11
AS603 B738 20 17:03:00 17:03:16 16
AS743 B738 20 04:04:00 4:04:06 6
AS671 B739 20 03:48:00 3:48:17 17
AS467 B739 20 00:01:00 0:01:03 NA
AS1 B738 20 18:22:00 18:22:08 8
AS3 B738 20 04:02:19 4:02:19 0
AS307 B737 20 19:03:00 19:03:17 17
AS37 B737 20 22:33:00 22:33:16 16
AS453 B738 20 21:24:49 21:25:49 NA
AS529 B737 20 21:23:00 21:23:03 3
AS39 B738 20 04:05:00 4:05:00 0
AS233 B738 20 04:28:00 4:28:09 9
AS539 B734 20 16:41:00 16:41:17 17
AS611 B738 20 02:22:13 2:22:33 20
AS345 B737 20 03:11:00 3:11:16 16
AS315 B738 20 16:37:00 16:37:13 13
ASH B738 20 17:51:00 17:52:13 73
AS461 B738 20 23:10:00 23:09:58 -2
AS227 B738 20 18:59:00 18:58:46 -14
AS493 B734 20 16:59:00 16:58:59 -1
AS483 B738 20 22:43:00 22:43:08 8
AS605 B738 20 23:24:00 23:24:14 14
AS329 B738 20 04:18:06 4:18:19 13
AS503 B737 20 21:39:00 21:39:02 2
AS551 B734 20 20:32:00 20:32:10 10
AS365 B738 20 19:37:00 19:36:55 -5
AS305 B738 20 22:36:00 22:36:14 14
AS673 B738 20 02:47:00 2:48:41 NA
AS533 B734 20 20:10:00 20:10:29 NA
AS679 B738 20 21:29:00 21:30:43 NA
AS619 B739 20 19:29:00 19:28:54 -6
AS555 B739 20 00:23:17 0:23:31 14
AS553 B734 20 03:00:00 3:00:17 NA








Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS305 B734 20 22:46:00 22:46:36 NA
AS487 B737 20 01:05:00 1:05:43 NA
AS673 B738 20 02:37:00 2:37:10 10
AS21 B739 20 18:24:00 18:23:50 -10
AS503 B737 20 21:35:00 21:35:18 18
AS313 B738 20 02:29:00 2:29:49 49
AS551 B737 20 20:22:00 20:22:22 22
AS1 B738 20 18:26:30 18:26:34 4
AS327 B734 20 00:38:40 0:38:51 11
AS531 B734 20 03:41:00 3:40:44 -16
AS527 B737 20 18:01:00 18:01:10 10
AS325 B738 20 21:55:00 21:55:30 30
AS455 B734 20 01:44:00 1:44:16 16
AS601 B738 20 21:32:02 21:32:35 33
AS671 B739 20 03:53:00 3:53:15 15
AS743 B738 20 03:57:00 3:56:57 -3
AS355 B737 20 03:20:00 3:20:13 13
AS37 B738 20 22:33:00 22:32:47 -13
AS453 B738 20 20:11:00 20:11:24 24
AS303 B738 20 19:37:35 19:37:36 1
AS39 B738 20 03:53:00 3:53:39 NA
AS501 B737 20 20:34:00 20:34:31 31
AS25 B738 20 19:04:00 19:03:20 NA
AS307 B734 20 NaN 18:50:05 NA
AS469 B734 20 18:46:00 18:46:09 9
AS555 B737 20 00:41:00 0:40:59 -1
AS345 B737 20 03:16:16 3:16:28 12
AS495 B738 20 18:30:00 18:31:53 NA
AS467 B739 20 00:14:00 0:14:15 15
ASH B738 20 18:02:00 18:01:58 -2
AS661 B739 20 23:37:00 23:36:57 -3
AS619 B739 20 19:13:00 19:13:14 14
AS373 B738 20 22:40:48 22:40:38 NA
AS321 B738 20 18:55:00 18:55:12 12
AS23 B738 20 01:41:00 1:41:14 14
AS3 B738 20 04:07:00 4:07:14 14
AS229 B738 20 19:42:25 19:44:01 NA
AS9005 B734 20 17:08:00 17:08:21 21
AS453 B734 20 20:10:00 20:09:58 -2







Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS481 B737 20 20:25:00 20:24:58 -2
AS303 B737 20 19:50:00 19:51:20 NA
AS37 B739 20 22:29:00 22:30:30 NA
AS679 B739 20 21:40:00 21:40:01 1
AS529 B737 20 21:21:00 21:21:01 1
AS315 B738 20 16:52:00 16:52:58 NA
AS493 B737 20 17:11:00 17:11:12 12
AS469 B734 20 18:47:00 18:47:15 15
AS551 B734 20 20:47:00 20:47:15 15
AS495 B738 20 18:36:00 18:36:23 23
AS503 B737 20 21:49:00 21:49:19 19
ASH B738 20 18:04:00 18:04:10 10
AS357 B738 20 18:49:00 18:49:17 17
AS533 B734 20 20:30:00 20:30:15 15
AS21 B739 20 18:06:00 18:05:57 NA
AS325 B738 20 22:11:00 22:11:17 17
AS305 B737 20 22:43:00 22:43:15 15
AS1 B738 20 18:27:40 18:29:49 NA
AS373 B738 20 22:45:00 22:45:20 20
AS619 B738 20 19:20:00 19:20:10 10
AS685 B739 20 17:23:00 17:22:58 -2
AS17 B738 20 19:27:00 19:27:00 0
AS25 B738 20 19:11:00 19:11:22 22
AS483 B738 20 22:42:00 22:42:15 15
AS661 B739 20 23:45:00 23:45:32 32
AS493 B738 20 17:07:00 17:07:24 24
AS533 B734 20 20:36:00 20:36:23 23
AS487 B737 20 01:01:31 1:01:48 17
AS527 B737 20 18:01:00 18:01:06 6
AS509 B737 20 23:51:00 23:51:22 22
AS481 B734 20 20:24:00 20:24:26 26
AS501 B737 20 20:34:00 20:34:11 11
AS685 B739 20 17:24:00 17:24:16 16
AS495 B738 20 18:40:00 18:40:15 15
AS373 B738 20 22:52:00 22:52:20 20
AS469 B737 20 18:58:00 18:58:28 28
AS601 B739 20 21:23:00 21:23:14 14
AS555 B734 20 00:44:00 0:44:25 25
AS551 B734 20 20:43:00 20:43:13 13








Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS619 B739 20 19:17:39 19:17:57 18
AS37 B739 20 22:42:16 22:42:04 NA
AS679 B739 20 NaN 21:18:18 NA
AS307 B734 20 19:07:00 19:07:09 NA
AS453 B738 20 20:45:00 20:45:28 28
AS517 B738 20 18:16:00 18:16:21 21
ASH B738 20 18:26:00 18:26:38 NA
AS515 B737 20 17:32:00 17:32:21 21
AS21 B739 20 18:03:00 18:03:14 14
AS305 B737 20 22:34:00 22:34:16 16
AS325 B738 20 22:30:00 22:30:20 20
AS605 B738 20 23:41:00 23:41:21 21
AS529 B737 20 21:29:00 21:29:17 17
AS467 B739 20 00:15:34 0:16:02 28
AS603 B738 20 17:17:00 17:17:21 21
AS661 B739 20 23:43:00 23:43:10 10
AS515 B737 20 17:33:00 17:33:16 16
AS493 B738 20 17:09:00 17:11:52 NA
AS303 B737 20 19:40:00 19:41:47 NA
AS327 B738 20 00:52:00 0:53:30 NA
AS501 B737 20 20:40:46 20:43:43 NA
AS685 B739 20 17:22:11 17:22:22 11
AS25 B738 20 19:09:00 19:09:04 4
AS503 B737 20 21:44:00 21:44:09 9
AS495 B738 20 18:37:00 18:36:59 NA
AS315 B737 20 16:41:00 16:42:07 NA
AS619 B738 20 19:31:00 19:31:18 18
AS529 B737 20 21:24:53 21:25:53 NA
AS23 B739 20 01:25:00 1:24:59 -1
AS357 B738 20 18:35:00 18:35:03 3
AS307 B734 20 19:12:00 19:12:17 17
AS517 B738 20 18:20:00 18:20:05 5
AS509 B737 20 23:49:00 23:49:24 24
AS371 B738 20 16:37:00 16:37:56 NA
AS373 B738 20 23:08:00 23:08:40 NA
AS533 B734 20 20:35:00 20:40:08 NA
AS1 B738 20 18:11:00 18:11:07 7
AS539 B734 20 16:58:00 16:58:12 12
AS453 B738 20 20:29:00 20:29:04 4







Cross Fix - 
Time
Time Time At
AS487 B737 20 01:21:00 1:21:16 16
AS603 B738 20 17:39:00 17:40:23 NA
AS467 B737 20 00:15:00 0:15:08 8
AS679 B739 20 21:48:00 21:48:11 11
AS17 B738 20 19:24:00 19:24:36 36
AS601 B738 20 21:53:00 21:53:19 19
AS619 B738 20 19:35:00 19:35:14 14
AS495 B738 20 18:47:00 18:45:07 NA
AS469 B734 20 18:56:00 18:56:07 7
AS357 B738 20 18:43:00 18:43:49 NA
AS601 B739 20 21:40:41 21:40:55 14
AS365 B738 20 19:37:00 19:37:13 13
AS517 B738 20 18:33:00 18:33:16 16
AS481 B734 20 20:32:00 20:32:07 7
AS453 B738 20 20:38:00 20:38:05 NA
AS501 B737 20 20:55:00 20:58:25 NA
AS303 B738 20 19:50:58 19:51:57 NA
AS25 B738 20 19:57:00 19:58:00 NA
AS551 B734 20 21:14:00 21:13:59 -1
AS307 B734 20 19:02:00 19:02:17 17
AS17 B738 20 19:11:00 19:10:57 -3
AS503 B737 20 21:59:00 21:59:08 8
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APPENDIX E: 2012 FAA Simulation Results








TMA .  FMS 
ETA '  ETA
FMS Analysis 









Cross Fix - 
Time At
Cross Fix - 
Alt AAlt
Cross Fix - 
Speed ASpd
Notes
F1 +SW491 B737 30 NO 14:34:17 00:43 14:35:00 14 34:17 00:02 14:34:15 14:32:30 14:34:15 14:37:30 14:35:00 14:00 14:35:02 2 19,020 20 249 1
F2 +SW1396 B737 30 NO 14:36:57 00:03 14:37:00 14:36:57 01:52 14:35:05 14:35:00 14:35:05 14:40:00 14:37:00 14:02 14:37:02 2 19,024 24 250 0
| F6 •*OL227 B757 50 NO 14:39:05 00:05 14:39:00 14:39:05 01:05 14:38:00 NA 14:38:00 NA 14:39:00 14:05 14:38:59 -1 19,013 13 247 3
£
Q
F3 -*SW2809 B737 30 NO 14:40:33 00:33 14:40:00 14:40:33 00:40 14:39:53 14:38:00 14:39:53 14:41:00 14:40:00 14:07 14:40:20 20 19,020 20 250 0
F5 ■4JA675 B757 50 NO 14:42:31 00:31 14:42:00 14:42:31 00:31 14:42:00 NA 14:42:00 NA 14:42:00 14:08 14:42:00 0 19,006 6 249 1
F4 HJA311 A320 25 NO 14:46:25 02:25 14:44:00 14:46:25 08:25 14:38:00 NA 14:38:00 NA 14:44:00 14:21 14:44:28 28 18,983 17 251 1 AAUAmd 14:44 @ T
FI ■•SW491 B737 30 NO 16:22:16 00:44 16:23:00 16:22:16 00:19 16:21:57 16:20:05 16:21:57 16:23:15 16:23:00 15:55 16:23:10 10 19,019 19 251 1 Netoork comm wlh
FMSs unstable
F2 +SW1396 B737 30 NO 16:24:59 00:01 16:25:00 16:24:59 00:02 16:25:01 16:22:43 16:25:01 16:25:56 16:25:00 15:56 16:25:18 18 19.020 20 253 3 resulting in clock
errors. Data per§ F3 -SW2809 B737 30 NO 16:26:08 00:08 16:26:00 16:26:08 00:08 16:26:00 16:24:38 16:26:00 16:26:31 16:26:00 15:59 16:26:10 10 19,022 22 260 10 FMSs
|
5
F4 HJA311 A320 25 NO 16:28:52 00:08 16:29:00 16:28:52 00:35 16:28:17 NA 16:28:17 NA 16:29:00 16:01 16:29:57 57 19,095 95 259 9
F5 HJA675 B757 50 NO 16:29:33 00:27 16:30:00 16:29:33 00:33 16:29:00 NA 16:29:00 NA 16:30:00 16:02 16:30:03 3 18,996 4 260 10
F6 +DL227 8757 50 NO 16:31:49 00:11 16:32:00 16:31:49 00:11 16:32:00 NA 16:32:00 NA 16:32:00 16:04 16:32:08 8 19,020 20 244 6
F1 +SW491 B737 30 NO 18:31:30 02:00 18:33:30 18:31:30 00:09 18:31:21 18:29:30 18:31:21 18:34:44 18:33:30 18:00 18:33:12 -18 19,049 49 251 1
F2 *SW1396 B737 30 NO 18:34:11 00:49 18:35:00 18:34:11 00:02 18:34:09 18:32:09 18:34:09 18:38:00 18:35:00 18:02 18:34:54 -6 19,020 20 250 0
| F6 ■*OL227 B757 50 NO 18:36:23 00:07 18:36:30 18:36:23 00:35 18:35:48 NA 18:35:48 NA 18:36:30 18:03 18:36:31 1 19,041 41 247 3
nQC
Q
F3 ♦SW2809 B737 30 NO 18:37:46 00:14 18:38:00 18:37:46 00:40 18:37:06 14:38:00 18:37:06 14:41:00 18:38:00 18:04 18:38:00 0 19,019 19 250 0
F5 ■MJA311 A320 25 NO 18:38:25 01:05 18:39:30 18:38:25 01:25 18:37:00 NA 18:37:00 NA 18:39:30 18:06 18:38:55 -35 20,214 1214 255 5
F4 -MJA675 B757 50 NO 18:39:40 01:20 18:41:00 18:39:40 00:04 18:39:36 NA 18:39:36 NA 18:41:00 18:07 18:40:57 -3 19,300 300 247 3
148




 | TMA Analysis 
ETA At STA













Cross Fix - 
Time At
Cross Fix - 
Alt AAlt
Cross Fix - 
Speed ASpd
Notes
F1 +SW491 8737 30 NO 19:59:58 00:04 19:59:54 19:59:58 00:25 19:59:33 19:57:29 19:59:33 20:00:59 19:59:54 19:35 20:00:04 10 19.019 19 254 4
F2 +SW1396 B737 30 NO 20:02:34 01:10 20:01:24 20:02:34 00:21 20:02:13 20:00:08 20:02:13 20:03:39 20:01:24 19:37 20:01:27 3 19,020 20 286 36
| F3 ♦SW2809 B737 30 NO FMS Soltarare Failed
S>
sQF4 ■HJA311 A320 25 NO 20:06:17 00:01 20:06:18 20:06:17 00:17 20:06:00 NA 20:06:00 NA 20:06:18 19:40 20:06:37 19 18.984 16 254 4
F5 ■KJA675 B757 50 NO 20:06:58 00:50 20:07:48 20:06:58 00:02 20:07:00 NA 20:07:00 NA 20:07:48 19:41 20:07:49 1 19,038 38 250 0
F6 ■4DL227 B757 50 NO 20:09:17 00:01 20:09:18 20:09:17 00:31 20:09:48 NA 20:09:48 NA 20:09:18 19:44 20:09:22 4 18,991 9 253 3
F1 +SW491 B737 15 NO 14:32:18 00:48 14:33:06 14:32:18 00:22 14:32:40 14:29:15 14:32:40 14:34:27 14:33:06 14:01 14:32:52 -14 19,054 54 250 0
F2 ♦SW1396 B737 30 NO 14:33:39 00:21 14:33:18 14:33:39 00:04 14:33:35 14:31:41 14:33:35 14:37:05 14:34:18 14:01 14:34:09 -9 19,020 20 250 0
| F6 ■♦OL227 B757 25 NO 14:35:30 00:00 14:35:30 14:35:30 00:18 14:35:12 NA 14:35:12 NA 14:35:30 14:03 14:35:28 -2 19,003 3 249 1
! F3 <SW2809 B737 30 NO 14:37:28 00:46 14:36:42 14:37:28 00:57 14:36:31 14:34:48 14:36:31 14:36:42 14:36:42 14:05 14:37:13 31 19,023 23 250 0
F4 ■RJA311 A320 25 NO 14:37:55 00:01 14:37:54 14:37:55 05:55 14:32:00 NA 14:32:00 NA 14:37:54 14:07 14:39:24 90 18,983 17 250 0
F5 HJA675 B757 50 NO 14:39:40 00:34 14:39:06 14:39:40 00:40 14:39:00 NA 14:39:00 NA 14:39:06 14:07 14:39:07 1 19,020 20 248 2
Ft -SW491 B737 30 NO 15:58:19 00:41 15:59:00 15:58:19 00:21 15:57:58 15:55:52 15:57:58 15:59:28 15:59:06 15:34 15:59:18 12 19,020 20 251 1
F2 -SW1396 B737 30 NO 16:00:55 00:53 16:01:48 16:00:55 01:13 15:59:42 16:55:52 15:59:42 16:02:06 16:01:48 15:39 16:01:57 9 19,055 55 251 1
F3 +SW2809 B737 15 NO 16:02:09 00:51 16:03:00 16:02:09 00:26 16:02:35 16:00:39 16:02:35 16:03:00 16:03:00 15:40 16:03:13 13 19,019 19 252 2
2s.sNOF4 ♦UA311 A320 25 NO 16:04:31 00:07 16:04:24 16:04:31 00:29 16:05:00 NA 16:05:00 NA 16:04:24 1542 16:04:32 8 18.983 17 232 18
F5 HJA675 B757 50 NO 16:05:40 00:08 16:05:48 16:05:40 00:34 16:05:06 NA 16:05:06 NA 16:05:48 15:43 16:06:00 12 19,027 27 256 6
F6 +OL227 B757 100 NO 16:07:52 00:46 16:07:06 16:07:52 00:26 16:08:18 NA 16:08:18 NA 16:07:06 15:44 16:07:11 5 19,003 3 250 0
149




 | TMA Analysis 
ETA At STA
TMA FMS 
ETA "  ETA First
FMS Analysis 





RTA „  EDA 
AM
Spd Spd
Cross Fix - 
Time At
Cross Fix - 
Alt AAlt
Cross Fix - 
Speed ASpd
No b s
F1 ♦SW325 B737 15 NO 17:22:54 00:36 17:23:30 17:22:54 00:39 17:22:15 17:20:25 17:22:15 17:23:34 17:23:30 16:47 17:23:29 -1 19,012 12 250 0
F4 -UA320 A320 25 NO 17:24:20 00:46 17:25:06 17:24:20 02:20 17:22:00 NA 17:22:00 NA 17:25:06 16:47 17:24:44 -22 19,812 812 245 5
¥




F5 HJA456 B757 50 NO 17:27:05 01:25 17:28:30 17:27:05 00:05 17:27:00 NA 17:27:00 NA 17:28:30 16:49 17:28:20 -10 19,027 27 254 4
F3 +SW114 B737 15 NO 17:27:19 02:47 17:30:06 17:27:19 00:41 17:28:00 17:23:42 17:28:00 17:32:27 17:30:06 16:50 17:29:57 -9 19,066 66 250 0
F6 ■MJA517 B757 100 NO 17:30:55 00:53 17:31:48 17:30:55 00:01 17:30:54 NA 17:30:54 NA 17:31:48 16:54 17:31:44 -4 19,071 71 249 1
F1 +SW325 B737 30 NO 19:42:32 00:40 19:43:12 19:42:32 00:09 19:42:41 19:41:33 19:42:41 19:43:05 19:43:12 19:21 19:43:21 9 19,070 70 250 0
F2 ■>SW362 B737 30 NO 19:44:34 00:44 19:45:18 19:44:34 00:31 19:44:03 19:41:54 19:44:03 19:45:32 19:45:18 19:22 19:45:27 9 19,049 49 250 0
?
CD
F3 +SW114 B737 30 NO 19:46:02 00:16 19 46:18 19:46:02 01:17 19:44:45 19:42:13 19:44:45 19:47:23 19:46:18 19:22 19:46:29 11 19,022 22 250 0
§
F5 HJA456 B757 50 NO 19:45:56 01:28 19:47:24 19:45:56 00:02 19:45:54 NA 19:45:54 NA 19:47:24 19:24 19:47:26 2 19,106 106 250 0
F4 ■KJA320 A320 25 NO 19:47:42 01:12 19:48:54 19:47:42 02:42 19:45:00 NA 19:45:00 NA 19:48:54 19:23 19:49:13 19 18,983 17 259 9
F6 HJA517 B757 100 NO 19:48:11 02:25 19:50:36 19:48:11 00:01 19:48:12 NA 19:48:12 NA 19:50:36 19:24 19:50:39 3 19,001 1 250 0
F2 +OL1214 B737 30 1-3 21:26:59 00:35 21:26:24 21:26:59 00:22 21:26:37 21:23:57 21:26:37 21:35:02 21:26:24 20:51 21 26:00 -24 19,012 12 251 1





F1 +SW2241 B737 30 1-3 21:27:00 01:48 21:28:48 21:27:00 00:25 21:27:25 21:25:26 21:27:25 21:31:12 21:28:48 20:55 21:28:46 -2 19,012 12 250 0
F6 HJA745 B757 50 1-3 21:28:04 02:02 21:30:06 21:28:04 00:34 21:27:30 NA 21:27:30 NA 21:30:06 20:56 21:30:00 -6 19,096 96 250 0
F4 HJA962 A320 25 1-3 21:31:18 01:00 21:32:18 21:31:18 01:18 21:30:00 NA 21:30:00 NA 21:32:18 20:58 21:32:04 -14 20,870 1870 240 10
F5 ■KJA923 B757 50 1-3 21.34:02 00:02 21:34:00 21:34:02 00:14 21:33:48 NA 21:33:48 NA 21:34:00 20:59 21:34:06 6 19,043 43 249 1
150




 j TMA Analysis 
ETA At STA
TMA .  FMS 
ETA M  ETA First
FMS Analysis 








^  o jSpd
Cross Fix - 
Time At
Cross Fix - 
Ait AAlt
Cross Fix - 
Speed ASpd
Notes
F4 ■4JA320 A320 25 1-3 14:44:17 00:37 14:44:54 14:44:17 04:17 14:40:00 NA 14:40:00 NA 14:44:54 14:06 14:45:38 44 18,983 17 248 2 Clock error (FMS =20s late)
F1 +SW325 B737 45 1-3 14:45:14 00:58 14:46:12 14:45:14 00:59 14:44:15 14:43:22 14:44:15 14:46:24 14:46:12 14:08 14:46:10 -2 19,021 21 250 0




F2 ♦SW362 B737 30 1-3 14:46:45 02:03 14:48:48 14:46:45 00:20 14:46:25 14:44:23 14:46:25 14:50:23 14:48:48 14:12 14:48:33 -15 19,046 46 250 0
F5 +UA456 B757 50 1-3 14:47:53 02:13 14:50:06 14:47:53 00:01 14:47:54 NA 14:47:54 NA 14:50:36 14:13 14:49:56 -40 19,089 89 249 1
F6 HIA517 B757 100 1-3 14:51:23 00:13 14:51:36 14:51:23 00:41 14:50:42 NA 14:50:42 NA 14:51:36 16:54 14:51:44 8 19,030 30 241 9
F1 +SW325 B737 45 1-3 15:59:46 01:14 16:01:00 15:59:46 00:11 15:59:35 15:58:33 15:59:35 16:00:27 16:00:30 15:34 16:01:02 32 19,022 22 252 2 AUI Amd 16:00.30 @








F3 ■•SW114 B737 30 1-3 16:02:12 01:06 16:03:18 16:02:12 00:35 16:01:37 15:59:03 16:01:37 16:04:17 16:03:18 15:35 16:03:24 6 19,019 19 250 0
F5 4JA456 B757 50 1-3 16:02:48 01:36 16:04:24 16:02:48 00:06 16:02:42 NA 16:02:42 NA 16:04:24 15:36 16:04:28 4 19,127 127 249 1
F4 ■AJA320 A320 45 1-3 16:04:54 00:36 16:05:30 16:04:54 00:54 16:04:00 NA 16:04:00 NA 16:05:30 15:37 16:05:46 16 18,983 17 250 0
F6 *UA517 B757 100 1-3 16:05:01 01:59 16:07:00 16:05:01 00:31 16:04:30 NA 16:04:30 NA 16:06:24 15:40 16:06:30 6 19,103 103 235 15 AUlAmd 16:06:24® 15:45
F3 +SW449 B737 30 1-3 17:11:50 00:50 17:11:00 17:11:50 00:01 17:11:51 17:10:24 17:11:51 17:12:13 17:11:00 16:41 17:11:05 5 19,012 12 250 0
F2 ♦OL1214 B737 30 1-3 17:12:11 00:13 17:12:24 17:12:11 00:05 17:12:16 17:09:35 17:12:16 17:15:23 17:12:24 16:49 17:12:24 0 19,021 21 267 17
g
(J
F1 +SW2241 B737 30 1-3 17:11:34 02:14 17:13:48 17:11:34 00:28 17:12:02 17:10:07 17:12:02 17:13:21 17:13:48 16:52 17:13:51 3 19,020 20 252 2
£m
o
F4 ■RJA962 A320 25 1-3 17 15:46 00:28 17:15:18 17:15:46 00:14 17:16:00 NA 17:16:00 NA 17:15:16 16:54 17:15:48 32 18,983 17 245 5
F5 4JA923 B757 50 1-3 17:16:29 00:01 17:16:30 17:16:29 00:01 17:16:30 NA 17:16:30 NA 17:16:30 16:55 17:17:01 31 19,020 20 267 17
F6 +UA745 B757 50 1-3 17:17:40 00:14 17:17:54 17:17:40 00:32 17:18:12 NA 17:18:12 NA 17:17:54 16:56 17:18:06 12 19,013 13 242 8
151















. .  EDA
AM „  ,  
Spd
Cross Fix - 
Time At
Cross Fix - 
Alt AAlt
Cross Fix - 
Speed ASpd
Nolas
F2 ■•011214 B737 30 1-3 18:57:20 00:14 18:57:06 18:57:20 00:37 18:56:43 18:54:11 18:56:43 19:05:16 18:57:06 18:24 18:56:59 -7 19,037 37 250 0
F3 ♦SW449 B737 30 1-3 18:57:24 02:18 18:59:42 18:57:24 01:37 18:55:47 18:55:07 18:55:47 18:58:06 18:58:24 18:25 18:58:11 -13 19,070 70 250 0 Swap Amd 18:58:24@18:28




F6 ■HJA745 B757 50 1-3 18:58:48 02:12 19:01:00 18:58:48 01:12 18:57:36 NA 18:57:36 NA 19:01:00 18:27 19:00:59 -1 19.000 0 250 0
F4 •HJA962 A3 20 25 1-3 19:01:43 00:35 19:02:18 19:01:43 01:43 19:00:00 NA 19:00:00 NA 19:02:18 18:30 19:02:33 15 18,983 17 240 10
F5 •OA923 B757 50 1-3 19:04:01 00:25 19:03:36 19:04:01 00:07 19:03:54 NA 19:03:54 NA 19:03:36 18:31 19:03:32 -4 19,002 2 250 0
Ft SW325 B737 30 1-3 13:25:08 00:08 13:25:00 13:25:08 00:05 13:25:13 13:23:47 13:25:13 13:25:34 13:25:00 Y Y N N 13:25:11 11 19,018 18 250 0 RTA entered as 13:25:09
S'
F2 SW362 B737 30 1-3 13:27:03 00:21 13:26:42 13:27:03 00:40 13:26:23 13:24:38 13:26:23 13:27:40 Network Comm: A/C dropped
P
i F5 AA456 B757 50 1-3 13:26:55 00:59 13:27:54 13:26:55 00:01 13:26:54 NA 13:26:54 NA 13:27:54 NA Y N N 13:27:55 1 19,118 118 248 2s
a
N
F3 SW114 B737 15 1-3 13:27:50 01:16 13:29:06 13:27:50 01:04 13:26:46 13:24:30 13:26:46 13:29:12 13:29:06 Y Y N N 13:29:08 2 19,017 17 259 9
fil
F4 UA320 A320 25 1-3 13:28:13 02:05 13:30:18 13:28:13 00:13 13:28:00 NA 13:28:00 NA 13:30:18 NA Y N N 13:30:28 10 18,983 17 243 7
F6 AA517 B757 100 1-3 13:29:41 03:07 13:32:48 13:29:41 00:05 13:29:36 NA 13:29:36 NA 13:31:42 NA Y N N 13:31:44 2 18,994 6 248 2
F1 SW241 B737 30 1-3 15:43:59 00:17 15:43:42 15:43:59 00:37 15:43:22 15:41:26 15:43:22 15:44:59 15:43:42 Y Y N N 15:43:57 15 19,013 13 250 0
S'
F3 SW449 B737 30 1-3 15:44:04 00:52 15:44:56 15:44:04 00:06 15:44:10 15:43:02 15:44:10 15:44:49 15:45:00 N Y N N 15:45:14 14 19,012 12 250 0
p
o F2 DL121 B737 30 1-3 15:45:20 00:42 15:46:02 15:45:20 01:26 15:43:54 15:41:09 15:43:54 15:47:47 15:46:00 Y Y N N 15:45:47 -13 19,015 15 296 46
a5
(M
F5 AA923 B757 50 1-3 15:44:55 02:22 15:47:17 15:44:55 00:07 15:44:48 NA 15:44:48 NA NA N Y N 18,972 28 250 0 AUI: Amd RTA notissued
fil
F4 UA962 A320 25 1-3 15:45:55 02:36 15:4831 15:45:55 00:05 15:46:00 NA 15:46:00 NA 15:48:30 NA Y N N 15:47:35 -55 19,024 24 250 0
F6 AA745 B757 50 1-3 15:49:30 00:15 15:49:45 15:49:30 00:18 15:49:48 NA 15:49:48 NA 15:49:48 NA Y N N 15:49:51 3 18,999 1 249 1
152




 | TMA Analysis 
ETA At STA












a .  EDA am
Spd
Cross Fix - 
Time At
Cross Fix - 
Alt AAlt
Cross Fix - 
Speed ASpd
Notes
Ft SW325 B737 30 4-8 17:32:24 03:06 17:35:30 17:32:24 00:44 17:31:40 17:30:05 17:31:40 17:33:05 17:35:30 N N Y N 17:35:36 6 19,012 12 250 0
F4 UA32Q A320 25 4-8 17:33:56 03:14 17:37:10 17:33:56 01:56 17:32:00 NA 17:32:00 NA 17:37:12 N N Y N 17:37:52 40 18,983 17 236 14




F2 SW362 B737 30 4-8 17:35:34 04:56 17:40:30 17:35:34 00:30 17:35:04 17:33:03 17:35:04 17:39:00 Network Comm. A/C dropped
CM
F5 AA4S6 B757 50 4-8 17:36:50 05:20 17:42:10 17:36:50 00:26 17:36:24 NA 17:36:24 NA 17:42:12 NA N Y N 17:41:58 -14 19,006 6 247 3
F6 AA517 B757 100 4-8 17:40:53 07:57 17:48:50 17:40:53 00:35 17:40:18 NA 17:40:18 NA 17:48:48 NA N Y N 17:48:48 0 19,001 1 251 1
F2 DL121 B737 30 4-8 19:58:10 02:14 20:00:24 19:58:10 58:10 0:00:00 19:54:50 20:06:10 20:00:24 20:00:07 -17 19,065 65 251 1
Ft SW241 B737 30 4-8 19:58:10 04:02 20:02:12 19:58:10 58:10 0:00:00 19:56:13 20:01:51 20:02:12 N N Y N 20:02:16 4 19,029 29 250 0




F6 AA745 B757 50 4-8 19:58:50 07:10 20:06:00 19:58:50 58:50 0:00:00 NA NA 20:06:00 N N Y N 20:05:58 -2 19,007 7 251 1
IN
F4 UA962 A320 25 4-8 20:00:44 07:10 20:07:54 20:00:44 06:34 19:54:10 NA 19:54:10 NA N N Y N 19,000 0 227 23 AUI: Amd RTA notissued
F5 AA923 B757 50 4-8 20:01:24 08:18 20:09:42 20:01:24 01:24 0:00:00 NA NA 20:09:42 N N Y N 20:09:42 0 19,016 16 250 0
Ft SW325 B737 30 4-8 13:40:20 00:11 13:40:09 13:40:20 40:20 0:00:00 NA N Y N 13:40:34 19,011 11 250 0
s
F4 UA320 A320 25 4-8 13:40:18 01:42 13:42:00 13:40:18 40:18 0:00:00 NA N Y Y 13:44:18 18,986 14 249 1 Unable Istpati; Reqd Corr
£








F2 SW362 B737 30 4-8 13:41:22 04:20 13:45:42 13:41:22 41:22 0:00:00
>
<QLU
NA N Y N 13:45:55 19.037 37 250 0
IN
F5 AA456 B757 50 4-8 13:43:14 04:19 13:47:33 13:43:14 43:14 0:00:00 NA N Y N 13:47:37 18,999 230 20
F6 AA517 B757 100 4-8 13:47:08 07:49 13:54:57 13:47:08 47:08 0:00:00 NA N Y N 13:54:23 19,001 250 0
153




 | TMA Analysis 
ETA At STA
TMA .  FMS 
ETA “  ETA First
FMS Analysis 







..  EDA 
AM
Spd
Cross Fix - 
Time At
Cross Fix - 
Alt AAlt
Cross Fix - 
Speed ASpd
Nobs
F2 DL121 B737 30 4-8 15:17:04 01:13 15:18:17 15:17:04 17:04 0:00:00 NA N Y N 15:16:51 20,511 1511 251 1
5?
F3 SW449 B737 30 4-8 15:17:45 02:27 15:20:12 15:17:45 17:45 0:00:00 NA N Y N 15:20:44 19,084 84 250 0
|





NA N Y Y 15:22:34 19,071 71 250 0
N




NA N Y N 15:23:16 19,002 2 250 0
N
F4 UA962 A320 25 4-8 15:20:14 05:42 15:25:56 15:20:14 20:14 0:00:00 NA N Y N 15:25:44 18,983 17 250 0 Vect past SAYGE for Spacing
F5 AA923 B757 50 4-8 15:21:08 06:44 15:27:52 15:21:08 21:08 0:00:00 NA N Y N 15:28:06 19,007 7 248 2
Ft SW325 B737 30 4-8 17:10:38 01:10 17:11:48 17:10:38 00:41 17:09:57 17:08:27 17:09:57 17:11:04 17:11:48 N N Y N 17:11:52 4 19,014 14 250 0
F4 UA320 A320 25 4-8 17:12:02 01:16 17:13:18 17:12:02 02:02 17:10:00 NA 17:10:00 NA 17:13:18 NA Y N N 17:13:05 -13 18,983 17 240 10
£
S .




F2 SW362 B737 30 4-8 17:13:02 03:46 17:16:48 17:13:02 00:46 17:12:16 17:11:16 17:12:16 17:16:34 17:16:48 N N Y Y 17:16:51 3 19,002 2 250 0 Pilot Error Enty of RTA
CM
F5 AA4S6 B757 50 4-8 17:18:14 00:04 17:18:18 17:18:14 03:38 17:14:36 NA 17:14:36 NA 17:18:18 NA N Y N 17:18:21 3 19,004 4 251 1
F6 AA517 B757 too 4-8 17:18:53 06:31 17:25:24 17:18:53 00:29 17:18:24 NA 17:18:24 NA 17:25:24 NA N Y N 17:25:33 9 18,997 3 248 2
F2 0L121 B737 30 4-8 18:42:08 06:04 18:48:12 18:42:08 01:48 18:43:56 18:41:19 18:43:56 16:52:58 18:48:12 Y N Y N 18:48:13 1 19,043 43 239 11
F3 SW449 B737 30 4-8 18:45:38 02:34 18:48:12 18:45:38 01:33 18:44:05 18:42:23 18:44:05 16:45:17 19,000 0 250 0 AUI; Ext Vectors; No Amd
u F1 SW241 B737 30 4-8 18:45:13 07:34 18:52:47 18:45:13 00:22 18:44:51 18:42:48 18:44:51 18:48:46 18:52:42 N N Y N 18:53:20 38 19,012 12 220 30 ATC Spd R sr <250K/ <220K
F6 AA745 B757 50 4-8 18:53:16 00:56 18:54:12 18:53:16 08:28 18:44:48 NA 18:44:48 NA 18:51:50 19,000 0 250 0 AUI; No Amd
F4 UA962 A320 25 4-8 18:55:43 00:07 18:55:36 18:55:43 09:43 18:46:00 NA 18:46:00 NA 18:55:42 NA N Y N 18:56:18 36 18,986 14 240 10
F5 AA923 B757 50 4-8 18:44:24 09:48 18:54:12 18:44:24 03:06 18:47:30 NA 18:47:30 NA 19:00:14 19,000 0 250 0 No RTA Issued
154




 | TMA Analysis 
ETA At STA
TMA FMS 
ETA "  ETA First
FMS Analysis 







. .  EDA
AM „ JSpd
Cross Fix - 
Time At
Cross Fix - 
Alt AAlt
Cross Fix - 
Speed ASpd
Nobs
F2 DL121 B737 30 4-8 20:06:02 02:40 20:08:42 20:06:02 05:06 20:00:56 19:58:38 20:00:56 20:04:04 20:04:51 N N Y N 20:04:57 6 19,018 18 262 12
S '
FI SW241 B737 30 4-8 20:10:43 00:43 20:10:00 20:10:43 09:47 20:00:56 19:58:52 20:00:56 20:02:02 20:04:30 19,069 69 250 0 AUlw1 Path Slrefch; No Amd
P
o F3 SW449 B737 30 4-8 20:06:22 04:56 20:11:18 20:06:22 05:49 20:00:33 20:00:33 20:03:36 Y Y Y N 20:03:47 11 19,002 2 250 0
1
CM
F5 AA923 B757 50 4-8 00:00 0:00:00 01:54 20:01:54 NA 20:01:54 NA 20:05:54 NA N Y N 20:05:56 2 19,001 1 250 0
«N
F4 UA962 A320 25 4-8 00:00 0:00:00 03:00 20:03:00 NA 20:03:00 NA Y 20:13:06 18,983 17 220 0 No RTA: ATC Assn 220K
F6 AA745 B757 50 4-8 00:00 0:00:00 06:54 20:06:54 NA 20:06:54 NA 20:09:54 NA N Y N 20:09:54 0 19,001 1 250 0
Ft SW325 8737 30 4-8 13:26:24 03:24 13:29:48 13:26:24 00:41 13:25:43 13:23:58 13:25:43 13:27:03 13:29:48 N N Y Y 13:32:13 17,001 0 250 0 ATC Spd7Alt Reslr; x17000
S'
F2 SW362 B737 30 4-8 13:26:00 03:26 13:29:26 13:26:00 03:03 13:29:03 13:26:57 13:29:03 13:33:11 13:29:36 Y Y N N 13:29:34 -2 19,002 2 250 0
£
a .




F3 SW114 B737 30 4-8 13:28:50 04:31 13:33:21 13:28:50 00:26 13:29:16 13:26:58 13:29:16 13:35:19 13:33:24 Y N Y N 13:33:42 19,015 15 220 0 ATC Assn 220K
IN
F5 AA456 B757 50 4-8 13:30:47 05:31 13:36:18 13:30:47 00:23 13:30:24 NA 13:30:24 NA 13:35:42 N N Y Y 13:37:58 19,004 4 250 0 AUI: Amd AUI
F6 AA517 B757 50 4-8 13:34:46 01:56 13:36:42 13:34:46 00:28 13:34:18 NA 13:34:18 NA 13:36:42 N N Y N 13:36:21 23,001 0 285 0 ATC Assn Spd/AltResY
F2 DL121 B737 30 4-8 15:03:56 00:52 15:04:48 15:03:56 00:44 15:03:12 15:00:34 15:03:12 15:12:11 15:04:48 Y Y N N 15:04:45 -3 19.031 31 250 0
s
F3 SW449 B737 30 4-8 15:04:03 00:45 15:04:48 15:04:03 04:43 14:59:20 14:58:18 14:59:20 15:01:29 15:06:24 N N Y N 15:06:36 12 19,034 34 250 0
£




F6 AA745 B757 50 4-8 15:04:44 05:01 15:09:45 15:04:44 00:38 15:04:06 NA 15:04:06 NA 15:09:48 NA N Y Y 15:09:12 -36 19,003 3 248 2
AUlw/1 st P ati; OK ml 2nd
F4 UA962 A320 25 4-8 15:06:24 05:01 15:11:25 15:06:24 09:24 14:57:00 NA 14:57:00 NA 15:11:24 NA N Y N 15:11:20 -4 18,983 17 216 34
F5 AA923 8757 50 4-8 15:07:21 02:24 15:09:45 15:07:21 00:33 15:06:48 NA 15:06:48 NA 15:12:42 NA N Y N 15:12:43 1 19,009 9 250 0
155















„  EDA 
Spd
Cross Fix - 
Time 4 t
Cross Fix - 
Alt AAlt
Cross Fix - 
Speed ASpd
Notes
F1 SW325 B737 30 4-8 16:12:05 03:18 16:15:23 16:12:05 00:03 16:12:08 16:10:37 16:12:08 16:12:33 16:15:24 N N Y N 16:15:34 10 19,012 12 250 0
V
F2 SW362 B737 30 4-8 16:15:12 03:21 16:18:33 16:15:12 00:11 16:15:01 16:12:51 16:15:01 16:16:28 16:18:32 N N Y N 16:18:25 -7 19,011 11 250 0
J
m F3 SW114 B737 30 4-8 16:16:15 03:53 16:20:08 16:16:15 00:31 16:15:44 16:13:11 16:15:44 16:24:05 16:20:06 Y N Y N 16:20:08 2 19,016 16 250 0
1CM
F5 AA456 B757 50 4-8 16:16:53 05:07 16:22:00 16:16:53 00:05 16:16:48 NA 16:16:48 NA 16:22:00 NA N Y N 16:23:15 19,003 3 251 1 AAU; Fit FREEZE Error
F4 UA320 A320 25 4-8 16:19:03 04:52 16:23:55 16:19:03 04:03 16:15:00 NA 16:15:00 NA 16:23:36 NA N Y N 16:23:30 -6 20,866 866 255 5 ATC Assn FL200
F6 AA517 B757 50 4-8 16:19:18 05:58 16:25:16 16:19:18 00:06 16:19:12 NA 16:19:12 NA 16:25:18 NA N Y N 16:25:16 -2 23,654 0 251 1 ATC Res* Alt Unable FL190
F3 SW449 8737 30 4-8 18:03:48 02:18 18:06:06 18:03:48 00:00 18:03:48 18:02:26 18:03:48 18:04:14 18:06:06 N N Y N 18:06:13 7 19.018 18 250 0
S '
F2 DL121 B737 30 4-8 18:04:11 03:35 18:07:46 18:04:11 00:00 18:04:11 18:01:17 18:04:11 18:08:02 18:07:48 N N Y N 18:07:47 -1 19,017 17 263 13
S




F5 AA923 B757 50 4-8 18:05:16 05:40 18:10:56 18:05:16 00:04 18:05:12 NA 18:05:12 NA 18:11:00 NA N Y N 18:10:29 19,007 7 250 0 AUI; No Amd
N
F4 UA962 A320 25 4-8 18:06:25 06:06 18:12:31 18:06:25 00:25 18:06:00 NA 18:06:00 NA 18:12:30 NA N Y N 18:12:13 -17 18,986 14 250 0
F6 AA745 B757 50 4-8 18:10:00 04:06 18:14:06 18:10:00 00:12 18:10:12 NA 18:10:12 NA 18:14:06 NA N Y Y 18:13:27 19,007 7 249 1 AUI: Revised Pati AUI
156







TMA ,  FMS 
ETA A'  ETA
FMS Analysis 







Cross Fix - 
Time At
Cross Fix - 
Alt AAlt
Cross Fix - 
Speed ASpd
Notos
51Ft SWA241 B737 30 3-4 15:44:43 02:47 15:47:30 15:44:43 01:36 15:43:07 15:42:26 15:43:07 15:48:52 15:47:30 LBF AMW043/62 AMW 1 0.763 0.023 0.74 15:47:12 18 19.000 0 280 30 1 Arndt/NC
1 F2 DAL121 B737 30 3-4 15:34:10 03:02 15:37:12 15:34:10 00:40 15:33:30 15:32:45 15:33:30 15:39:30 15:37:12 0 0.707 0.007 0.70 15:37:20 19,100 100 250 0
u F3 SWA449 B737 30 3-4 15:30:16 03:02 15:33:18 15:30:16 01:21 15:31:37 15:31:03 15:31:37 15:33:12 15:33:18 Vector/DAM WAY 0 0.776 0.006 0.77 15:33:13 -5 19.000 0 250 0 No PATH; Vector tor RTA
s F4 UAL 962 B737 30 3-4 15:40:23 03:13 15:43:36 15:40:23 00:36 15:40:59 15:38:27 15:40:59 15:48:07 15:42:02 19,000 0 250 0 No RTA; EDA NVT
s
<•» F5 AAL923 B757 50 3-4 15:38:36 02:30 15:41:06 15:38 36 00:12 15:38:24 NA 15:38:24 NA 15:41:06 LBF AMWQ52/59 AMW 0 0.765 0.025 0.79 15:41:06 0 19,100 100 249 1
(VI
F6 AAL745 B757 30 3-4 15:29:17 01:43 15:31:00 15:29:17 00:19 15:29:36 NA 15:29:36 NA FMST FAILED; End Run
5* F1 SWA325 B737 30 3-4 17:27:58 02:56 17:30:54 17:27:58 00:10 17:27:48 17:26:45 17:27:48 17:28:22 17:30:54 LBF AMW038/65 AMW 1 0.778 0.008 0.77 17:30:50 -4 19,000 0 258 8 1 Amdt/NC
i F2 SWA362 B737 30 3-4 17:34:33 02:39 17:37:12 17:34:33 00:23 17:34:56 17:32:06 17:34:56 17:43:19 17:37:12 0 0.726 0.006 0.72 17:37:07 20,200 0 262 12 AAC: EDA [FFT165]: Alt
£ F3 SWA114 B737 30 3-4 17:35:52 04:28 17:40:20 17:35:52 00:09 17:36:01 17:33:27 17:36:01 17:41:37 17:40:18 LBF SA026/59 SA 0 0.733 0.023 0.71 17:40:18 0 19,000 0 251 1
2 F4 UAL320 B737 30 3-4 17:24:01 02:11 17:26:12 17:24:01 00:05 17:23:56 17:22:59 17:23:56 17:27:31 17:26:12 YANKISNY079/54 SNY 0 0.762 0.022 0.74 17:26:11 -1 19,000 0 254 4
5
*? F5 AAL456 B757 50 3-4 17:26:53 02:29 17:29:22 17:26:53 00:07 17:27:00 NA 17:27:00 NA 17:29:24 LBF AMW048/46 AMW 0 0.787 0.037 0.75 17:29:21 -3 19,100 100
257 7
F6 AAL517 B757 50 3-4 17:31:56 02:08 17:34:04 17:31:56 00:02 17:31:54 NA 17:31:54 NA 17:34:06 2 0.753 0.013 0.74 17:34:05 -1 19,000 0 246 4 2 Amdt/NC
£■ F1 SWA241 B737 30 3-4 19:05:05 03:31 19:08:36 19:05:05 00:29 19:05:34 19:07:22 19:05:34 19:10:09 19:08:36 LBF AMW051/103 AMW 0 0.769 0.049 0.72 19:08:45 9 19,000 0 250 0
F2 DAL121 B737 30 3-4 18:58:21 03:21 19:01:42 18:58:21 00:15 18:58:06 18:58:36 18:58:06 19:03:44 19:01:36 LBF AMW035/66AMW 0 0.710 0.030 0.68 19:01:45 9 19,100 100 251 1
u F3 SWA449 B737 30 3-4 18:55:48 01:54 18:57:42 18:55:48 00:51 18:56:39 18:56:18 18:56:39 18:57:53 18:57:42 0 0.776 0.026 0.75 18:57:23 -19 19,000 0 250 0 EDA NVT; RTA LATE: PFSC
8 F4 UAL 962 B737 30 3-4 19:04:16 01:44 19:06:00 19:04:16 00:27 19:04:43 19:03:14 19:04:43 19:06:21 19:06:00 1 0.703 0.037 0.74 19:06:19 19,100 100 250 0 AAC; ATC > 250K in DES
5
(O F5 AAL923 B757 50 3-4 19:00:38 02:28 19:03:06 19:00:38 00:04 19:00:42 NA 19:00:42 NA 19:03:06 LBF AMW051/59 AMW 0 0.758 0.018 0.74 19:03:13 7 19.100 100 253 3
N
F6 AAL745 B757 30 3-4 18:52:56 02:40 18:55:36 18:52:56 00:08 18:52:48 NA 18:52:48 NA 18:55:36 YANKI SA067/126SA 0 0.770 0.030 0.74 18:55:40 4 19,200 200 265 15
„ F1 SWA325 B737 30 3-4 20:27:49 03.05 20:30:54 20:27:49 00:11 20:28:00 20:29:23 20:28:00 20:31:00 20:30:48 PP AMW057/115 AMW 0 0.776 0.006 0.77 20:30:45 -3 19,000 0 251 1
e F2 SWA362 B737 30 3-4 20:34:51 02:27 20:37:18 20:34:51 00:14 20:34:37 20:34:31 20:34:37 20:38:28 20:37:12 HCT SA358/27 SA 0 0.697 0.017 0.68 20:37:16 4 19,000 0 251 1 Early Descent
a F3 SWA114 B737 30 3-4 20:33:09 02:33 20:35:42 20:33:09 00:04 20:33:13 20:33:54 20:33:13 20:36:47 20:35:36 PPAMW041/64AMW 0 0.740 0.030 0.71 20:35:40 4 19,000 0 250 0 Laddered Descent
2
51 F4 UAL320 B737 30 3-4 20:23:50 02:16 20:26:06 20:23:50 00:12 20:23:38 20:24:17 20:23:38 20:26:43 20:26:00 YANKI SNY092/60 SNY 0 0.751 0.011 0 74 20:25:52 -8 19.000 0 252 2
o
n F5 AAL456 B757 50 3-4 20:26:46 00:56 20:27:42 20:26:46 00:52 20:25:54 NA 20:25:54 NA 20:27:36 NONE, BUT NEEDED 20:26:30 19,100 100 250 0 AUI; Adj Spd to > Corr; None
N
F6 AAL517 B757 50 3-4 20:29:39 04:27 20:34:06 20:29:39 00:09 20:29:48 NA 20:29:48 NA 20:34:00 LBF AMW034/67 AMW 0 0.761 0 021 0.74 20:34:02 2 19,100 100 254 4
S' Ft SWA241 B737 15 3-4 13:38:07 01:35 13:39:42 13:38:07 00:13 13:37:54 13:37:02 13:37:54 13:41:02 13:39:42 LBF AMW044/61 AMW 0 0.765 0.025 0 74 13:39:27 -15 19,000 0 261 11
1 F2 0AL121 B737 45 3-4 13:25:11 03:55 13:29:06 13:25:11 00:11 13:25:22 13:24:06 13:25:22 13:35:00 13:29:06 0 0.701 0001 0 70 13:29:07 1 19,100 100 250 0
o F3 SWA449 B737 15 3-4 13:22:30 03:24 13:25:54 13:22:30 01:56 13:24:26 13:22:22 13:24:26 13:24:47 13:25:54 Vectors >DHCT/BSA 13:26:55 19,100 100 252 2 EDA NVT tienAUI
s F4 UAL962 B737 45 3-4 13:31:35 03:31 13:35:06 13:31:35 00:06 13:31:41 13:32:37 13:31:41 13:38:05 13:35:00 1 0.772 0.042 0.73 13:35:04 4 19,000 0 251 1 EDA NVT; PFSC; 1 Amdt/NC
on F5 AAL923 B757 100 3-4 13:27:48 02:54 13:30:42 13:27:48 01:18 13:29:06 NA 13:29:06 NA 13:30:36 0 0.773 0.007 0.78 13:30:37 1 19,000 0 230 20 CRZ DES to FL360
N
F6 AAL745 B757 30 3-4 13:21:48 01:48 13:23:36 13:21:48 00:54 13:22:42 NA 13:22:42 NA 13:23:30 0 0.766 0.016 0.75 13:23:33 3 19,000 0 255 5
5? F1 SWA325 B737 45 3-4 14:57:37 03:53 15:01:30 14:57:37 01:23 1 4:59:00 14:59:58 14:59:00 15:01:39 15:01:30 LBFAMW014/45 AMW 0 0.776 0.006 0.77 15:01:31 1 19,000 0 250 0
S F2 SWA362 B737 15 3-4 15:06:54 03:42 15:10:36 15:06:54 03:26 15:10:20 15:10:03 15:10:20 15:12:18 15:10:36 PPAMW042/64AMW 0 0 759 0.029 0 73 15:10:39 3 19.000 0 254 4 Vector to generate
£ F3 SWA114 B737 45 3-4 15:02:37 03:41 15:06:18 15:02:37 00:18 15:02:19 15:03:51 15:02:19 15:07:24 15:06:18 LBF AM036/67 AMW 0 0.724 0.014 0.71 15:06:26 8 19,000 0 250 0
2 F4 UAL320 B737 15 3-4 14:54:19 03:59 14:58:18 14:54:19 00:41 14:55:00 14:56:20 14:55:00 14:59:16 14:58:18 YANKI SNY102/69 SNY 0 0.751 0.011 0 74 14:58:14 -4 19,000 0 250 0
o
*? F5 AAL456 B757 25 3-4 14:55:45 00:45 14:56:30 14:55:45 00:39 14:56:24 NA 14:56:24 NA 14:56:30 PPAMW060/61 AMW 0 0.767 0.027 0.74 14:56:36 6 19,100 100 256 6
N
F6 AAL517 B757 100 3-4 14:58:18 04:48 15:03:06 14:58:18 00:24 14:57:54 NA 14:57:54 NA 15:03:06 LBF AMVW15/45 AMW 0 0.749 0.009 0.74 15:03:09 3 19,200 200 255 5
157




 | TMA Analysis 
ETA A1 STA












Cross Fix - 
Time At
Cross Fix - 
Alt AAlt
Cross Fix - 
Speed ASpd
Notes
S ’ F1 SWA241 B737 45 4-5 17:11:42 04:06 17:15:48 17:11:42 06:42 17:05:00 17:08:26 17:05:00 17:13:19 17:11:54 LBF AMW004/38 AMW 0.762 0.022 0.74 17:12:35 19.000 0 260 10 AAC/FMS Snapshot ERROR£ F2 DAL121 B737 15 4-5 16:59:05 03:31 17:02:36 16:59:05 00:31 16:58:34 16:56:11 16:58:34 17:04:26 17:02:36 LBF AMVW57/58 AMW 0 0.687 0.007 0.68 17:02:41 5 19,100 100 250 0
o F3 SWA449 B737 45 4-5 16:53:35 04:37 16:58:12 16:53:35 00:19 16:53:16 16:56:19 16:53:16 16:58:24 16:58:30 0 0.776 0.026 0 75 16:58:26 -4 19,300 300 251 1 EDA NVTafi! F4 UAL962 B737 15 4-5 17:05:12 05:12 17:10:24 17:05:12 00:24 17:05:36 17:07:30 17:05:36 17:13:00 17:08:12 Vector tien  BSA 0 0.795 0.015 0.78 17:08:18 6 19,000 0 262 12 EDA NVTa
n F5 AAL923 B757 25 4-5 16:59:46 04:50 17:04:36 16:59:46 00:38 17:00:24 NA 17:00:24 NA 17:04:36 LBF AMW034/67 AMW 0 0.763 0.023 0.74 17:04:34 -2 19,000 0 257 7
«s F6 AAL745 B757 100 4-5 16:50:15 04:00 16:54:15 16:50:15 00:27 16:49:48 NA 16:49:48 NA 16:54:18 YANKI SA064/146SA 0 0.750 0.010 0.74 16:54:20 2 19,000 0 253 3
¥ F1 SWA241 B737 15 4-5 18:36:11 05:13 18:41:24 18:36:11 02:26 18:38:37 18:41:34 18:38:37 18:43:22 18:41:24 LBFAMW031/70AMW 0 0.781 0041 0.74 18:41:33 9 19,000 0 250 0g F2 DAL121 B737 45 4-5 18:29:25 03:29 18:32:54 18:29:25 00:24 18:29:01 18:31:31 18:29:01 18:34:06 18:32:54 LBF AMW039/64 AMW 0 0.709 0.029 0.68 18:33:04 10 19,000 0 250 0
o F3 SWA449 B737 15 4-5 18:28:59 02:25 18:31:24 18:28:59 00:40 18:29:39 18:29:45 18:29:39 18:31:33 18:31:24 HCT AMW058/58AMW 0 0.776 0.006 0.77 18:31:32 8 19,100 100 250 0
I F4 UAL962 B737 45 4-5 18:35:45 04:03 18:39:48 18:35:45 00:13 18:35:32 18:36:40 18:35:32 18:41:12 18:39:48 LBFAMW036/66AMW 0 0.724 0.014 0.71 18:39:58 10 19,000 0 250 0a*? F5 AAL923 8757 100 4-5 18:32:04 04:32 18:36:36 18:32:04 00:22 18:31:42 NA 18:31:42 NA 18:36:36 LBF AMW038/64 AMW 1 0 744 0.004 0 74 18:36:40 4 19,100 100 249 1 1 Arndt/ NCN
F6 AAL745 B757 25 4-5 18:25:31 04:17 18:29:48 18:25:31 00:29 18:26:00 NA 18:26:00 NA 18:29:48 YANKI SA069/147 SA 0 0.768 0.028 0 74 18:29:52 4 19,100 100 253 3
s F1 SWA325 B737 15 5-6 19:53:04 04:26 19:57:30 19:53:04 00:45 19:53:49 19:59:44 19:53:49 20:00:58 20:00:48 PP SA020/59 SA 0 0.776 0.006 0.77 20:00:52 4 19.000 0 250 0 No EDA Inifally: Vectored
F2 SWA362 B737 45 5-6 19:59:13 04:11 20:03:24 19:59:13 00:24 19:58:49 20:00:16 19:58:49 20:04:56 20:03:24 HCT SA010/43SA 0 0699 0.019 0.68 20:03:23 -1 19,000 0 252 2
s. F3 SWA114 B737 15 5-6 20:00:08 04:40 20:04:48 20:00:08 00:39 20:00:47 20:01:49 20:00:47 20:0622 20:04:48 LBFAMW026/74AMW 0 0.726 0.016 0.71 20:04:52 4 19.000 0 250 0
§ F4 UAL320 B737 45 5-6 19:48:09 04:27 19:52:36 19:48:09 00:09 19:48:00 19:50:27 19:48:00 19:53:18 19:52:36 YANKI SNY100/66 SNY 0 0.743 0.003 0.74 19:52:45 9 19,000 0 250 0o
n F5 AAL456 B757 100 5-6 19:49:42 04:54 19:54:36 19:49:42 00:00 19:49:42 NA 19:49:42 NA 19:53:54 LBF AMW030/37 AMW 0 0.738 0.002 0.74 19:53:54 0 19,000 0 255 5 ATC>Spd/Vec;RTAAAC??
ft
F6 AAL517 B757 25 5-6 19:54:57 04:03 19:59:00 19:54:57 00:51 19:55:48 NA 19:55:48 NA 19:59:06 LBFAMW035/68AMW 0 0.754 0.014 0.74 19:59:06 0 19,100 100 251 1
s F1 SWA325 8737 45 5-6 13:30:22 04:26 13:34:48 13:30:22 00:21 13:30:43 13:33:04 13:30:43 13:34:49 13:34:48 LBF AMW032/70 AMW 0 0.787 0.017 0.77 13:34:40 -8 19,017 17 254 4£ F2 SWA362 B737 15 5-6 13:39:58 05:02 13:45:00 13:39:58 01:43 13:41:41 13:38:49 13:41:41 13:47:33 13:45:00 HCT SA014/38 SA 1 0.697 0.017 0.68 13:44:39 -21 19,075 75 250 0
i. F3 SWA114 B737 45 5-6 13:38:12 04:48 13:43:00 13:38:12 00:29 13:38:41 13:38:49 13:38:41 13:46:10 13:43:00 LBF AMW044/62 AMW 0 0 750 0.040 0.71 13:42:46 -14 19,064 64 250 0a F4 UAL320 8737 15 5-6 13:28:28 04:32 13:33:00 13:28:28 01:05 13:29:33 13:33:14 13:29:33 13:38:02 13:33:00 PP SNY057/102 SNY 0 0.806 0.006 0.80 13:32:54 -6 19,017 17 252 2
Q
ft F5 AAL456 B757 25 5-6 13:31:12 05:24 13:36:36 13:31:12 01:06 13:32:18 NA 13:32:18 NA 13:36:36 LBF AMW004/39 AMW 0 0.762 0.022 0.74 13:36:29 -7 19,039 39 248 2N F6 AAL517 B757 100 5-6 13:34:52 04:38 13:39:30 13:34:52 00:22 13:34:30 NA 13:34:30 NA 13:39:24 LBFAMVW39/63AMW 0 0.762 0.022 0.74 13:39:23 -1 19,100 100 242 8
S F1 SWA325 B737 15 5-6 15:00:34 04:02 15:04:36 15:00:34 00:15 15:00:49 15:02:50 15:00:49 15:04:33 15:04:36 LBF AMW003/39 AMW 0 0.776 0.006 0.77 15:04:49 13 19,000 0 250 0s F2 SWA362 B737 45 5-6 15:06:47 04:19 15:11:06 15:06:47 00:56 15:05:51 15:10:06 15:05:51 15:14:26 15:11:06 PPAMVW59/45AMW 0 0.792 0.012 0.78 15:10:44 -22 19,000 0 258 8
i. F3 SWA114 B737 15 5-6 15:07:41 03:49 15:11:30 15:07:41 00:07 15:07:48 15:12:45 15:07:48 15:16:21 15:13:06 PPAMW066/70AMW 1 0.806 0.004 0.81 15:13:40 34 19,000 0 252 2 1 AmdtAAC: Pilot Error; LNAVac-t F4 UAL320 B737 45 5-6 14:55:39 04:03 14:59:42 14:55:39 00:28 14:55:11 14:57:28 14:55:11 15:00:05 14:59:42 YANKI SNY098/65 SNY 0 0.740 0.000 0.74 14:59:52 10 19,000 0 250 0
Qft F5 AAL456 8757 100 5-6 14:58:33 04:27 15:03:00 14:58:33 00:39 14:57:54 NA 14:57:54 NA 15:03:00 LBF AMW035/66 AMW 0 0.757 0.017 0.74 15:03:08 8 19,100 100 250 0Ctl
F6 AAL517 8757 25 5-6 15:03:27 04:51 15:08:18 15:03:27 00:21 15:03:48 NA 15:03:48 NA 15:08:18 LBFAMW002/39AMW 0 0.791 0.051 0 74 15:08:22 4 19.000 0 247 3
158
Run Fit ACD Type Cl 1 TMA Analysis TMA FMS FMS Analysis RTA Assignment Corr RTA . .  EDA AM Cross Fix - Cross Fix - Cross Fix- Nobs
s ETA At STA ETA ETA First ETA Last Window Time Assn Spd Pali Amd Spd Spd Time At Alt AAlt Speed ASpd
Ft SWA241 B737 45
2-3 N/A 02:00 17:51:00 N/A N/A 17:49:00 17:47:48 17:49:00 17:53:32 17:51:00 0.765 17:51:06 6
1 Amdt/NC
4-5 18:15:43 02:17 18:18:00 18:15:43 15:00 18:19:14 18:15:33 18:15:00 18:19:14 18:18:00 PPAMW044/60AMW 1 0.769 0.029 0 74 18:17:54 -6 19,000 0 259 9
F2 DAL121 B737 30
2-3 N/A 01:13 17:41:36 N/A N/A 17:40:23 17:38:05 17:40:23 17:50:17 17:41:36 0.753 17:41:38 2
y 4-5 18:06:23 02:19 18:08:42 18:06:23 01:22 18:05:01 18:04:15 18:05:01 18:10:38 18:08:42 0 0.702 0.002 0.70 18:08:48 6 19,000 0 252 2£
F3 SWA449 B737 45
2-3 N/A 01:02 17:37:36 N/A N/A 17:36:34 17:36:16 17:36:34 17:38:01 17:37:36 0.784 17:37:36 0
o 4-5 17:59:54 00:48 18:00:42 17:59:54 01:38 17:58:16 17:58:52 17:58:16 18:00:48 18:00:42 0 0.776 0.006 0.77 18:00:38 -4 19,000 0 252 2
I F4 UAL962 B737 30 2-3 N/A 02:51 17:46:48 N/A N/A 17:45:45 17:43:51 17:45:45 17:53:01 17:46:48 0.765 17:46:48 0Q
« 4-5 18:14:12 02:00 18:16:12 18:14:12 03:50 18:10:22 18:12:43 18:10:22 18:17:26 18:16:12 PPAMW048/61 AMW 0 0.733 0.023 0.71 18:16:05 -7 19,000 0 250 0
(V
F5 AAL923 B757 50
2-3 N/A 02:30 17:48:36 N/A N/A 17:46:06 NA 17:46:06 NA 17:48:36 0.791 17:48:41 5
4-5 18:13:06 01:24 18:14:30 18:13:06 03:24 18:09:42 NA 18:09:42 NA 18:14:30 PPAMW057/53AMW 0 0.754 0.014 0.74 18:14:31 1 19,000 0 257 7
F6 AAL745 B757 100
2-3 N/A 01:00 17:34:00 N/A N/A 17:33:00 NA 17:33:00 NA 17:34.00 0.795 17:33:57 -3
4-5 18:00:50 01:40 18:02:30 18:00:50 02:20 17:58:30 NA 17:58:30 NA 18:02:30 0 0.744 0.004 0.74 18:02:31 1 19,100 100 238 12
F1 SWA241 B737 30
2-3 N/A 01:00 19:37:00 N/A N/A 19:36:47 19:33:55 19:36:47 19:36:55 19:37:00 0.732 19:37:04 4
4-5 19:55:45 04:09 19:59:54 19:55:45 04:09 19:59:54 19:59:11 19:59:54 20:01:55 19:59:54 PPAMW023/52 0 0 780 0 010 0.77 19:59:59 5 19,000 0 250 0
F2 DAL121 B737 30
2-3 N/A 03:00 19:32:00 N/A N/A 19:32:00 19:26:08 19:32:00 19:32:10 19:32:00 0.660 19:32:13 13 En Route RTA C rossing Time
4-5 19:51:28 01:50 19:53:18 19:51:28 03:26 19:54:54 19:49:52 19:54:54 19:53:34 19:53:18 PPAMW047/63AMW 0 0.685 0.005 0.68 19:53:27 9 19,000 0 251 1 (rom Track Data




F4 UAL 962 B737 45
2-3 N/A 03:00 19:39:00 N/A N/A 19:36:00 19:34:25 19:36:00 19:39:07 19:39:00 0.700 19:39:00 0
1 Amdt/NC
4-5 19:58:34 04:14 20:02:48 19:58:34 04:34 19:54:00 20:02:30 19:54:00 20:05:29 20:02:48 PPAMVW12/38AMW 1 0.704 0.006 0.71 20:02:58 10 19,000 0 250 0
N
F5 AAL923 B757 100
2-3 N/A 02:00 19:34:00 N/A N/A 19:32:30 NA 19:32:30 NA 19:34:00 0762 19:34:05 5
4-5 19:52:37 03:29 19:56:06 19:52:37 04:05 19:56:42 NA 19:56:42 NA 19:56:06 PPAMW036/63AMW 0 0.765 0.025 0.74 19:56:10 4 19,300 300 250 0
F6 AAL745 B757 100
2-3 N/A 01:00 19:24:00 N/A N/A 19:23:00 NA 19:23:00 NA 19:24:00 0.741 19:24:00 0
1 Amdt/NC
4-5 19:45:08 02:34 19:47:42 19:45:08 01:08 19:44:00 NA 19:44:00 NA 19:47:42 PP SNY080/81 SNY 1 0.764 0.024 0.74 19:47:41 -1 19,100 100 254 4
F1 SWA325 B737 45
2-3 13:20:55 01:11 13:22:06 13:20:55 00:39 13:20:16 13:20:09 13:20:16 13:21:11 01:02 13:21:00 0783 13:21:08 8
4-5 14:01:29 04:43 14:06:12 14:01:29 01:03 14:00:26 14:03:50 14:00:26 14:06:32 02:42 14:06:18 LBF AM VI/006/40 AMW 0 0.779 0.009 0 77 14:06:20 2 19,100 100 238 12
F2 SWA362 B737 45
2-3 13:28:24 00:36 13:29:00 13:28:24 02:42 13:25:42 13:25:14 13:25:42 13:33:21 08:07 13:29:00 0.729 13:29:00 0
S ' 4-5 14:12:28 06:20 14:18:48 14:12:28 06:42 14:05:46 14:16:12 14:05:46 14:20:20 04:08 14:18:48 None 0 0.690 0 000 0 69 14:18:55 7 19,000 0 245 5
£
F3 SWA114 B737 45
2-3 13:27:31 01:17 13:28:48 13:27:31 00:29 13:28:00 13:26:54 13:28:00 13:32:30 05:36 13:28:48 0.768 13:28:55 7
GO 4-5 14:11:23 05:49 14:17:12 14:11:23 42:23 13:29:00 13:28:46 13:29:00 13:29:11 00:25 14:17:12 LBF AMVW14/45AMW 0 0 734 0.024 0 71 14:17:17 5 19,100 100 241 9
2
F4 UAL320 B737 45
2-3 12:56:55 26:05 13:23:00 12:56:55 07:48 13:04:43 13:01:56 13:04:43 13:09:58 08:02 13:23:00 0.741 13:23:00 0
5 4-5 14:05:30 05:30 14:11:00 14:05:30 05:30 14:11:00 14:04:29 14:11:00 14:15:15 10:46 14:11:00 None 0 0.689 0.001 0.69 14:11:06 6 19,100 100 242 8
IN
F5 AAL456 B757 100
2-3 13:19:19 00:59 13:20:18 13:19:19 00:19 13:19:00 NA 13:19:00 NA NA 13:20:18 0.791 13:20:14 -4
4-5 14:00:18 02:42 14:03:00 14:00:18 02:06 13:58:12 NA 13:58:12 NA NA 14:03:00 LBF AMW050/46 AMW 0 0.743 0.013 073 14:02:54 -6 19,000 0 245 5
F6 UAL 946 B757 100
2-3 12:56:22 24:38 13:21:00 12:56:22 04:20 13:00:42 NA 13:00:42 NA NA 13:21:00 0.800 13:21:09 9
4-5 14:00:28 04:20 14:04:48 14:00:28 04:20 14:04:48 NA 14:04:48 NA NA 14:04:48 None 0 0.732 0.018 0.75 14:04:49 1 19,000 0 247 3
Ft SWA255 B737 45
2-3 15:14:29 01:07 15:15:36 15:14:29 00:43 15:13:46 15:13:12 15:13:46 15:16:20 03:08 15:15:42 0.708 15:15:50 8
4-5 15:49:25 04:57 15:54:22 15:49:25 15:00 15:45:19 15:46:22 15:45:19 15:50:43 04:21 15:53:00 LBF AMW003/39 AMW 0 0.735 0.025 0.71 15:53:06 6 19,000 0 250 0
F2 DAL121 B737 45
2-3 15:19:48 00:00 15:19:48 15:19:48 03:38 15:16:10 15:17:12 15:16:10 15:22:02 04:50 15:19:18 0.686 15:19:24 6
S ' 4-5 15:53:29 05:13 15:58:42 15:53:29 04:18 15:49:11 15:54:29 15:49:11 16:00:57 06:28 15:57:18 LBF AMW030/70 AMW 0 0.736 0.056 0.68 15:57:40 22 19,000 0 250 0
p
F3 SWA449 B737 45
2-3 15:17:08 01:46 15:18:54 15:17:08 00:20 15:16:48 15:16:29 15:16:48 15:16:45 00:16 15:16:54 0.776 15:16:54 0
o 4-5 15:48:37 04:23 15:53:00 15:48:37 03:26 15:52:03 15:52:03 15:52:03 15:53:46 01:43 19,000 0 250 0 AUI: Error in Pali Steteh
2
F4 UAL350 B737 45
2-3 14:57:52 08:08 15:06:00 14:57:52 07:55 14:49:57 14:47:50 14:49:57 14:50:58 03:08 15:06:00 0.696 15:06:00 0
a
t 4-5 15:42:38 04:16 15:46:54 15:42:38 04:16 15:46:54 15:42:30 15:46:54 15:49:31 07:01 15:46:54 YANKI SNY099/66 SNY 1 0.690 0.040 0.65 15:46:33 -21 29,700 10700 259 9 Alitide Reslicion
N
F5 AAL923 B757 100
2-3 15:12:31 01:50 15:14:21 15:12:31 00:19 15:12:12 NA 15:12:12 NA NA 15:14:24 0.710 15:14:21 -3
4-5 15:46:04 04:02 15:50:06 15:46:04 03:16 15:42:48 NA 15:42:48 NA NA 15:50:06 LBF AMW034/68AMW 0 0.732 0.008 0.74 15:50:05 -1 19,080 80 251 1
F6 AAL431 8757 100
2-3 14:57:39 12:33 15:10:12 14:57:39 03:09 14:54:30 NA 14:54:30 NA NA 15:10:12 0834 15:10:44 32
4-5 15:41:38 03:52 15:45:30 15:41:38 03:52 15:45:30 NA 15:45:30 NA NA 15:45:30 LBF AMW 045/61 AMW 0 0 670 0.010 0.68 15:45:35 5 19,200 200 261 11
159























Cross Fix - 
Time At
Cross Fix - 
Alt AAlt
Cross Fix - 
Speed ASpd
Nobs
F1 SWA255 B737 45
2-3 17:30:11 01:04 17:31:15 17:30:11 01:07 17:31:18 17:29:43 17:31:18 17:35:36 05:53 17:30:24 0.792 17:30:30 6
4-5 18:11:25 04:41 18:16:06 18:11:25 00:01 18:11:26 18:10:22 18:11:26 18:17:17 06:55 18:16:06 LBF AMW045/61 AMW 0 0.737 0.027 0.71 18:15:46 -20 36000 17000 227 23 No Descent Pilot Error
F2 DAL121 B737 45
2-3 17:32:44 00:00 17:32:44 17:32:44 00:57 17:31:47 17:30:57 17:31:47 17:39:33 08:36 17:33:18 0.761 17:33:15 -3
4-5 18:15:40 03:53 18:19:33 18:15:40 02:58 18:12:42 18:12:47 18:12:42 18:23:22 10:35 18:19:36 LBFAMW053/6OAMW 0 0.689 0.009 0.68 18:19:19 -17 23,700 4700 229 21 Lato DES: Pilot Distacted
£
F3 SWA449 B737 45
2-3 17:34:45 00:40 17:35:25 17:34:45 00:10 17:34:35 17:33:20 17:34:35 17:34:35 01:15 17:34:30 0.776 17:34:34 4
o 4-5 18:14:04 03:20 18:17:24 18:14:04 03:19 18:17:23 18:15:40 18:17:23 18:17:40 02:00 18:17:24 HCTSA014/39SA 1 0.776 0.006 0.77 18:18:05 41 19,000 0 260 10
s
F4 UAL350 B737 45
2-3 17:06:37 16:23 17:23:00 17:06:37 01:34 17:05:03 17:01:54 17:05:03 17:05:56 04:02 17:23:00 0.749 17:23:07 7o 4-5 18:07:06 04:18 18:11:24 18:07:06 04:18 18:11:24 18:04:11 18:11:24 18:16:12 12:01 18:11:24 0 0.689 0 001 0 6 9 18:11:21 -3 19,000 0 246 4CM
F5 AAL923 B757 100
2-3 17:28:24 01:30 17:29:54 17:28:24 00:24 17:28:00 NA 17:28:00 NA NA 17:29:54 0.773 17:30:04 10
4-5 18:10:30 04:00 18:14:30 18:10:30 03:12 18:07:18 NA 18:07:18 NA NA 18:14:18 LBF AMW042/63 AMW 0 0.758 0.018 0.74 18:13:56 -22 19,000 0 246 4
F6 AAL431 B757 100
2-3 17:07:27 15:27 17:22:54 17:07:27 03:09 17:04:18 NA 17:04:18 NA NA FMS Emulation FAILED
4-5 18:02:08 03:58 18:06:06 18:02:08 57:50 17:04:18 NA 17:04:18 NA NA 18:06:24 0 0.820 0.010 0.83 18:06:18 -6 19,000 0 250 0 Restored tor EDA/RTA
F1 SWA325 B737 45
2-3 19:17:53 00:01 19:17:54 19:17:53 00:12 19:17:41 19:17:13 19:17:41 19:17:56 00:43 19:17:54 0.777 19:17:43 -11
4-5 19:49:20 02:10 19:51:30 19:49:20 00:00 19:49:20 19:48:26 19:49:20 19:50:15 01:49 19:51:30 LBF AMW043/61 AMW 0 0.776 0 006 0.77 19:51:35 5 19,000 0 250 0
F2 SWA362 B737 45
2-3 19:24:51 02:28 19:27:19 19:24:51 00:49 19:24:02 19:23:02 19:24:02 19:27:45 04:43 19:27:18 0.666 19:27:24 6
£* 4-5 20:01:52 04:26 20:06:18 20:01:52 06:08 19:55:44 20:04:58 19:55:44 20:10:10 05:12 20:06:18 PP AM028/22 AMW 0 0.754 0.056 0.81 20:06:26 8 19.000 0 250 0P
F3 SWA114 B737 45
2-3 19:26:03 00:57 19:27:00 19:26:03 07:03 19:19:00 19:26:18 19:19:00 19:27:01 00:43 19:27:00 0693 19:27:06 6
E 4-5 20:00:45 04:07 20:04:52 20:00:45 00:45 0:00:00 19,000 0 254 4 FMS Interlace Failure
ss : F4 UAL320 B737 45 2-3 18:59:15 13:15 19:12:30 18:59:15 03:11 18:56:04 18:54:23 18:56:04 18:57:21 02:58 19:12:30 0 705 19:12:31 1o
t 4-5 19:49:03 03:39 19:52:42 19:49:03 03:39 19:52:42 19:48:18 19:52:42 19:55:22 07:04 19:52:42 YANKI SNY096/62 SNY 0 0 685 0.035 0.65 19:52:51 9 19,000 0 250 0N
F5 AAL456 B757 100
2-3 19:17:31 02:11 19:19:42 19:17:31 00:37 19:16:54 NA 19:16:54 NA NA 19:19:24 0.693 19:19:34 10
4-5 19:52:23 04:37 19:57:00 19:52:23 04:59 19:47:24 NA 19:47:24 NA NA 19:57:00 LBF AMW027/73 AMW 0 0.727 0.013 0.74 19:57:07 7 19,000 0 296 46
F6 UAL 946 B757 100
2-3 18:56:30 NA 18:56:30 NA NA 19:12:30 0.781 19:13:04 34
4-5 19:44:34 04:08 19:48:42 19:44:34 11:56 19:56:30 NA 19:56:30 NA NA FMS Emulation FAILED
F1 SWA255 B737 45
2-3 13:16:21 01:27 13:17:48 13:16:21 00:37 13:16:58 13:15:57 13:16:58 13:21:44 05:47 13:17:48 0.764 13:17:53 5
4-5 13:59:30 04:00 14:03:30 13:59:30 15:00 18:19:14 13:57:42 13:58:50 14:05:32 07:50 14:03:30 LBF AM047/62 AMW 0 0.739 0.029 0.71 14:03:34 4 19.200 200 251 1
F2 DAL121 B737 30
2-3 13:18:18 01:05 13:19:23 13:18:18 00:09 13:18:27 13:17:13 13:18:27 13:25:21 08:08 13:19:24 0.756 13:19:28 4
5* 4-5 14:01:37 05:23 14:07:00 14:01:37 01:23 14:00:14 14:00:36 14:00:14 14:08:56 08:20 14:07:06 LBF AM047/62 AMW 0 0.668 0.008 0.68 14:07:03 -3 19,200 200 250 0£
F3 SWA449 B737 45
2-3 13:20:10 00:20 13:20:30 13:20:10 00:20 13:20:30 13:20:06 13:20:30 13:20:49 00:43 13:20:30 0.778 13:20:34 4
o 4-5 14:00:11 05:07 14:05:18 14:00:11 05:07 14:05:18 14:05:26 14:05:18 14:07:50 02:24 14:05:18 0 0.805 0.005 0.81 14:05:53 35 19,000 0 250 0
8 F4 UAL350 B737 30 2-3 12:53:00 13:54 13:06:54 12:53:00 04:23 12:48:37 12:45:50 12:48:37 12:49:52 04:02 13:06:54 0.665 13:07:00 6o
t 4-5 13:56:42 03:18 14:00:00 13:56:42 03:18 14:00:00 13:51:02 14:00:00 14:02:24 11:22 14:00:00 YANKI SNY087/67 SNY 0 0.658 0.008 0.65 14:00:13 13 19,200 200 250 0n
F5 AAL923 B757 100
2-3 13:14:33 01:30 13:16:03 13:14:33 00:27 13:14:06 NA 13:14:06 NA NA 13:16:06 0.794 13:16:14 8
4-5 13:57:00 04:48 14:01:48 13:57:00 03:36 13:53:24 NA 13:53:24 NA NA 14:01:48 LBF AMW037/67 AMW 0 0.741 0.001 0.74 14:01:49 1 19.100 100 251 1
F6 AAL431 B757 50
2-3 12:52:50 14:10 13:07:00 12:52:50 04:50 12:48:00 NA 12:48:00 NA NA 13:07:00 0.760 13:07:02 2
4-5 13:46:47 04:31 13:51:18 13:46:47 04:31 13:51:18 NA 13:51:18 NA NA 13:51:18 0 0.732 0.012 0.72 13:51:17 -1 19,200 200 253 3
F1 SWA325 B737 45
3-4 15:07:28 00:02 15:07:30 15:07:28 00:12 15:07:16 15:06:27 15:07:16 15:07:31 01:04 15:07:30 0.776 15:07:23 -7
5-6 15:39:06 04:54 15:44:00 15:39:06 15:00 15:38:56 15:38:03 15:38:56 15:39:52 01:49 15:44:00 0 0.790 0.020 0.81 15:44:16 16 19,000 0 251 1
F2 SWA362 B737 30
3-4 15:15:16 01:56 15:17:12 15:15:16 00:48 15:14:28 15:13:09 15:14:28 15:17:17 04:08 15:17:12 0.656 15:17:18 6
S ’ 5-6 15:51:19 05:29 15:56:48 15:51:19 04:12 15:47:07 15:47:35 15:47:07 15:53:54 06:19 15:56:48 PPAMW040/73AMW 0 0.754 0.024 0.73 15:57:00 12 19,000 0 250 0
5
F3 SWA114 B737 30
3-4 15:15:45 00:45 15:16:30 15:15:45 07:45 15:08:00 15:14:15 15:08:00 15:16:32 02:17 15:16:30 0.700 15:16:33 3




F4 UAL320 B737 45
3-4 14:50:26 14:22 15:04:48 14:50:26 12:22 15:02:48 15:02:48 00:00 15:04:48 0.800 15:04:48 0
5-6 15:37:32 04:52 15:42:24 15:37:32 04:52 15:42:24 15:38:08 15:42:24 15:44:10 06:02 15:42:24 YANKI SNY086/57 SNY 0 0.675 0 025 0.65 15:42:34 10 19,000 0 250 0C4
F5 AAL456 B757 100
3-4 15:07:15 00:45 15:08:00 15:07:15 00:33 15:06:42 NA 15:06:42 NA NA 15:08:00 0.730 15:08:00 0
5-6 15:40:34 06:26 15:47:00 15:40:34 03:22 15:37:12 NA 15:37:12 NA NA 15:47:30 PP AM W085/45 AM W 1 0.796 0.004 0 80 15:47:50 20 19,020 20 259 9
F6 UAL946 B757 100
3-4 14:51:02 10:46 15:01:48 14:51:02 05:42 14:45:20 NA 14:45:20 NA NA 15:01:48 0.782 15:02:06 18
5-6 15:33:33 05:21 15:38:54 15:33:33 05:27 15:39:00 NA 15:39:00 NA NA 15:38:54 LBF AMW015/44AMW 0 0.716 0.036 0.68 15:38:57 3 19,000 0 250 0
160






















Cross Fix - 
Time At
Cross Fix - 
Alt AAlt
Cross Fix - 
Speed ASpd
Nobs
F1 SWA325 8737 30
3-4 17:30:20 02:28 17:32:48 17:30:20 01:13 17:29:07 17:28:45 17:29:07 17:29:55 01:10 17:29:36 0.785 17:30:00 24
5-6 18:10:32 04:40 18:15:12 18:10:32 15:00 18:19:14 18:12:02 18:06:58 18:14:49 02:47 18:14:36 LBFAMVW31/70AMW 1 0.776 0.006 0.77 18:14:46 10 19000 0 255 5
F2 SWA362 B737 45
3-4 17:34:40 02:27 17:37:07 17:34:40 00:17 17:34:23 17:33:28 17:34:23 17:41:23 07:55 17:37:06 0.735 17:37:18 12
5-6 18:19:42 04:54 18:24:36 18:19:42 06:09 18:13:33 18:15:13 18:13:33 18:25:27 10:14 18:24:36 HCT SA026/44 SA 0 0 679 0.001 0.68 18:24:47 11 19000 0 250 0
£
F3 SWA114 B737 45
3-4 17:36:15 03:03 17:39:18 17:36:15 04:15 17:32:00 17:35:47 17:32:00 17:40:37 04:50 17:39:18 0.721 17:39:25 7
i. 5-6 18:23:08 06:10 18:29:18 18:23:08 05:52 18:29:00 18:23:37 18:29:00 18:30:46 07:09 18:29:18 LBF AMW027/73 AMW 0 0.728 0.018 0.71 18:29:34 16 19,000 0 250 0
i F4 UAL320 B737 30 3-4 17:05:24 09:12 17:14:36 17:05:24 08:52 16:56:32 16:53:53 16:56:32 16:57:00 03:07 17:14:36 0.696 17:14:44 8o 5-6 18:01:03 05:45 18:06:48 18:01:03 05:57 18:07:00 17:51:47 18:07:00 18:07:58 16:11 18:06:48 YANKISNY084/57 SNY 0 0.648 0.002 0.65 18:06:53 5 19,000 0 250 0
CM
F5 AAL456 B757 100
3-4 17:28:20 01:52 17:30:12 17:28:20 00:26 17:27:54 NA 17:27:54 NA NA 17:30:12 0771 17:30:12 0
5-6 18:11:37 05:11 18:16:48 18:11:37 05:19 18:06:18 NA 18:06:18 NA NA 18:16:42 LBF AMW015/46 AMW 0 0.740 0.020 0.76 18:16:30 -12 19,000 0 253 3
F6 UAL946 B757 50
3-4 17:05:51 18:57 17:24:48 17:05:51 00:15 17:06:06 NA 17:06:06 NA NA 17:24:48 0.799 17:24:55 7
5-6 18:03:33 05:57 18:09:30 18:03:33 06:27 18:10:00 NA 18:10:00 NA NA 18:09:30 0.727 0.027 0.70 18:09:26 -4 19,000 0 250 0
F1 SWA255 B737 45
3-4 19:20:29 01:43 19:22:12 19:20:29 00:35 19:19:54 19:19:20 19:19:54 19:22:12 02:52 19:22:12 0.693 19:21:54 -18
5-6 19:55:17 04:31 19:59:48 19:55:17 15:00 19:52:00 19:57:07 19:52:00 20:02:11 05:04 19:59:48 LBF AMW027/73 AMW 0 0.744 0.034 0.71 19:59:50 2 19,000 0 250 0
F2 DAL121 B737 30
3-4 19:23:36 02:30 19:26:06 19:23:36 00:28 19:23:08 19:21:54 19:23:08 19:26:06 04:12 19:26:06 0.650 19:26:00 -6
S' 5-6 19:59:35 04:43 20:04:18 19:59:35 02:03 19:57:32 20:01:35 19:57:32 20:09:06 07:31 20:04:18 LBF AMW028/73AMW 1 0.746 0.066 0.68 20:03:44 -34 24,000 5000 250 0 Late DES: Pilot Dislactedg
F3 SWA449 B737 45
3-4 19:22:57 00:00 19:22:57 19:22:57 00:15 19:22:42 19:22:19 19:22:42 19:22:57 00:38 19:22:54 0.778 19:22:38 -16
£ 5-6 19:54:09 04:09 19:58:18 19:54:09 03:51 19:58:00 19:56:59 19:58:00 19:58:38 01:39 19:58:18 PPSA051/94SA 0 0.776 0.004 0.78 19:58:11 -7 19.000 0 250 0
2a F4 UAL350 B737 30 3-4 19:03:33 05:39 19:09:12 19:03:33 12:03 18:51:30 18:50:50 18:51:30 18:53:52 03:02 19:09:12 0.615 19:09:11 -1
5-6 19:46:55 05:11 19:52:06 19:46:55 05:05 19:52:00 19:48:15 19:52:00 19:55:53 07:38 19:52:06 YANKI SNY103/69 SNY 0 0.703 0.053 0.65 19:52:03 -3 19,000 0 250 0
CM
F5 AAL923 B757 100
3-4 19:16:08 00:52 19:17:00 19:16:08 00:14 19:15:54 NA 19:15:54 NA NA 19:17:00 0.743 19:17:10 10
5-6 19:49:17 05:19 19:54:36 19:49:17 02:29 19:46:48 NA 19:46:48 NA NA 19:54:36 LBFAMW027/73AMW 0 0.718 0.022 0.74 19:54:39 3 19,020 20 275 25
F6 AAL431 B757 100
3-4 19:04:57 05:15 19:10:12 19:04:57 05:15 19:10:12 NA 19:10:12 NA NA 19:10:12 0.783 19:10:53 41
5-6 19:42:23 04:55 19:47:18 19:42:23 04:55 19:47:18 NA 19:47:18 NA NA 19:47:18 LBF AMW034/67 AMW 0 0.717 0.037 0.68 19:47:24 6 19,000 0 250 0
F1 SWA325 B737 45
3-4 13:12:37 00:00 13:12:37 13:12:37 00:35 13:12:02 13:11:27 13:12:02 13:13:07 01:40 13:12:30 0.787 13:12:40 10
5-6 13:53:04 04:44 13:57:48 13:53:04 00:53 13:52:11 13:55:10 13:52:11 13:58:04 02:54 13:57:48 LBF AMW032/70 AMW 0 0.780 0.010 0.77 13:57:46 -2 19,000 0 256 6
F2 SWA362 B737 30
3-4 13:20:21 01:27 13:18:54 13:20:21 02:17 13:18:04 13:16:41 13:18:04 13:25:44 09:03 13:18:54 0.761 13:18:54 0
i* 5-6 13:59:37 05:23 14:05:00 13:59:37 00:39 13:58:58 13:57:24 13:58:58 14:08:04 10:40 14:05:00 0 0.697 0.017 068 14:04:56 -4 19,000 0 250 0£
F3 SWA114 B737 45
3-4 13:23:12 00:12 13:23:00 13:23:12 00:12 13:23:00 13:18:46 13:23:00 13:24:29 05:43 13:23:00 0.725 13:23:03 3
£ . 5-6 14:07:53 06:31 14:14:24 14:07:53 06:07 14:14:00 14:08:34 14:14:00 14:17:18 08:44 14:14:24 LBF AMWD23779 AMW 0 0.741 0.031 0.71 14:14:23 -1 19,000 0 259 9
i F4 UAL320 B737 30 3-4 12:48:25 07:53 12:56:18 12:48:25 10:23 12:38:02 12:35:16 12:38:02 12:39:16 04:00 12:56:18 0.687 12:56:25 7o
'T 5-6 13:44:38 06:34 13:51:12 13:44:38 06:22 13:51:00 13:41:07 13:51:00 13:54:16 13:09 13:51:12 YANKI SNY099/68 SNY 0 0.661 0.011 0.65 13:51:22 10 19,100 100 250 0
CM
F5 AAL456 B757 100
3-4 13:10:55 00:35 13:11:30 13:10:55 00:13 13:10:42 NA 13:10:42 NA NA 13:11:30 0.800 13:11:39 9
5-6 13:51:56 04:28 13:56:24 13:51:56 01:56 13:50:00 NA 13:50:00 NA NA 13:56:24 LBF AMW045/60 AMW 0 0.742 0.002 0.74 13:56:23 -1 19,100 100 257 7
F6 UAL 946 B757 50
3-4 12:49:15 05:15 12:54:30 12:49:15 13:45 12:35:30 NA 12:35:30 NA NA 12:54:30 0.795 12:54:35 5
5-6 13:34:08 05:52 13:40:00 13:34:08 05:52 13:40:00 NA 13:40:00 NA NA 13:40:00 LBF AMW048/58 AMW 0 0.710 0.030 0.68 13:39:58 -2 19,100 100 253 3
F1 SWA325 B737 45
3-4 15:09:00 00:42 15:09:42 15:09:00 00:27 15:09:27 15:08:58 15:09:27 15:09:41 00:43 15:09:42 0.776 15:09:31 -11
5-6 15:40:56 02:28 15:43:24 15:40:56 02:26 15:43:22 15:41:45 15:43:22 15:43:22 01:37 15:43:24 LBF AMW043/61 AMW 0 0.776 0.006 0.77 19,000 0 250 0 AAC: Pilot Comm Issues
F2 SWA362 B737 30
3-4 15:25:55 01:31 15:24:24 15:25:55 02:39 15:23:16 15:20:35 15:23:16 15:24:24 03:49 15:24:24 0.650 15:24:26 2 Start-up in HOVER
Sf 5-6 15:58:38 04:40 16:03:18 15:58:38 03:11 15:55:27 15:59:27 15:55:27 16:06:21 06:54 16:03:18 HCT AMW044/69AMW 0 0.717 0.037 0.68 16:03:24 6 19,000 0 250 0
F3 SWA114 B737 45
3-4 15:17:53 01:05 15:18:58 15:17:53 00:07 15:18:00 15:16:19 15:18:00 15:18:58 02:39 15:18:58 0.693 15:19:05 7
a 5-6 15:52:42 05:18 15:47:24 15:52:42 04:18 15:57:00 15:54:35 15:57:00 15:59:04 04:29 15:57:24 LBF AMW044/69AMW 0 0.734 0 024 071 15:57:30 6 19,000 0 264 14
F4 UAL320 B737 45
3-4 14:52:32 07:52 15:00:24 14:52:32 08:24 14:44:08 14:42:17 14:44:08 14:45:15 02:58 15:00:24 0.642 15:00:26 2
5-6 15:37:58 03:50 15:41:48 15:37:58 04:02 15:42:00 15:36:49 15:42:00 15:45:19 08:30 15:41:48 YANKI SNY099/67 SNY 0 0.691 0.041 0.65 15:41:53 5 19,000 0 266 16
IN
F5 AAL456 B757 100
3-4 15:09:23 00:37 15:10:00 15:09:23 00:35 15:08:48 NA 15:08:48 NA NA 15:10:00 0.724 15:10:12 12
5-6 15:42:29 04:07 15:46:36 15:42:29 03:05 15:39:24 NA 15:39:24 NA NA 15:46:36 LBF AMW031/69 AMW 0 0.739 0.001 0.74 15:46:54 18 19,160 160 248 2
F6 UAL 946 B757 50
3-4 14:52:56 07:28 15:00:24 14:52:56 04:04 14:57:00 NA 14:57:00 NA NA 15:00:24 0720 15:00:56 32
5-6 15:34:48 04:12 15:39:00 15:34:48 34:24 15:00:24 NA 15:00:24 NA NA 15:39:00 LBFAMW079/49AMW 1 0.743 0.043 0.70 15:39:08 8 19,000 0 250 0
161
APPENDIX F: 2013 FAA Simulation Results
Run Fit ACID Type Cl &Q>
TM A Analysis
™ A A,
FMS FMS Analysis RTA Assignment RTA „  EDA 
AM
Cross Fix - 
Time
Cross Fix - 
Altitude
Cross Fix - 
Speed Notes
> ETA At STA ETA ETA First ETA Last Window Time Pati Spd Spd Time At Alt AAlt Speed ASpd
F1 SWA255 B737ge 30
2-3 14:17:54 14:19:20 14:22:36 04:42 14:19:30 0.760 14:19:32 2
4-5 15:02:14 03:40 15:05:54 15:02:14 15:00:43 15:07:26 06:43 15:05:54 LBF AMW044/61 AMW 0.737 0.027 0.71 15:06:05 11 19,000 0 250 0
F2 UAL350 30
2-3 14:03:47 14:05:15 14:07:57 04:10 14:05:00 0.755 14:05:05 5
4-5 14:49:58 07:02 14:57:00 14:49:58 14:46:17 14:59:12 12:55 14:57:00 YANKI SNY077/53 SNY 0.636 0.014 0.65 14:57:01 1 19,000 0 250 0
?
u
F3 AAL923 B752rl 50
2-3
4-5 15:06:00 05:06 15:11:06 15:06:00
14:17:27 14:19:17 14:25:04 07:37
FMS Emulation FAILED
0£
F4 AAL431 RL 50
2-3 13:59:14 14:03:00 14:03:07 03:53 14:03:00 0.768 14:03:13 13
a B752 4-5 15:06:48 02:48 15:04:00 15:06:48 03:41 15:03:07 14:59:05 15:03:07 15:07:18 08:13 FMS Emulation FAILED
CO
F5 AAL256 8752a 50
2-3
4-5 15:10:48 03:30 15:14:18 15:10:48 02:12 15:13:00











12 19,012 12 245 5
F6 AAL764 B752a 50
2-3
4-5 15:00:39 07:03 15:07:42 15:00:39 01:21 15:02:00











9 19,028 28 243 7
F1 SWA325 B737G£ 30
2-3










11 19,000 0 250 0
F2 UAL320 B737* 30
2-3 16:04:16 16:07:00 02:44 16:22:48 16:22:47 -1
= • 4-5 16:57:15 04:45 17:02:00 16:57:15 04:49 17:02:04 16:57:10 17:02:04 17:04:48 07:38 17:02:00 YANKI SNY091/61 SNY 0.684 0.034 0.65 17:02:14 14 19,000 0 250 0
£
F3 AA456 50
2-3 16:27:23 16:30:41 16:30:43 03:20 16:30:30 0.705 16:30:38 8
o B752 4-5 17:01:32 04:46 17:06:18 17:01:32 02:58 17:04:30 17:02:58 17:04:30 17:07:29 04:31 17:06:18 LBF AMW034/67 AMW 0.728 0.012 0.74 17:06:26 8 19,000 0 250 0
u
F4 UAL946 B752rl 50
2-3 16:26:05 16:26:48 16:28:04 01:59 16:26:48 0.833 16:27:04 16
o
4-5 16:57:00 03:31 17:00:31 16:57:00 03:10 17:00:10 16:56:46 17:00:10 17:01:39 04:53 17:00:30 0.724 0.024 0.70 17:00:36 6 19,014 14 250 0
CO
F5 AAL789 B752bl 50
2-3




NA 17:09:06 PP SA023/68 SA 0.750 0.010 0.74 17:09:17 11 19,013 13 256 6
No RTA Pos Error on Start
F6 UAL279 B752a 50
2-3
4-5 17:08:17 05:01 17:13:18 17:08:17 04:37 17:12:54











23 19,021 21 252 2
162
Run Fit ACID Type Cl £0) TM A Analysis ™ A At FMS FMS Analysis RTA Assignment RTA EDA AM
Cross Fix - 
Time
Cross Fix - 
Altitude
Cross Fix - 
Speed Noes
ETA At STA ETA ETA First ETA la s t Window Time Pati Spd Spd Time At Alt AAlt Speed ASpd
F1 SWA325 B737“ 30
2-3 19:01:19 19:07:29 06:10 19:03:12 0.767 19:03:15 3
4-5 19:45:20 03:16 19:48:36 19:45:20 19:43:23 19:50:44 07:21 19:48:36 LBF AMW057/60 AMW 0.730 0.020 0.71 19:48:35 -1 19,000 0 250 0
F2 UAL320 8737“ 30
2-3 18:34:54 18:38:34 03:40 18:56:00 0.722 18:56:05 5
4-5 19:41:49 04:11 19:46:00 19:41:49 19:37:46 19:48:36 10:50 19:46:00 0.664 0.004 0.66 19:46:02 2 19,000 0 250 0
i
F3 AA456 B752rl 50
2-3 19:02:40 19:06:50 19:10:09 07:29 19:06:54 0.756 19:06:57 3
m 4-5 19:45:29 04:55 19:50:24 19:45:29 04:31 19:50:00 19:45:17 19:50:00 19:53:37 08:20 19:50:24 LBF AMW059/59 AMW 0.756 0.016 0.74 19:50:27 3 19,000 0 250 0
U
F4 UA1946 B752rl 50
2-3 18:54:47 18:56:00 18:58:40 03:53 18:56:00 0.740 18:56:02 2
o
4-5 19:37:36 05:00 19:42:36 19:37:36 04:00 19:41:36 19:33:43 19:41:36 19:41:47 08:04 19:41:36 0.700 0.010 0.69 19:41:32 4 19,011 11 250 0
A
F5 AAL789 B7528l 50
2-3 NA 19:07:54 NA NA 19:08:00 0.786 19:08:09 9
4-5 19:49:03 04:27 19:53:30 19:49:03 02:09 19:51:12 NA 19:51:12 NA NA 19:53:30 LBF AMW038/65 AMW 0.752 0.012 0.74 19:53:41 11 19,024 24 238 12
F6 UAL279 B752a 50
2-3








NA 19:44:12 0.740 0.000 0.74 19:44:11 -1 19,023 23 243 7
No RTA; FMC Unstable
F1 SWA255 B737“ 30
2-3 20:49:06 20:50:00 20:53:36 04:30 20:52:36 0.761 20:52:36 0
4-5 21:22:52 04:08 21:27:00 21:22:52 21:24:10 21:28:46 04:36 21:27:00 LBF AMW034/69 AMW 0.733 0.023 0.71 21:27:06 6 19,000 0 250 0
F2 UAL350 8737“ 30
2-3 20:25:31 20:27:12 20:28:14 02:43 20:44:00 0.684 20:44:00 0
fr 4-5 21:18:34 05:14 21:23:48 21:18:34 21:19:39 21:26:30 06:51 21:23:48 YANKI SNY095/63 SNY 0.686 0.036 0.65 21:23:56 8 19,000 0 250 0P
F3 AAL923 B752RL 50
2-3 20:52:27 20:55:12 02:45 FMS Emulation FAILED
o 4-5 21:26:30 03:36 21:30:06 21:26:30 21:26:24 21:30:55 04:31 21:30:06 LBF AMW050-58 AMW 0.718 0.008 0.71 21:30:14 8 19,000 0 250 0
ce
F4 AAL431 B752rl 50
2-3 20:43:19 20:44:00 20:45:17 01:58 20:44:00 0.840 20:43:58 -2
4-5 21:19:00 03:06 21:22:06 21:19:00 03:13 21:22:13 21:17:26 21:22:13 21:22:54 05:28 21:22:12 LBF AMW028/73 AMW 0.711 0.031 0.68 21:22:20 8 19,014 14 249 1
c*>
F5 AAL256 B752a 50
2-3 NA 20:52:48 NA NA 20:55:12 0.680 20:55:23 11
4-5 21:27:54 03:48 21:31:42 21:27:54 02:12 21:30:06 NA 21:30:06 NA NA 21:31:42 LBF AMW032/70 AMW 0.734 0.006 0.74 21:32:04 22 19,011 11 256 6
F6 AAL764 B752a 50
2-3
4-5 21:21:52 03:32 21:25:24 21:21:52
NA 20:48:36 NA NA
FMS Emulation FAILED
F1 SWA325 B737“ 30
2-3 14:16:36 14:18:30 14:21:06 04:30 14:18:18 0.755 14:18:25 7
4-5 15:01:27 04:09 15:05:36 15:01:27 15:00:42 15:07:38 06:56 15:05:36 LBF AMW038/65 AMY 0.737 0.027 0.71 15:05:30 -6 19,000 0 250 0
F2 UAL320 8737“ 30
2-3 14:03:37 14:06:57 14:07:14 03:37 14:07:00 0.659 14:07:05 5
y 4-5 14:58:06 04:00 15:02:06 14:58:06 14:50:51 15:05:29 14:38 15:02:06 YANKI SNY098/65 SNY 0.670 0.020 0.65 15:02:10 4 19,000 0 250 0
*
F3 AA456 B752RL 50
2-3 14:19:10 14:22:36 14:26:14 07:04 14:22:36 0.766 14:22:54 18
00 4-5 15:01:36 05:48 15:07:24 15:01:36 05:28 15:07:04 15:02:54 15:07:04 15:10:19 07:25 15:07:24 LBF AMW044/61 AMW 0.757 0.017 0.74 15:07:27 3 19,000 0 248 2
00
F4 UAL946 RL50 2-3 14:04:00 14:05:06 14:06:00 02:00 14:05:00 0.778 14:05:04 4a B752
4-5 14:44:39 02:45 14:47:24 14:44:39 00:38 14:45:17 FMS Emulation FAILED
n
F5 AAL789 B752a 50
2-3 NA 14:24:12 NA NA 14:24:36 0.778 14:24:46 10
4-5 15:06:52 02:20 15:09:12 15:06:52 FMS Emulation FAILED
F6 UAL279 B752a 50
2-3
















1 19,030 30 254 4
163
Run Fit ACID Type Cl
S
0>
TM A Analysis TMA .  FMS 
At
FMS Analysis RTA Assignment RTA „  EDA 
AM
Cross Fix - 
Time
Cross Fix - 
Altitude
Cross Fix - 
Speed Notes
J*
ETA At STA ETA ETA First ETA Last Window Time Pad Spd Spd Time At Alt AAlt Speed ASpd
F1 SWA255 B737<* 30
2-3 16:06:40 16:08:07 16:09:44 03:04 16:08:12 0.752 16:08:25 13
4-5 16:40:32 04:28 16:45:00 16:40:32 16:41:45 16:46:41 04:56 16:45:00 LBF AMW039/69 AMY 0.733 0.023 0.71 16:45:12 12 19,000 0 250 0
F2 UAL350 6737* 30
2-3 15:59:49 16:00:58 16:02:34 02:45 16:01:00 0.745 16:01:00 0
F 4-5 16:35:57 04:33 16:40:30 16:35:57 16:35:55 16:43:36 07:41 16:40:30 YANKI SNY093/62 SNY 0.681 0.031 0.65 16:40:47 17 19,000 0 250 0
£
F3 AAL923 R l 50
2-3 16:07:52 16:09:50 16:10:50 02:58 16:10:00 0.706 16:10:05 5
o B752 4-5 16:41:57 05:03 16:47:00 16:41:57 04:47 16:46:44 16:43:31 16:46:44 16:48:54 05:23 16:47:06 LBF AMW029/72 AMW 0.752 0.012 0.74 16:47:13 7 19,012 12 249 1
y
F4 AAL431 B752Rl 50
2-3 16:00:19 16:01:00 16:02:17 01:58 16:01:00 0.840 16:01:20 20 FMC Unstable in CLB
o
4-5 16:31:16 03:32 16:34:48 16:31:16 03:33 16:34:49 16:32:00 16:34:49 16:36:00 04:00 16:34:48 0.722 0.022 0.70 16:34:54 6 19,015 15 255 5
A
F5 AAL256 B752bl 50
2-3 NA 16:11:00 NA NA 16:14:54 0.671 16:15:06 12
4-5 16:47:20 04:28 16:51:48 16:47:20 02:32 16:49:52 NA 16:49:52 NA NA 16:51:48 LBF AMW030/70 AMW 0.730 0.010 0.74 16:52:08 20 19,020 20 257 7
F6 AAL764 B752a 50
2-3
















11 19,010 10 261 11
F1 SWA255 B737GE 30
3-4
5-6 19:15:11 05:25 19:20:36 19:15:11
18:32:18




2 19,000 0 250 0
F
F2 UAL350 8737“ 30
3-4
5-6 19:06:50 04:34 19:11:24 19:06:50 19:03:15 19:13:00 09:45
18:23:00




17 19,000 0 250 0
£
o F3 AAL923 B752Rl 50
3 4
5-6 19:14:13 04:47 19:19:00 19:14:13 57:45 16:16:28











-10 19,025 25 269 19
y
3 F4 AAL431 B752rl 50 3 4
5-6 19:02:42 04:42 19:07:24 19:02:42 04:31 19:07:13











-2 19,001 1 283 33
C O
F5 AAL256 B752a 50
3 4
















22 19,014 14 252 2
F6 AAL764 B752bl 50
3 4
















17 19,001 1 249 1
F1 SWA325 B737“ 30
3 4








-1 19,020 20 250 0
F
F2 UAL320 B737® 30
3 4
5-6 20:48:52 03:38 20:52:30 20:48:52 20:45:00 20:56:00 11:00
20:15:00




9 19,020 20 250 0
£
F3 AA456 B752RL 50
3-4 20:22:40 20:26:20 20:26:46 04:06 20:26:36 0.714 20:26:36 0
DO 5-6 20:59:11 05:31 21:04:42 20:59:11 05:13 21:04:24 21:01:42 21:04:24 21:06:47 05:05 21:04:42 LBF AMW024/76 AMW 0.749 0.009 0.74 21:04:46 4 19,000 0 250 0
£
F4 UAL946 50
3 4 20:19:17 20:19:56 20:21:21 02:04 20:20:00 0.782 20:20:24 24 MEM ON fix NOT loaded
o B752
5-6 20:54:08 03:22 20:57:30 20:54:08 02:43 20:56:51 20:53:23 20:56:51 20:58:10 04:47 20:57:30 LBF AMW015/45 AMW 0.713 0.033 0.68 20:57:38 8 19,018 18 248 2
F5 AAL789 B752bl 50
3 4
5-6 21:02:01 05:29 21:07:30 21:02:01
NA 20:26:24 NA NA 20:30:00 0.680 20:29:56 -4
FMS Emulation FAILED
F6 UA1279 B75261 50
3-4




















Engineering Management and Systems Engineering 
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Senior Safety and Systems Engineer 
Systems Enginuity & BAE Systems






Ph.D., Engineering Management and Systems Engineering August 2012
University of Virginia 
M.E., Systems Engineering May 2012
Stanford University
Graduate Certificate, Management Science and Engineering March 2011
United States Air Force Academy 
B.S., Engineering May 1989
RECENT PUBLICATIONS
Bell, A., Gheorghe, Performance Metrics and Collision Risk Models for Time-Based Air 
Traffic Management, Virginia Space Grant Consortium Conference Proceedings, Hampton 
University, Hampton, VA, April 11,2014.
Bell, A., Gheorghe, A., Hester, P., Avionics Certification for Trajectory Based Operations, 
ICMIE Conference Proceedings, Politehnica University, Bucharest, Romania, October 31, 
2013.
Bell, A., Implementation o f Standards for Time-Based Air Traffic Management, ICNS 
Conference Proceedings, Herndon, VA, IEEE, April 23-25, 2013.
Bell, A., Unal, R., Application o f  Taguchi Methods to NextGen Integrated Safety Risk 
Management, ICNS Conference Proceedings, Herndon, VA, IEEE, April 23-25, 2013.
